借款人在P2P小额贷款市场中的信用行为——基于博弈论的分析

发布时间：2018-08-09 15:47

【摘要】：P2P小额贷款市场在我国野蛮生长,存在着较严重的信用风险问题。本文构建P2P小额贷款市场借贷双方的静态和动态博弈模型,分析借款人的信用行为以及违约的约束条件。结果表明:在静态博弈中,较高的违约成本是借款人信守承诺的必要条件,并且借贷双方的"廉价磋商"大大增加了博弈达到帕累托最优均衡的可能性;在动态博弈中,较高的违约成本是借款人守信的充分条件;借款人的信用行为还与博弈次数有关,在无限次重复博弈中,无论违约成本高低,坚持守信都是借款人最好的选择。因此,增加借款人违约成本、借贷双方及P2P平台在借贷前开展"廉价磋商"以及投资人采取"冷酷策略"将是降低P2P小额贷款市场中借款人违约风险的有效方法。
[Abstract]:P2P microfinance market is growing savagely in our country, and there are serious credit risk problems. In this paper, the static and dynamic game models of both lenders and borrowers in P2P microfinance market are constructed, and the credit behavior of borrowers and the constraint conditions of default are analyzed. The results show that the higher default cost is the necessary condition for the borrower to keep his promise in static game, and the "cheap negotiation" between the two parties greatly increases the probability of reaching Pareto optimal equilibrium in the dynamic game. The higher cost of breach of contract is the sufficient condition for the borrower to keep his word, and the borrower's credit behavior is related to the number of games. In the infinite repeated game, it is the best choice for the borrower to keep his promise, regardless of the cost of breach of contract. Therefore, increasing the cost of borrowers' default, conducting "cheap negotiation" between borrowers and P2P platforms before borrowing and adopting "cold strategy" by investors will be an effective way to reduce the risk of borrowers' default in the P2P microfinance market.
【作者单位】：南昌大学管理学院;上饶银行股份有限公司;
【基金】：江西省“十二五”重点学科“管理科学与工程”资助
【分类号】：F832.4;F724.6;F224.32

【参考文献】