独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制研究

发布时间：2018-02-22 10:33

  本文关键词： 独裁 污染联控 机制设计　出处：《中国管理科学》2016年S1期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：污染联控问题的解决是区域间环境保护、经济发展的关键问题,本文从中央政府角度出发,设计了不完全信息下独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制。研究发现:若中央政府不监管,地方政府不能实现污染联控;独裁地方政府存在的必要条件是,独裁地方政府对社会福利的贡献程度大于其他地方政府对社会福利贡献程度的总和;非独裁和独裁地方政府污染联控机制都是占优策略可执行的,且独裁时的社会福利大于非独裁时的社会福利。建议中央政府在区域污染联控机制设计中,利用一些省市的区位优势,发挥具有独裁特性的地方政府在污染联控中的作用,实现区域社会福利最优。
[Abstract]:The solution to the problem of pollution control is the key problem of regional environmental protection and economic development. This paper starts from the perspective of the central government. This paper designs the pollution control mechanism of autocratic and non-autocratic local governments under incomplete information. The study finds that if the central government does not regulate, local governments cannot achieve pollution control; the necessary conditions for authoritarian local governments to exist are, The contribution of autocratic local government to social welfare is greater than the sum of other local governments' contribution to social welfare. Moreover, the social welfare in dictatorship is greater than that in non-autocracy. It is suggested that the central government should make use of the geographical advantages of some provinces and cities in the design of regional pollution control mechanisms, and give play to the role of local governments with dictatorial characteristics in the joint control of pollution. The regional social welfare should be optimized.
【作者单位】： 北方工业大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301002) 北方工业大学优势建设学科资助项目(XN0081)
【分类号】：X321
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本文编号：1524193