基于利益博弈视角下的农村土地流转问题研究

发布时间：2019-05-10 12:13

【摘要】：改革开放三十多年以来,农村家庭联产承包责任制对推动农村经济社会发展,提高农业现代化水平,巩固农业基础性地位,提高农民生活水平等方面发挥了巨大作用。随着生产力的发展和时代进步,传统家庭联产承包责任制的小农经营模式越来越不适应现代工业化和城镇化的发展需要。出于对农民生活水平的进一步提高,农业发展的进一步现代化,农村经济社会进一步发展的考虑,必须制定优化农村土地资源配置的相关土地制度和土地政策,如何制定和完善农村土地流转制度成为当务之急。任何一种制度安排都是现有条件下中央与地方及各利益相关方进行博弈的结果。在国家法律和地方规范不同的规则体系下,会形成不同的利益博弈格局。农村土地流转背后存在的利益差异,使得中央和地方通常会站在不同的社会政治、经济的考量下会做出不同的利益选择。作为农村土地流转的直接参与者,基层政府、土地流入方、土地流出方对农村土地使用权的流转基于利益诉求采取何种立场、各自会选择怎样的策略来推动或限制土地流转、在土地流转过程中究竟问题的症结何在、各利益相关方最终的博弈会导致何种结果,是当前农村土地流转问题研究中需要关注的问题。其中,完善农村土地流转制度的关键在于如何进行利益与价值权衡,从而使参与博弈的各主体利益最大化,即达到博弈的纳什均衡。基于此,本研究通过对农村土地流转各参与主体的收益、博弈的成因、博弈的结果分析,力图从中发现土地流转政策博弈过程中存在的问题,并提出完善土地流转制度、机制的政策建议。本文主要由7章组成。第一章：绪论。主要介绍论文的选题背景及研究的意义,分析了国内外对于土地流转问题的研究现状,概述了本论文的研究方法。第二章：研究土地流转主体利益博弈的理论基础。理论是研究的指南。本章主要介绍本论文在撰写过程中涉及到的理论依据,主要包括博弈论、社会资本理论、土地政策理论和制度变迁理论等。第三章：中央政府与地方政府的利益博弈分析。本章主要从宏观层面阐述了利益博弈的两大主体,中央政府与地方政府在利益博弈中的策略选择,以及博弈的最终结果。第四章：农村土地流转各参与主体间的博弈分析。本章主要从微观的视角去剖析农村土地流转利益主体之间的博弈,介绍了博弈的三大主体：基层政府、土地流入方、土地流出方,并明确了各主体的收益,通过建立博弈模型,推演出相关结论。第五章：土地流转过程中存在的问题。本章主要从中央政府、地方政府和土地流出方三方各自分析了土地流转过程中存在的问题。第六章：解决土地流转问题的对策。本章主要针对第五章的问题逐一进行了分析,提出了解决方案。第七章：总结部分。主要对全文的逻辑框架进行了一个小结,同时展望了未来还有待进一步研究和拓展的问题。
[Abstract]:Since the reform and opening-up for more than 30 years, the responsibility system for rural families has played an important role in promoting the economic and social development of the rural areas, improving the level of agricultural modernization, strengthening the basic status of agriculture and improving the living standards of the peasants. With the development of the productive forces and the progress of the times, the small-scale peasant operation model of the traditional household contract responsibility system is becoming more and more unsuitable for the development of the modern industrialization and the urbanization. In the light of the further improvement of the living standard of the peasants, the further modernization of the agricultural development and the further development of the rural economy and society, the relevant land system and land policy for optimizing the allocation of rural land must be formulated, It is urgent to develop and improve the rural land circulation system. Any one of the institutional arrangements is the knot of the game between the central and local and the stakeholders under the existing conditions Fruit. Under the different rules and regulations of national laws and local codes, different interests games can be formed. The interest difference behind the rural land circulation is that the center and the place usually stand in different social and political and economic considerations to make different interests. Alternative. As the direct participant of the rural land circulation, the grass-roots government, the land inflow party and the land outflow party take the position on the transfer of the rural land use right based on the interest demand, and the respective strategies will be chosen to push or restrict the land flow In the process of land circulation, what is the crux of the problem, what is the result of the final game of the stakeholders is the question that needs to be paid attention to in the current research of the rural land circulation The key to the improvement of the rural land circulation system is how to balance the interests and the value, so as to maximize the interests of the main subjects involved in the game, that is, the Nash of the game On the basis of this, this study tries to find out the problems existing in the process of land circulation policy game by analyzing the income, the cause of the game and the result of the game, and put forward the policy construction to improve the land circulation system and mechanism. The present paper is mainly composed of 7 chapter This paper mainly introduces the background and significance of the thesis, and analyses the present situation of the research on the land circulation problem both at home and abroad. The second chapter: to study the interests of the main body of the land flow The theoretical basis of game theory. This chapter mainly introduces the theoretical basis of the paper in the writing process, mainly including the game theory, the social capital theory, the land policy theory and the theory of land policy. The theory of institutional change, etc. Chapter 3: the central government and the local This chapter mainly expounds the two main subjects of the interest game from the macro level, and the strategic choice of the central government and the local government in the interest game. And the final result of the game. This chapter mainly analyzes the game between the main body of the rural land circulation from the micro view point of view, and introduces the three main subjects of the game: the grass-roots government, the land inflow party, the land outflow party, and the income of the main body, and through the establishment of the game The relevant conclusions are derived from the model and the relevant conclusions are derived. : The problems existing in the process of land circulation. This chapter is mainly analyzed from the three sides of the central government, the local government and the land outflow party. There are some problems in the process of land circulation. Chapter 6: Measures to solve the problem of land circulation. This chapter is mainly on the question of the fifth chapter. The analysis is carried out on a case-by-case basis. Chapter 7: A summary of the logical framework of the full text.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F321.1

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