公司治理中机构投资者作用的法律思考

发布时间：2018-06-18 09:59

本文选题：机构投资者 + 股东积极主义　；参考：《郑州轻工业学院学报(社会科学版)》2015年06期

【摘要】：机构投资者的兴起深刻改变了公司治理的规则和证券市场的制度环境。传统的公司治理难题是如何降低代理成本,以往的解决方式强调内部监督与外部监督的并行,而机构投资者的出现成为降低代理成本、监督管理层的新希望。机构投资者的行为特征使其拥有得天独厚的监督优势。相应的制度设计应该发挥机构投资者的监督作用,破除限制其行动的法律障碍,促使其积极行使股东权利:在机构投资者的治理结构中,应赋予受托人以行使股东权利为内容的忠实和勤勉义务,同时,建立一套合理的成本分担机制,建立完善的委托书征集与股东提案制度,以拓宽机构投资者行使股东权利的途径。
[Abstract]:The rise of institutional investors has profoundly changed the rules of corporate governance and the institutional environment of the securities market. The traditional corporate governance problem is how to reduce agency costs. The previous solutions emphasize the parallel between internal and external supervision, while the emergence of institutional investors has become a new hope to reduce agency costs and supervise management. Institutional investors have a unique supervisory advantage because of their behavioral characteristics. The corresponding institutional design should play a supervisory role of institutional investors, break down the legal barriers restricting their actions, and urge them to exercise their shareholder rights actively: in the governance structure of institutional investors, At the same time, we should establish a set of reasonable cost sharing mechanism, establish a perfect system of soliciting letters of attorney and shareholders' proposal system. In order to broaden institutional investors to exercise shareholder rights.
【作者单位】：武汉大学法学院;
【分类号】：D922.287

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