风险投资参与主体间的演化博弈研究

发布时间：2019-04-13 20:27

【摘要】：本文是从博弈论的角度分别对风险投资中参与主体间的博弈关系进行了研究。在风险投资者和风险投资家之间的博弈模型中,首先从完全理性的角度讨论了存在两个纳什均衡的情况；其次,在有限理性的假设前提下,研究了超额利润、初始成本以及贴现因子对风险项目合作成功的可能性的影响,结果发现超额利润和贴现因子对系统向“合作”方向的演化是正的影响,而初始成本则是负的影响。在风险投资家和风险企业家之间的博弈模型中,分别讨论了存在一个纳什均衡和存在两个纳什均衡时参数的取值范围；在有限理性的条件下,研究了分成系数、监督成本以及收益对群体演化的影响。最后,对理论模型进行了参数赋值,给出了数值模拟,并和理论模型得到了较好的一致性结论。
[Abstract]:This paper studies the game relationship between participants in venture capital from the perspective of game theory. In the game model between venture capitalists and venture capitalists, we first discuss the existence of two Nash equilibrium from the point of view of complete rationality. Secondly, under the assumption of limited rationality, the effects of excess profit, initial cost and discount factor on the possibility of successful cooperation of venture projects are studied. It is found that the excess profit and discount factor have a positive effect on the evolution of the system towards "cooperation", while the initial cost is negative. In the game model between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs, the range of parameters is discussed when there is one Nash equilibrium and two Nash equilibria. Under the condition of finite rationality, the influence of partition coefficient, supervision cost and income on population evolution is studied. Finally, the parameters of the theoretical model are assigned, the numerical simulation is given, and a good agreement between the theoretical model and the theoretical model is obtained.
【学位授予单位】：西南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F224.32;F830.59

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