风险管理视角下的房地产市场监管机制困境及其路径选择
发布时间:2018-08-13 15:21
【摘要】:房地产监管产生的直接基础是市场失灵,,随着自由市场经济的发展,市场出现了自然垄断、人为垄断、外部效应、信息不对称等失灵的状况,证明市场这只看不见得手并不是万能的,需要政府作为公共利益的代表,纠正市场失灵。加强房地产市场监管对解决房地产市场信息不对称和负外部性问题,打破房地产市场垄断,实现房地产调控政策预期效果,维护社会公平,弥补法律不完备性具有重要的理论和现实意义。 本文在对房地产监管理论和风险管理理论综述的基础上,从风险管理的视角对房地产监管问题进行研究。首先,对我国房地产监管机制进行概述,分析房地产市场监管的价值。采用相似度法对房地产市场监管的效果进行评估,选取若干有代表性的房地产监管效果评判指标为尺度,给定各指标的评价标准值,运用模糊综合评判原理,得出某一阶段的监管指标与标准的相似度,据以评判该阶段监管效果优劣。结果显示我国的房地产监管效果在整体上还非常差,房地产监管效果没有达到预期的目标,但是从趋势来看,呈现出逐年发展进步的趋向。其次,分析房地产监管中的主体、客体的行为特征以及主客体之间的博弈行为,基于博弈论的思想探讨我国房地产市场监管困境。最后,从加强房地产市场监管的风险管理机制建设,优化房地产监管政策与监管环境,推进房地产市场监管体制改革,构建房地产市场监管问责的基本制度,加强房地产监管信息平台建设,进行房地产市场监管的绩效评估等方面,提出了对策措施,并形成完善房地产市场监管的实施路线图。
[Abstract]:The direct foundation of real estate supervision is market failure. With the development of free market economy, there are natural monopoly, artificial monopoly, external effect, information asymmetry and so on. To prove that the market is invisible is not a panacea, it needs the government as the representative of the public interest to correct the market failure. Strengthening the supervision of the real estate market can solve the problem of information asymmetry and negative externality in the real estate market, break the monopoly of the real estate market, realize the expected effect of the real estate regulation and control policy, and safeguard social fairness. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to make up for the imperfections of the law. On the basis of summarizing the theories of real estate supervision and risk management, this paper studies the problem of real estate supervision from the perspective of risk management. First of all, the real estate supervision mechanism of our country is summarized, and the value of real estate market supervision is analyzed. This paper uses similarity method to evaluate the effect of real estate market supervision, selects some representative evaluation indexes of real estate supervision effect as the yardstick, gives the evaluation standard value of each index, and applies the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation principle. The similarity between the supervision index and the standard in a certain stage is obtained to judge the effect of supervision in that stage. The result shows that the effect of real estate supervision in our country is still very poor on the whole, the effect of real estate supervision has not reached the expected goal, but from the trend, it shows the trend of development and progress year by year. Secondly, it analyzes the behavior characteristics of the subject and object in the real estate supervision and the game behavior between the subject and the object, and discusses the dilemma of the supervision of the real estate market in our country based on the thought of game theory. Finally, from strengthening the risk management mechanism construction of the real estate market supervision, optimizing the real estate supervision policy and regulatory environment, promoting the real estate market supervision system reform, constructing the basic system of the real estate market supervision and accountability. Strengthening the construction of real estate supervision information platform and evaluating the performance of real estate market supervision, this paper puts forward some countermeasures, and forms a road map to perfect the real estate market supervision.
【学位授予单位】:武汉科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.23
本文编号:2181379
[Abstract]:The direct foundation of real estate supervision is market failure. With the development of free market economy, there are natural monopoly, artificial monopoly, external effect, information asymmetry and so on. To prove that the market is invisible is not a panacea, it needs the government as the representative of the public interest to correct the market failure. Strengthening the supervision of the real estate market can solve the problem of information asymmetry and negative externality in the real estate market, break the monopoly of the real estate market, realize the expected effect of the real estate regulation and control policy, and safeguard social fairness. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to make up for the imperfections of the law. On the basis of summarizing the theories of real estate supervision and risk management, this paper studies the problem of real estate supervision from the perspective of risk management. First of all, the real estate supervision mechanism of our country is summarized, and the value of real estate market supervision is analyzed. This paper uses similarity method to evaluate the effect of real estate market supervision, selects some representative evaluation indexes of real estate supervision effect as the yardstick, gives the evaluation standard value of each index, and applies the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation principle. The similarity between the supervision index and the standard in a certain stage is obtained to judge the effect of supervision in that stage. The result shows that the effect of real estate supervision in our country is still very poor on the whole, the effect of real estate supervision has not reached the expected goal, but from the trend, it shows the trend of development and progress year by year. Secondly, it analyzes the behavior characteristics of the subject and object in the real estate supervision and the game behavior between the subject and the object, and discusses the dilemma of the supervision of the real estate market in our country based on the thought of game theory. Finally, from strengthening the risk management mechanism construction of the real estate market supervision, optimizing the real estate supervision policy and regulatory environment, promoting the real estate market supervision system reform, constructing the basic system of the real estate market supervision and accountability. Strengthening the construction of real estate supervision information platform and evaluating the performance of real estate market supervision, this paper puts forward some countermeasures, and forms a road map to perfect the real estate market supervision.
【学位授予单位】:武汉科技大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F299.23
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