政府与农户博弈视角下退耕还湿生态补偿研究——以黑龙江三江湿地自然保护区为例

发布时间：2018-01-09 22:16

本文关键词：政府与农户博弈视角下退耕还湿生态补偿研究——以黑龙江三江湿地自然保护区为例　出处：《求索》2016年08期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：以黑龙江三江湿地自然保护区退耕还湿生态补偿为例,运用成本-收益法计量农户和政府在退耕还湿中的收益,建立农户与政府的动态博弈模型。研究发现:只要补偿适度,政府对农户进行生态补偿对退耕还湿参与者和社会整体福利都有利;[退耕,补偿]的合作均衡无法自动实现,双方只进行一次或有限次博弈时,最后只能达到[不退耕,不补偿]的非合作均衡;双方进行无穷次博弈时,通过达成合作协议,且规定如果一方违约将受到惩罚,可实现[退耕,补偿]的合作均衡。
[Abstract]:Taking the compensation of returning farmland to wet ecology in Sanjiang Wetland Nature Reserve of Heilongjiang Province as an example, the cost-income method is used to measure the income of farmers and government in returning farmland to wet land. The dynamic game model between farmers and government is established. The results show that as long as the compensation is moderate, the ecological compensation of farmers by the government will benefit both the participants and the welfare of the society as a whole. [The balance of cooperation between the two sides can not be realized automatically. When the two sides only play one game or a limited game, they can only reach the. [The non-cooperative equilibrium of not returning farmland and not compensating]; when the two sides play an infinite game, they reach a cooperation agreement and stipulate that if one party breaks the contract, it will be punished, which can be achieved. [The balance of cooperation between farmland and compensation.
【作者单位】：仲恺农业工程学院;
【基金】：广东省软科学项目(2016A070705066)
【分类号】：F224.32;X36
【正文快照】： 1Simon Z.,David R.L.“Paying for Environmental Services:An Analysis of Participation in Costa Rica’s PSA Program”,World Development,vol.33,no.2,2005,pp.255-272.2Cowell R.“Environmental compensation and the mediation of environmental change:making capi

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