两阶段双任务委托代理情形下煤矿安全管理激励机制

发布时间：2019-04-04 20:04

【摘要】：煤矿企业安全监管效能低下一直困扰煤炭行业的重大问题,监管效能低下的根本原因是煤矿企业的委托代理激励机制的失衡,进而导致在安全产出中搭便车行为大量存在.煤矿的委托代理问题是一个多阶段多任务的动态问题,因此构造了一个两阶段双任务的委托代理模型.在模型第二阶段中煤矿职工能够通过对第一阶段信息的学习了解自身努力与回报之间的映射,进而决定自己在两项任务的委托代理中努力程度的付出.通过模型的分析得到:煤炭生产任务的正向激励会对煤矿职工在安全产出方面的努力程度造成负面的影响,且煤矿职工在完成安全产出任务方面的能力越高,在此方面努力程度就下降的越慢,降低截断水平能够导致更多的职工在第二阶段的工作中提高努力水平,进而减少搭便车行为.
[Abstract]:The low safety supervision efficiency of coal mining enterprises has been plaguing the coal industry. The fundamental reason for the low supervision efficiency is the imbalance of the principal-agent incentive mechanism in coal mine enterprises, which leads to a large number of hitchhikers in the safety output. The principal-agent problem of coal mine is a multi-stage and multi-task dynamic problem, so a two-stage and two-task principal-agent model is constructed. In the second stage of the model, the coal mine workers can understand the mapping between their efforts and their returns by learning the information in the first stage, and then determine their efforts in the principal-agent effort of the two tasks. Through the analysis of the model, it is concluded that the positive incentive of the coal production task will have a negative impact on the effort of the coal mine workers in the safety output, and the higher the ability of the coal mine worker to accomplish the safety output task, the higher the ability of the coal mine worker to complete the safety output task. The slower the effort decreases in this respect, the lower the cut-off level will lead more workers to improve their efforts in the second stage of work, thereby reducing hitchhiking behavior.
【作者单位】：阜阳师范学院经济学院;中国矿业大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金(71173217,71303233) 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(11YJC630162) 江苏省青蓝工程(2012)江苏高校哲学社会科学优秀创新团队(能源资源管理创新团队)
【分类号】：TD7;F426.21

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