生态补偿的复制动态及其进化稳定策略研究——以黄河流域上游青藏高原区为分析背景

发布时间：2019-03-20 10:17

【摘要】：以黄河流域上游青藏高原区建立流域生态补偿的必要性为分析背景,将保护者(破坏者)和受益者(受害者)视作补偿客体和补偿主体利益群体,依托地方政府,引入第三方NGO组织作为"惩罚"和"支付"平台,构建了博弈双方收益矩阵。运用有限理性非对称博弈模型分析了补偿客体和补偿主体的复制动态和进化稳定策略,并借助雅可比矩阵及其迹对均衡点抗扰动的稳定性进行了分析。结果表明:在第三方NGO组织的"双向惩罚"约束机制下,补偿客体和补偿主体之间的非对称博弈系统在关系1下才存在唯一的具有抗扰动的稳定性的均衡点,即(保护,支付),而且补偿客体的长期和短期经济收益(L1和S1)及策略选择在该博弈系统中起着决定性的作用;不管博弈双方在该非对称博弈系统中的初始状态处于何种位置,通过第三方NGO组织的"双向惩罚"约束(或刺激)博弈双方的策略选择行为,均可增加博弈双方中的一方或双方向均衡点(保护,支付)调整的比重。
[Abstract]:Based on the analysis of the necessity of establishing ecological compensation in Qinghai-Tibet Plateau in the upper reaches of the Yellow River Basin, the author regards the protector (destroyer) and beneficiary (victim) as the object of compensation and the interest group of compensation subject, relying on the local government. The third-party NGO organization is introduced as the platform of "penalty" and "payment", and the return matrix of both sides of the game is constructed. The replication dynamics and evolutionary stability strategies of compensation object and compensation subject are analyzed by using the finite rational asymmetric game model, and the stability of equilibrium point anti-disturbance is analyzed by means of Jacobian matrix and its trace. The results show that under the "bi-directional penalty" constraint mechanism of the third-party NGO organization, the asymmetric game system between the compensation object and the compensation subject exists only under relation 1, that is, the only equilibrium point with anti-disturbance stability, that is, (protection). The long-term and short-term economic benefits of the compensation object (L1 and S1) and the choice of strategies play a decisive role in the game system. Regardless of the initial state of the game in the asymmetric game system, the strategy selection behavior of both sides is constrained (or stimulated) by the "bi-directional punishment" organized by the third party NGO. Both can increase the proportion of one or both sides of the game to adjust to the equilibrium point (protection, payment).
【作者单位】：兰州大学经济学院;
【基金】：公益性行业(农业)科研专项经费项目(项目编号:201203006) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目编号:15LZUJBWYJ015)资助
【分类号】：X321

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