碳调度模式下火力发电商的碳减排投资策略分析

发布时间：2018-05-24 20:40

本文选题：期权博弈 + 碳减排投资　；参考：《中国管理科学》2017年11期

【摘要】：论文首先提出了基于发电成本最小的碳排放约束电力上网机制,在此基础上构建不对称的寡头发电商碳减排投资期权博弈模型,模型的数值分析结果表明:1)发电商碳减排投资以后的上网电价,对寡头发电商的投资行为有显著影响:即存在一个上网电价"阈值",当上网电价低于该阈值时,只有低排放发电商有碳减排投资动机;而当上网电价高于该阈值时,高排放发电商则会领先进行碳减排投资;只有当上网电价等于该阈值时,两发电商会同时进行碳减排投资;2)上述发电商碳减排投资以后上网电价阈值与碳排放标准等参数有关。
[Abstract]:Firstly, the paper proposes a carbon emission constrained power access mechanism based on the minimum generation cost, and then constructs an asymmetric carbon emission reduction investment option game model for oligarchs. The numerical analysis results of the model show that the electricity price after the carbon reduction investment of the generation company has a significant effect on the investment behavior of the oligopoly: that is, there exists a "threshold" of the electricity price, when the price is below the threshold, Only low-emission generators have incentive to invest in carbon emissions reduction; when the price of electricity on the Internet is above the threshold, high-emission generators will lead in carbon emission reduction investments; only when the price of electricity is equal to the threshold, Carbon emission reduction investment by the two power producers at the same time. (2) the electricity price threshold after carbon reduction investment is related to the carbon emission standard and other parameters.
【作者单位】：长沙理工大学经济与管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71671018,71271033)
【分类号】：F426.61;X322

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