国有产权、掏空动机与公司表现——以金融危机为背景

发布时间：2018-08-22 10:42

【摘要】：以金融危机为背景,研究国有产权与上市公司表现的关系。结果表明,最终控制人为国有的上市公司在金融危机期间的表现更好,国有控股对股票价格收益有正向作用。同时,国有最终控制人仅在金融危机期间可以减小公司受到ST处理的概率。进一步研究发现非融资约束企业中,国有产权对公司股票收益率起正向作用,而在融资约束企业中国有、非国有企业没有明显差异,说明在金融危机中国有最终控制人对企业"帮助之手"更强,而"攫取之手"更弱,对企业的掏空动机更弱,从而使得国有企业表现相对更好。
[Abstract]:Taking the financial crisis as the background, this paper studies the relationship between state-owned property rights and the performance of listed companies. The results show that the final control of the artificial state-owned listed companies performed better during the financial crisis, and the state-owned holding has a positive effect on the stock price returns. At the same time, state-owned ultimate controllers can reduce the probability of St treatment only during the financial crisis. Further study shows that the state-owned property right plays a positive role in the stock yield of non-financing constrained enterprises, while in China, there is no obvious difference between the non-state-owned enterprises. It shows that in the financial crisis China has the ultimate controller to the enterprise "help hand" stronger, "grab the hand" weaker, to the enterprise's emptying motivation is weaker, thus causes the state-owned enterprise to perform relatively better.
【作者单位】：南开大学金融发展研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目“私募股权、发行上市和我国企业绩效研究”(项目编号71272179) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目“政府控股、外国投资和生产效率”(项目编号12YJA790124)的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：F832.5;F276.1

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