基于双主体博弈的地方政府任期对区域环境合作稳定性影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-24 01:06

本文选题：地方政府　切入点：任期　出处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2016年03期

【摘要】：区域内地方政府合作是解决跨界环境污染的重要途径,我国现行环境管理体制决定了任期长短对地方政府是否环境合作具有重要影响。基于博弈论分析方法,针对地方政府任期对区域环境合作的稳定性影响进行了理论分析。首先,分析了完全信息静态博弈时两个地方政府非合作与合作情形下的均衡污染排放量,构建基于无限次重复博弈模型并讨论两个地方政府采取冷酷战略时彼此合作的临界贴现因子。然后,基于有限次重复博弈模型讨论了临界贴现因子与任期长短的关系。研究发现,贴现因子高于临界水平是地方政府选择环境合作的必要条件;而地方政府的任期越长则临界贴现因子越小,地方政府之间环境合作稳定性越强。基于此,提出了地方政府任期及环境保护终身追责等促进区域环境合作的建议。
[Abstract]:The local government cooperation in the region is an important way to solve transboundary environmental pollution, environment management system of China's current tenure decision has important influence on whether the local government environmental cooperation. The game theory analysis method based on the local government office for cooperation on regional environment influence the stability is analyzed. Firstly, the analysis of complete information static game when the two local government non balanced emissions cooperation and cooperation situation, constructing the critical discount factor to cooperate with each other the infinitely repeated game model and discuss the two local governments to take the grim strategy based on. Then, finite repeated game model is discussed based on the relation between the critical discount factor and tenure. The study found that the discount the factor is above the critical level is a necessary condition for the local government to choose environmental cooperation; and the local government of the longer term is the critical discount The smaller the factor, the stronger the stability of the environmental cooperation between the local governments. Based on this, we put forward proposals for promoting the regional environmental cooperation such as the tenure of the local government and the lifelong accountability of environmental protection.

【作者单位】：北京大学环境科学与工程学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目“我国地区间经济关联的隐含大气污染转移及补偿机制研究:基于多地区投入产出分析”(编号:41471465)
【分类号】：X321;D630

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