我国建筑业实施Partnering模式的合作策略选择与管理机制问题研究

发布时间：2018-08-05 19:44

【摘要】：根据美国工程新闻记录(ENR)(1998)的一项调查显示,欠发达国家和发展中国家的建筑业增加值占GDP的比重都要多于发达国家,而且其建筑业产值的增加速度也都分别超过了各自国家的GDP增长速度。作为发展中国家的中国,随着其城市化进程的加快和城乡人民生活水平的提高,国家在铁路、公路、机场、水利、电力、住宅等基础设施建设方面的投入正不断加大,建筑业已成为我国现阶段经济发展的四大支柱产业之一,也是国家实现基础设施投资的主要载体,建筑业在拉动内需、增加就业、促进经济增长、改善人民生活水平、加快农村劳动力转移、实现城乡统筹发展等方面都做出巨大贡献。然而,还应看到,在我国建筑业快速推进的背后仍然存在着竞争无序、资源大量浪费、生产效率低下的事实。虽然我国建筑业的总产值和增加值早已达到万亿规模,且每年还在以较大增幅持续上升,但建筑业的利润率水平却不尽如人意,与制造业等其它行业相比始终处于一个较低水平。传统的发展经济学认为技术进步和资本积累可以促进经济发展,杨小凯教授却认为从制度上的彻底改变才是推动经济发展的原动力。制度的改变可以有效节约生产成本,从而达到提高行业生产运行效率的目的。学者毛友权(2004)也指出：选择正确的项目管理模式是决定建筑工程成功与否的关键性因素。在我国传统的建筑工程管理模式中,项目管理组织结构层次过多,存在着大量的管理接口和监管界面,致使管理过程中协调量增加,控制难度加大,决策过程缓慢。同时,传统建筑工程管理模式的信息孤岛现象也很严重,信息传递失真、扭曲、延误、短缺。在这种组织模式下,只有命令和控制,而缺少协调与合作,项目各参与方都会只从自身经济利益出发,而忽视甚至是损害项目中其它各方的利益,从而影响了项目总目标的实现。在全球经济一体化和商业趋同化的大背景下,在合作中谋求发展是提升行业总体实力的有效手段,建筑业长期、稳定的发展同样不能偏离这一宏观经济环境,Partnering模式就是在这种情况下应运而生的。Partnering模式是一种可以将传统的对抗型的建筑企业文化转变为基于信任与共享的共赢型项目文化的管理方式,自1988年被美国军方正式提出,在之后的几十年间,已被成功应用到欧洲、日本、韩国、澳大利亚、中国香港等地的大型民用建设项目中,Partnering模式在提高建筑业长期落后的生产效率及质量,改善行业内传统的敌对关系等方面都发挥着巨大的推动作用。Wood和Ellis(2005)在文献中曾盛赞Partnering模式是“迄今为止,在提高项目绩效方面最具有价值的管理方式”。国外大量的实证研究也充分证明了在建筑工程中实施Partnering模式可以有效改善行业内恶意竞争、效率低下、工期拖延、预算超支等诸多问题。我国在建筑工程管理方面的研究起步较晚,其理论研究与实际应用也尚处于探索阶段,与其它发达国家成熟、系统的管理模式之间还存在着相当大的差距。以Partnering模式为例,从目前收集到的文献和资料来看,尚没有发现我国建筑工程在系统化、标准化应用Partnering模式方面的成功案例,个别文献中引用的“准Partnering模式”工程也只是借鉴了其合作理念及部分工作流程而已。我国建筑行业能否选择合作策略?如何将Partnering模式成功移植到我国建筑业中?在我国建筑业中应怎样制定科学、有效的Partnering管理机制?通过对以上问题的研究和理解,可以对在我国建筑工程中成功实施Partnering模式具有非常重要的理论和实践意义。通过对相关文献的研究和查阅可以看出,很多中、外文献对Partnering模式的研究热点都集中在管理机制、基本概念、工作流程和绩效评价等方面,而对Partnering模式合作策略选择的研究却鲜有涉足；对Partnering模式的研究方法也多为概念性描述、定性分析和实证研究,而应用数学模型及博弈理论对Partnering模式的研究方法则并不多见。建筑工程往往会涉及到众多的建筑企业。作为理性的决策者,这些参与Partnering模式的建筑企业在做出的任何决策时都不仅要参考对方给出的策略,同时还应考虑到我方做出的决策将会给对方造成的影响,这是一个典型的博弈过程。鉴于以上原因,论文以交易成本、资源依赖、博弈论和演化博弈论等基本理论为基础,应用理论分析与数学模型相结合的研究方法,对上文中提出的,在我国成功实施Partnering模式所需解决的诸多问题做出系统研究。论文的研究成果可以为有效提高我国建筑工程管理水平和工程运行效率、完善我国建筑工程管理领域的运行机制、促进工程管理的改革与创新提供一定的理论依据。论文的创新点主要有：一、论文试图以重复博弈理论和演化稳定策略的视角来解决我国建筑业的“囚徒困境”问题,并进而对企业实施Partnering模式的合作策略选择问题进行探究。研究认为,可替代型企业只要满足一定条件,同样存在演化稳定的合作行为,这为有竞争关系的建筑企业选择合作策略提供了理论依据。论文还系统研究了在合作行为演化稳定的状态下,各类建筑企业的互补性、替代性、技术水平等内部属性与其合作意愿、努力程度、生产效率、合作利润等外显因素之间的相关性问题,为在实际工程中制定科学合理的Partnering模式管理机制提供理论指导。二、通过对我国现有经济体制、法律体系和文化背景等外部环境因素对建筑企业实施Partnering模式的影响分析,并结合论文对影响Partnering模式合作策略选择的因素分析及由此产生的对Partnering模式管理机制的探索,有针对性地对我国建筑业实施Partnering模式的具体管理措施提出对策和建议。