终极控制人、盈余管理方式与IPO业绩变化——来自不同市场板块的证据

发布时间：2018-06-11 22:12

本文选题：剩余收益 + 随机前沿模型　；参考：《财会月刊》2014年20期

【摘要】：本文首先运用应计盈余管理模型和真实盈余管理模型检验我国证券市场IPO前后盈余操纵动机的强度,并细分至终极控制人性质和资本市场两个层次,以观察盈余管理方式选择上所存在的差异,然后进一步分析了两种盈余管理方式对IPO后长期经营业绩的影响程度。实证结果表明:上市公司上市前后三年内每年均进行应计盈余管理,而每间隔一年会进行真实盈余管理;盈余管理程度和选择实施真实盈余管理意愿的强度均遵循"主板中小板创业板"的规律,且国有上市公司更倾向于采用真实盈余管理方式;在公司治理因素中,董事会持股比例和管理层持股比例是盈余管理程度和方式选择的两大重要参考因素。此外,与应计盈余管理相比,真实盈余管理对IPO后长期经营业绩的负面影响更大。
[Abstract]:This paper first uses the accrual earnings management model and the real earnings management model to test the intensity of earnings manipulation motivation before and after IPOs in China's stock market, and divides it into two levels: the nature of ultimate controller and the capital market. By observing the differences in the choice of earnings management methods, this paper further analyzes the impact of two earnings management methods on the long-term operating performance after IPO. The empirical results show that the listed company carries on the accrual earnings management every three years before and after listing, and carries on the real earnings management every one annual interval; The degree of earnings management and the intensity of choosing to implement real earnings management follow the law of "main board small and medium-sized board gem", and state-owned listed companies tend to adopt real earnings management mode. The proportion of board holding and the proportion of management holding are two important reference factors for the choice of earnings management degree and mode. In addition, compared with accrual earnings management, real earnings management has more negative impact on long-term operating performance after IPO.
【作者单位】：北京大学光华管理学院;
【分类号】：F832.51;F275

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