机构投资者持股对创业板上市公司盈余管理的影响

发布时间：2018-07-05 13:27

本文选题：机构投资者 + 创业板　；参考：《江西财经大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：盈余管理由于其对资本市场和投资者利益日益彰显的影响，已经成为会计研究的一个重要领域。会计信息应该客观、公允地反映企业的经营状况、经营成果和现金流量，引导投资者和相关部门做出正确的决策，实现社会资源的有效配置，但是上市公司的盈余管理严重影响了会计信息的上述目的，严重影响了上市公司对外财务报告的质量，使得财务报告不真实、不客观，从而影响相关财务报告使用者做出正确的决策，严重损害了外部财务报告使用者的利益。 2009年9月，我国正式开设创业板，上市公司首次在深圳进行IPO的启动。创业板开设的目的主要是为解决我国中小企业，特别是科技型中小企业的融资问题提供一个平台，创业板的开设，不仅有助于我国多层次资本市场的发展，而且可以为解决我国高新中小企业的融资发挥重要作用，推动我国高新中小企业的发展。创业板市场的上市标准与证券交易所主板市场相比较低，这就决定了创业板市场面临着比主板市场更高的风险。与主板市场相比，创业板市场上市公司规模偏小、双职合一问题比较严重，容易出现内部人控制，因此公司治理结构还不完善，盈余管理动机可能比主板上市公司更强烈。我们知道，通过变更会计政策和会计估计、利用非经常损益、利用关联方交易等，这些都是上市公司进行盈余管理经常使用的手段，以达到调增或递延利润的目的。实际中，由于创业板上市公司与主板上市公司特征有所不同，创业板的上市公司多为新兴的高科技公司，其所持有的无形资产比重大，知识产权风险比较高，在无形资产方面很容易发生盈余管理，因为其进行盈余管理的成本比较低，在无形资产方面很容易形成价值“黑洞”。研究创业板上市公司的盈余管理行为，揭示创业板上市公司的投资风险，为指导投资者更好地从已披露公司财务会计报告中获取对自己有用的信息从而做出正确的决策，具有重要意义。与此同时，我国证券市场中的机构投资者也不断发展，逐步壮大，其在资本市场上的作用也越来越大。拥有强大的资金实力，先进的管理技术，专业的资金投资技术，这是机构投资者拥有而一般投资者无法与之比拟的优势。与一般投资者相比，机构投资者其投资管理专业化、投资结构组合化，投资行为规范化。机构投资者利用其专业投资技术和信息优势，选择真正有投资价值的股票，并中长期持有，不仅能够抑制市场短期波动幅度过大，而且能够导入理性、成熟的投资理念，引导广大中小投资者理性投资、鼓励投资、遏制投机，促进证券市场规范、稳健、高效地运作。机构投资者不仅能在稳定市场方面发挥作用，而且在丰富市场金融品种方面也能起到重要作用。可以说，中国资本市场发展的过程本身也是机构投资者不断成长的过程。随着我国经济的发展，机构投资者也不断发展壮大。2012年，在创业板市场上，在诸多机构投资者当中，证券投资基金成为最具有实力的机构投资者，其不仅持股量大，持股比例大，而且获取的收益也比较可观。而全国社保基金与券商作为代表新生力量也加快了发展的脚步，持股比例不断加大，持股范围也不断扩大；相比，保险公司发展相对缓慢，其在创业板上市公司的持股比例比较小；同时合格境外机构投资者（QFII）也发展很快，但是其在创业板上市公司的持股还不普遍，并且持股比例相对小。本文在介绍机构投资者、创业板上市公司及创业板上盈余管理有关理论的基础上，，阐述了我国创业板上市公司特征及盈余管理的情况，然后根据我国机构投资者的自身特点以及其在我国创业板上持股的情况，运用横截面修正琼斯模型，以我国深圳创业板上市公司为样本，构建回归分析模型，进行回归分析，研究机构投资者整体持股对创业板上市公司盈余管理的影响，以及证券投资基金、券商持股对创业板上市公司盈余管理的影响。结果发现：（1）机构投资者整体持股对上市公司盈余管理的行为起到抑制作用，说明其在参与公司治理的过程中一定程度上发挥了其积极作用。（2）不同类型机构投资者的治理作用不同，抑制盈余管理的程度不同，证券投资基金、券商基金的治理作用比较明显，证券投资基金、券商持股有助于抑制创业板上市公司的盈余管理行为。总之，机构投资者在参与上市公司治理的过程中是进行了主动式监督的，但监督的力度和效果还不够，还需进一步加强。最后，结合本文研究结论，对减少盈余管理给出建议。针对创业板上市公司，对以后如何使机构投资者能有效抑制公司盈余管理、在公司治理中发挥积极作用提出建议。
[Abstract]:Because of its increasing influence on the capital market and the interests of investors, earnings management has become an important field in the research of accounting. The accounting information should objectively and objectively reflect the business situation, management results and cash flow, guide investors and related departments to make correct decisions and realize the effective allocation of social resources. However, the earnings management of listed companies seriously affects the above purpose of accounting information, which seriously affects the quality of the listed companies' external financial reports, making the financial reports untrue and objective, thus affecting the relevant financial reporting users to make correct decisions and seriously damage the interests of the external financial reporting users.
In September 2009, China officially opened the gem, and the listed company started IPO for the first time in Shenzhen. The purpose of the opening of the gem is to provide a platform for solving the financing problems of small and medium sized enterprises in China, especially the small and medium sized enterprises in science and technology. The opening of the gem is not only helpful to the development of the multi-level capital market in China, but also for the development of the multilevel capital market in China. The financing of high and new and small and medium enterprises in China plays an important role in promoting the development of China's high and new and small and medium enterprises. The listing standards of the GEM market are relatively low with the main board market of the stock exchange, which determines that the gem is facing a higher risk than the main board market.
Compared with the main board market, the size of the listed companies in the GEM market is small, the problem of double duty is more serious and the insider control is easy to appear. Therefore, the corporate governance structure is not perfect, and the motivation of earnings management may be stronger than that of the main board listed company. In fact, because of the different characteristics of the GEM listed companies and the main board listed companies, the listed companies of the gem are mostly new high-tech companies, and the intangible assets they hold are more important than the knowledge production. The right risk is relatively high. It is easy to manage the surplus in the intangible assets, because the cost of earnings management is relatively low, and it is easy to form a "black hole" in the intangible assets. It studies the earnings management behavior of the GEM listed companies and reveals the investment risk of the gem listed companies. It is of great significance to obtain useful information from the company's financial accounting reports and make the right decisions.
