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基于信息不对称的中建银行深圳市分行信贷风险管理对策研究

发布时间:2018-12-26 09:26
【摘要】:商业银行是我国金融系统最主要的组成部分,商业银行的资金安全,关系社会民生,尤其信贷资产的质量,关系到国家整体经济运营是否健康、平稳、有序,在当前国内外经济形势复杂多变的环境下,如何防控商业银行的信用风险,提升商业银行的信用风险管理能力,是摆在商业银行面前的十分具有现实意义的课题也是急需解决的问题。从银行的不良授信案例来看,信用风险的形成都是人为有意或无意造成银企之间信息不对称,影响了银行对企业的经营情况,盈利能力,法律合规等情况做出正确的判断,从而造成信用风险的形成,而信息不对称的成因主要有两个方面:银行内部信息传递漏损,缺失,造成了信息不对称的结果:借款人对银行有选择的传递信息,,主观过滤负面信息。因此降低信用风险的关键是减小银行内部信息传递中的漏损,减低银行与借款人之间信息不对称。 本文主要结合笔者自身在银行授信发起、审批、贷后管理、不良清收等多个岗位的实践经验,从介绍银行信用风险的类型、信用风险的识别入手,分析了中建银行深圳分行的信贷投放现状、信用风险防控体系,并对现有信用风险防控体系进行了剖析,揭示了银行授信中存在的信息不对称问题,通过实际案例的调研和论证,思考当前银行在信贷审批、贷后管理中如何规避信息盲点,创新的提出在面对银行信用风险中存在的信息不对称问题中对于实际控制人、核心竞争力,经营情况、财务情况等方面入手,细化信息采集内容,强调彼此印证关系,力求得到相对完全的信息以对抗信息不对称造成不良影响,并提出从产品创新、体制创新、模式创新等多个方面,应用银团贷款等新兴金融产品,采取派驻式客户经理制度、搭建防控体系等具体措施消除信息不对称问题,以点带面强化研究成果的转化和应用。希望有助于银行加强授信的风险管理能力,推动银行信贷的安全、稳定及和谐发展。
[Abstract]:Commercial banks are the most important part of our financial system. The capital safety of commercial banks is related to the people's livelihood of the society, especially the quality of credit assets, and is related to the health, stability and order of the overall economic operation of the country. How to prevent and control the credit risk of commercial banks and improve their ability of credit risk management under the complicated and changeable economic situation at home and abroad, In front of commercial banks is a very practical issue is also urgent to solve the problem. Judging from the bad credit cases of banks, the formation of credit risks is artificially or unintentionally resulting in asymmetric information between banks and enterprises, which affects the banks' correct judgment on the operation, profitability, legal compliance and other situations of the enterprises. Therefore, the formation of credit risk, and the causes of information asymmetry mainly have two aspects: leakage and loss of information transmission within banks, resulting in the result of information asymmetry: the borrower has the choice to transmit information to the bank. Subjective filtering of negative information. Therefore, the key to reduce the credit risk is to reduce the leakage in the internal information transmission of the bank and to reduce the information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower. This paper mainly combines the author's practical experience in many posts such as bank credit initiation, examination and approval, post-loan management, bad collection and so on, starting with the introduction of the types of bank credit risk and the identification of credit risk. This paper analyzes the present situation of credit supply and credit risk prevention and control system of China Construction Bank Shenzhen Branch, and analyzes the existing credit risk prevention and control system, which reveals the information asymmetry in the credit granting of the bank. Through the investigation and argumentation of actual cases, this paper thinks about how to avoid the blind spot of information in the current bank's credit examination and approval and post-loan management, and puts forward innovatively the problem of information asymmetry in the face of the bank's credit risk. Starting with the core competitiveness, business situation, financial situation and so on, we should refine the content of information collection, emphasize the relationship between each other, strive to obtain relatively complete information to counter the adverse effects of information asymmetry, and put forward the idea of product innovation. System innovation, model innovation, and so on, applying new financial products such as syndicated loans, adopting the system of stationed account manager, setting up a system of prevention and control, and so on, to eliminate the problem of information asymmetry. To strengthen the transformation and application of research results. Hope to help banks strengthen the risk management ability of credit, promote the security, stability and harmonious development of bank credit.
【学位授予单位】:天津大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F832.4

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