股权激励对企业绩效影响的理论研究
发布时间：2018-10-21 14:43
【摘要】：现代公司制企业制度下,两权分离导致股东和管理者之间的利益发生冲突,进而促使其产生了委托代理关系。为了在股东和管理者的利益之间寻求一个平衡点,使管理者在为自己的利益努力奋斗的同时更加关注公司的利益,从而解决委托代理问题,股权激励则应运而生。股权激励作为一种长期的激励机制,从本质上来说,是通过授予高管一定量的股份,使高管能够将自身的利益和全体股东的利益紧密地联系在一起,从而降低代理成本,促使企业价值达到最大化。本文分析了股权激励对企业绩效影响的相关基础理论,通过对国内外文献的梳理得出了股权激励对企业绩效影响的不同结论,为进一步实施实证研究奠定了基础。此研究结论为我国上市公司实施股权激励制度的研究与实施提供了经验数据和指引,也为相关部门推进和完善股权激励提供了有益参考。
[Abstract]:Under the modern corporation system, the separation of the two rights leads to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, which leads to the principal-agent relationship. In order to find a balance between the interests of shareholders and managers, so that managers pay more attention to the interests of the company while striving for their own interests, so as to solve the principal-agent problem, equity incentive came into being. Equity incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism, essentially, through granting a certain amount of shares to senior executives, so that executives can closely link their own interests and the interests of all shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs. To maximize the value of the enterprise. This paper analyzes the basic theory of the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance, and draws different conclusions on the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance by combing the literature at home and abroad, which lays a foundation for further empirical research. This conclusion provides empirical data and guidance for the research and implementation of equity incentive system for listed companies in China, and also provides a useful reference for relevant departments to promote and improve equity incentive.
【作者单位】： 东北师范大学;
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
[Abstract]:Under the modern corporation system, the separation of the two rights leads to the conflict of interests between shareholders and managers, which leads to the principal-agent relationship. In order to find a balance between the interests of shareholders and managers, so that managers pay more attention to the interests of the company while striving for their own interests, so as to solve the principal-agent problem, equity incentive came into being. Equity incentive as a long-term incentive mechanism, essentially, through granting a certain amount of shares to senior executives, so that executives can closely link their own interests and the interests of all shareholders, thereby reducing agency costs. To maximize the value of the enterprise. This paper analyzes the basic theory of the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance, and draws different conclusions on the impact of equity incentive on enterprise performance by combing the literature at home and abroad, which lays a foundation for further empirical research. This conclusion provides empirical data and guidance for the research and implementation of equity incentive system for listed companies in China, and also provides a useful reference for relevant departments to promote and improve equity incentive.
【作者单位】： 东北师范大学;
【分类号】：F275;F832.51
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