At the same time, the institutional investors in China's securities market have also been developing, gradually growing, and their role in the capital market is becoming more and more important. With strong capital strength, advanced management technology and professional capital investment technology, this is the advantage that institutional investors have and ordinary investors can't compare with. Institutional investors are specialized in investment management, combination of investment structure, and standardization of investment behavior. Institutional investors use their professional investment technology and information advantages to choose shares of real investment value and hold in the medium and long term. It can not only inhibit the large market volatility, but also lead to rational and mature investment ideas. To guide the rational investment of small and medium-sized investors, encourage investment, curb speculation, promote the standard, sound and efficient operation of the securities market. Institutional investors can not only play a role in stabilizing the market, but also play an important role in enriching market financial varieties.
It can be said that the process of the development of China's capital market is also the process of the continuous growth of institutional investors. With the development of China's economy, institutional investors have also developed and expanded for.2012 years. In the GEM market, among the many institutional investors, the securities investment fund has become the most powerful institutional investor. The share ratio is large, and the income is also considerable. And the national social security fund and the brokerage firm as the representative of the new forces also accelerate the pace of development, the proportion of shareholding is increasing, the scope of ownership is also expanding; compared to the relatively slow development of the insurance company, the share ratio in the GEM listed companies is relatively small; at the same time, the qualification of the company is qualified. Foreign institutional investors (QFII) have also developed rapidly, but their shareholding on GEM companies is not widespread and their shareholding ratio is relatively small.
On the basis of introducing the theories of institutional investors, GEM listed companies and the earnings management on the gem, this paper expounds the characteristics of Chinese GEM listed companies and the situation of earnings management. Then, according to the characteristics of institutional investors in China and their shareholding in China's gem, the cross section is used to modify the Jones model. Taking the Shenzhen GEM listed company in China as the sample, the regression analysis model is constructed and the regression analysis is made to study the influence of the overall shareholding of institutional investors on the earnings management of the GEM listed companies, and the effect of the securities investment fund and the stock holding stock on the earnings management of the GEM listed companies. The results are as follows:
(1) the overall shareholding of institutional investors inhibits the behavior of earnings management of the listed companies, indicating that it plays a positive role in the process of participating in corporate governance.
(2) different types of institutional investors have different governance roles, and the degree of restraining earnings management is different. Securities investment funds and securities firms are more effective in governance. Securities investment funds and securities firms' shareholding can help to restrain earnings management behavior of GEM listed companies.
In a word, institutional investors have been supervised actively in the process of participating in the governance of the listed companies, but the strength and effect of supervision are not enough and need to be further strengthened. Finally, some suggestions are given to reduce earnings management by combining the conclusions of this paper. Earnings management plays a positive role in corporate governance.
【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

【参考文献】