论文还通过定量分析制定了相对公平合理、适合我国国情的Partnering模式收益分配原则和监督管理对策,为我国建筑业更好地实施Partnering模式提供一定的理论支持。论文的主要结论如下：一、生产技术水平相同、不相同两种情况下的资源互补和生产替代的建筑企业都存在演化稳定的合作偏好,即合作行为都可以成为最佳的均衡策略选择。对资源互补型企业而言,任何情况下,合作行为都要好于不合作行为,合作行为是演化稳定的；但对生产替代型企业来说,只有双方的可替代性足够小(合作意愿足够大)时,合作行为才能够演化稳定,双方才更适合于合作。如果双方可替代性较大,即相似程度较高,则两建筑企业的合作行为不演化稳定,背叛行为会时有发生。但在任何情况下,不合作行为都不会演化稳定。从而解决了建筑业中的“囚徒困境”问题,并由此证明了合作行为可以成为建筑企业之间的最佳选择策略,也可以为合作双方赢得更多的合作收益。二、当合作行为演化稳定时,两个技术水平相同或相近的建筑企业,其生产技术水平越强,资源互补性越大,可替代性越小,那么企业的合作意愿越大,愿意为合作付出的努力越多,产生的生产效率越高,合作所得利润也越多；而对于技术水平不相同的任何类型的建筑企业而言,技术水平高的建筑企业相比技术水平低的建筑企业,其合作意愿更大,付出努力更多,工作效率更高,所得合作利润也更多。三、Partnering模式中的建筑企业的合作收益分配应遵循以下七条原则：合作增加收益原则、最优化分配原则、成本影响收益原则、收益与风险、付出、实力、工程复杂度相匹配原则等,即在合作项目中作用相对重要、承担风险较大、付出较多、实力较强的企业应适当增加合作收益的分配比例；但两个实力相差不多企业的收益分配比例不宜有太大差距,否则就会影响到合作双方的信任、沟通与共享程度,导致合作失败。研究还显示：实力较强一方的收益纳什均衡值与利润率是负相关的,而实力较弱一方的均衡收益与利润率是正相关的。这种现象可以用“智猪博弈”模型解释为：对于技术难度较大、不确定性风险较高的工程,由于强势方可以从该工程中获取较多利润,因此其合作意愿较高,为激发弱势方的合作积极性,强势方应减少收益比例。相反,对于技术难度较小的工程,强势方对合作伙伴的选择空间很大,这时弱势方具有很强的的合作意愿,为了取得合作机会,弱势企业则要降低收益要求。四、Partnering模式中的业主单位通过提高其监督检查力度和发现问题的能力,并加大对承包、承建单位投机行为的处罚力度,可以在一定程度上有效提高承包单位的尽职程度,降低承包单位和承建单位串通作假行为发生的可能性；而且,业主监督检查和发现问题的成本越高、承包单位和承建单位串通作假所得越多,则它们串通作假的可能性就越大；但研究同时发现,随着对承建单位投机行为处罚力度的增加,反而会降低承包单位的敬业程度。这种现象可以解释为,承包单位利润所得的主要来源是承建单位,实际工程中,承包单位与承建单位之间比与业主拥有更多的共同利益。
[Abstract]:According to a survey by the American Engineering News Record (ENR) (ENR) (1998), the proportion of the construction industry in the underdeveloped countries and the developing countries is more than the developed countries, and the increase in the output value of the construction industry is more than the growth rate of the GDP in their respective countries. As a developing country, China, with its urbanization. The acceleration of the process and the improvement of the living standard of urban and rural people, the investment of the state in the construction of railway, highway, airport, water conservancy, electricity, housing and other basic facilities is increasing. The construction industry has become one of the four pillar industries in the current economic development of our country, and is also the main carrier for the state to realize the investment in infrastructure, and the construction industry is pulling Domestic demand, increasing employment, promoting economic growth, improving people's living standards, speeding up the transfer of rural labor, and achieving coordinated urban and rural development have made tremendous contributions.
