公租房代建项目核心利益相关者行为研究

发布时间：2019-04-01 08:04

【摘要】：在我国存在着一群既不符合廉租房的保障标准，又无力购买商品房或经济适用房的“夹心层”，针对这类人群，政府提出建设公租房。公共租赁本身具有非常多的优势，如较低的租金、灵活的退出机制、广泛的覆盖范围等优势，这使得公租房在解决我国保障性住房结果结构化问题的有效措施。但是，目前已经建成的很多公租房却出现了“墙脆脆”、“楼歪歪”、“豆腐渣”“屋漏漏”等现象，主要原因是：由于项目一次性、不确定性等特点，参与项目的组织所属企业往往从项目中可以获得的短期利益出发考虑对项目进行管理；建设者往往不能以公民的利益出发对项目进行管理，监督力度不够等原因。最终形成了低投资效益以及高资源消耗的现状。本文针对该问题，从公租房代建项目的利益相关者的角度出发，首先识别出我国公租房代建项目中的主要利益相关者为政府、代建单位、承包商、咨询服务机构、金融机构、政府部门、使用人以及其他利益相关者。进而分析公租房代建项目中各个利益相关者的关系。之后，本文利用利益相关者理论中的米切尔评分方法，，找出公租房代建项目的核心利益相关者，即为政府、代建单位和承包商。在识别出公租房代建项目的核心利益相关者之后，对这些核心利益相关者的行为进行分析。在此基础上，利用演化博弈论，对公租房代建项目中核心利益相关者的行为关系进行演化博弈。在模拟演化博弈中，发现政府在与代建单位和承包商进行博弈的时候，主要的问题是代建单位是否努力积极工作，是否承包商合谋。而政府的行为选择中是否进行积极的监督激励措施公租房代建项目的顺利进行有非常重大的影响。因此要实现进公租房市场的稳定发展，必须积极采取监督激励机制，促进公租房代建市场的良性地发展。本文提出了公租房代建项目长期稳定发展的约束激励措施。即采取健全沟通机制、加强运行的法律环境、充分发挥行业协会和学会对承包商行为的约束以及充分发挥代建制的社会监督的越是机制；采取报酬激励机制、声誉刺激机制的激励机制。最后总结全文，并提出了本文在研究的深度和广度上的不足，是今后深入研究和探讨的方向。
[Abstract]:In our country, there exists a group of people who do not meet the guarantee standard of low-rent housing and cannot afford to buy commercial housing or comfortable housing's "sandwich layer". In view of this kind of people, the government proposes to build public rental housing. Public lease itself has many advantages, such as low rent, flexible exit mechanism, wide coverage and other advantages, which makes public rental housing in China to solve the structural problems of affordable housing effective measures. However, many public rental houses that have been built at present have appeared such phenomena as "brittle walls", "crooked buildings", "bean curd dregs" house leaks "and so on. The main reasons are: due to the characteristics of one-off and uncertainty of the project, The enterprises owned by the participating organizations often consider the management of the project from the short-term benefits that can be obtained in the project; Builders are often unable to manage projects in the interests of citizens, such as inadequate supervision. Finally, the present situation of low investment benefit and high resource consumption has been formed. In view of this problem, from the point of view of stakeholders of public rental housing construction projects, this paper firstly identifies the main stakeholders in the construction projects of public rental housing in our country as government, agent, contractor, consulting service institution, financial institution, and so on, and the main stakeholders in the project are government, agency, contractor, consulting service institution, financial institution, and so on. Government departments, users and other stakeholders. And then analyze the relationship between the stakeholders in the public rental housing construction project. Then, using the Mitchell scoring method in the stakeholder theory, this paper finds out the core stakeholders of the public rental housing agent project, that is, the government, the agent and the contractor. After identifying the core stakeholders of the public rental housing agent project, the behavior of these core stakeholders is analyzed. On this basis, the evolutionary game theory is used to carry on the evolutionary game to the behavior relation of the core stakeholders in the public rental housing construction project. In the simulation evolutionary game, it is found that when the government plays the game with the agent and contractor, the main problem is whether the agent works hard and whether the contractor is complicit. And the government's behavior choice whether carries on the positive supervision incentive measure the public rental housing agent construction project to carry on smoothly has the very important influence. Therefore, in order to realize the stable development of the public rental housing market, we must actively adopt the supervision and incentive mechanism to promote the benign development of the public rental housing market. This paper puts forward the restriction and incentive measures for the long-term stable development of the public rental housing construction project. That is, to adopt perfect communication mechanism, strengthen the legal environment of operation, give full play to the restraint of contractors' behavior by trade associations and society, and give full play to the more mechanism of social supervision of agent system; Adopt reward incentive mechanism, reputation incentive mechanism of incentive mechanism. Finally, this paper summarizes the full text, and puts forward the deficiency in the depth and breadth of the research, which is the direction of in-depth research and discussion.
【学位授予单位】：吉林大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F299.23

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