PPP模式下的保障房建设公私合作机制演化博弈分析
发布时间：2019-01-09 09:22
【摘要】：从群体博弈和适应角度,运用演化博弈方法深入研究了PPP模式下的公私双方在保障房建设中的合作机制。以地方政府和私人投资者只具有有限理性为前提,建立了PPP模式下保障房建设公私双方合作的演化博弈模型,并利用复制动态进化机理分析了保障房建设中公私双方合作中的群体博弈局势的变化形态。研究得出,保证常规监督—激励机制的激励约束效果是PPP模式下保障房项目公私双方良性合作机制建立的基础和先决条件;如果常规监督—激励机制效能不足,需要额外检查来补充;当常规和非常规约束机制都失效时,双方的合作必然滑向次劣或最劣均衡导致项目双方及项目本身利益受损,并据此提出了公私双方在保障房PPP项目中达成稳定合作的对策建议。
[Abstract]:From the angle of group game and adaptation, this paper studies the cooperation mechanism of public and private parties in indemnificatory apartment construction under PPP mode by using evolutionary game method. Based on the premise that local governments and private investors have only limited rationality, an evolutionary game model of indemnificatory apartment's construction of public-private cooperation under PPP mode is established. The dynamic evolution mechanism of replication is used to analyze the changing form of group game situation in the construction of indemnificatory apartment. It is concluded that it is the foundation and prerequisite for the establishment of benign cooperation mechanism between public and private parties of indemnificatory apartment project under PPP mode to ensure the effect of incentive and restraint of conventional supervisory and incentive mechanism. If the conventional supervisory-incentive mechanism is not effective enough, additional checks are needed to supplement it; When both conventional and unconventional constraint mechanisms fail, the cooperation between the two sides will inevitably slip to the inferior or the worst equilibrium, which will damage the interests of both sides of the project and the project itself. Based on this, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for the stable cooperation between public and private parties in indemnificatory apartment PPP project.
【作者单位】： 河海大学商学院;金陵科技学院土木工程学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZD108)
【分类号】：F299.23;F224.32
[Abstract]:From the angle of group game and adaptation, this paper studies the cooperation mechanism of public and private parties in indemnificatory apartment construction under PPP mode by using evolutionary game method. Based on the premise that local governments and private investors have only limited rationality, an evolutionary game model of indemnificatory apartment's construction of public-private cooperation under PPP mode is established. The dynamic evolution mechanism of replication is used to analyze the changing form of group game situation in the construction of indemnificatory apartment. It is concluded that it is the foundation and prerequisite for the establishment of benign cooperation mechanism between public and private parties of indemnificatory apartment project under PPP mode to ensure the effect of incentive and restraint of conventional supervisory and incentive mechanism. If the conventional supervisory-incentive mechanism is not effective enough, additional checks are needed to supplement it; When both conventional and unconventional constraint mechanisms fail, the cooperation between the two sides will inevitably slip to the inferior or the worst equilibrium, which will damage the interests of both sides of the project and the project itself. Based on this, the author puts forward the countermeasures and suggestions for the stable cooperation between public and private parties in indemnificatory apartment PPP project.
【作者单位】： 河海大学商学院;金陵科技学院土木工程学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点项目(12AZD108)
【分类号】：F299.23;F224.32
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