However, it should also be seen that behind the rapid development of China's construction industry, there is still a fact that competition is disorderly, resources are wasted, and production efficiency is low. Although the total output value and added value of the construction industry in China have already reached trillions of scale, and it is still rising with a large increase every year, the profit rate of the construction industry is not satisfactory. Manufacturing and other industries are at a low level.
The traditional development economics believes that technological progress and capital accumulation can promote economic development. Professor Yang Xiaokai believes that the radical change in the system is the driving force for economic development. The change of the system can effectively save the cost of production and thus achieve the purpose of improving the production and transportation efficiency of the industry. Scholar Mao Youquan (2004) also points out that Choosing the correct project management mode is the key factor to decide whether the construction project is successful or not.
In the traditional construction management model of China, the structure of the project management organization is too much, there are a large number of management interfaces and supervision interface, which leads to the increase of the coordination quantity, the difficulty of control and the slow decision process. At the same time, the information isolation of the traditional construction management mode is very serious, the information transmission is distorted and the process is twisted. In this organization mode, only command and control, but lack of coordination and cooperation, all the participants of the project will only start from their own economic interests, but ignore even the interests of other parties in the project, thus affecting the realization of the total project goal.
Under the background of global economic integration and commercial assimilation, seeking development in cooperation is an effective means to improve the overall strength of the industry. The long-term and stable development of the construction industry can not deviate from this macro economic environment. The Partnering model is a kind of.Partnering model which can be shipped in this case. The antagonistic construction enterprise culture is transformed into a win-win project culture based on trust and sharing. Since 1988, it was formally proposed by the US military. In the following decades, it has been successfully applied to large civil construction projects in Europe, Japan, Korea, Australia and Hongkong, China and other places. The Partnering model is improving the architecture. The long-term backward production efficiency and quality, and the improvement of the traditional hostility in the industry have played a great role in promoting.Wood and Ellis (2005) in the literature that the Partnering model has been praised as "the most valuable management formula for improving the performance of the project so far". Partnering model in construction projects can effectively improve the industry malicious competition, inefficiency, project delay, budget overruns and many other issues.
The research on Construction Engineering Management in China started relatively late, its theoretical research and practical application are still in the exploration stage. There is still a considerable gap between the mature and systematic management models of other developed countries. Taking the Partnering model as an example, from the present collection of literature and data, there has not yet been found in China's architectural engineering. In systematized and standardized application of the successful case of Partnering model, the "quasi Partnering model" project cited in some literature is only a reference to its cooperation concept and part of the work process. Can China's construction industry choose cooperation strategy? How to successfully transplant the Partnering model to China's architecture industry? In our country How to make a scientific and effective Partnering management mechanism in the industry? Through the research and understanding of the above problems, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to the successful implementation of the Partnering model in China's architectural engineering.
Through the research and inspection of relevant literature, we can see that many of the hot spots in the Partnering model are focused on the management mechanism, basic concepts, work flow and performance evaluation, but the research on the selection of Partnering mode cooperation strategy is rarely involved, and the research methods of Partnering model are mostly conceptual. Description, qualitative analysis and empirical research, while the application of mathematical model and game theory to the research method of Partnering model is not common. Architectural engineering often involves many construction enterprises. As a rational decision maker, the construction enterprises participating in the Partnering model should not only refer to each other when they make any decision. At the same time, we should also take into account the impact of the decisions we make on the other side. This is a typical game process.
In view of the above reasons, the paper, based on the basic theories of transaction cost, resource dependence, game theory and evolutionary game theory, applies the research method of combining theoretical analysis and mathematical model, and makes a systematic study on the many problems that need to be solved in the successful implementation of Partnering model in our country. It provides a certain theoretical basis for improving the management level and efficiency of construction engineering, improving the operation mechanism of Construction Engineering Management in our country, and promoting the reform and innovation of engineering management.
The main innovations of this paper are as follows:
First, the thesis tries to solve the "prisoner's dilemma" problem in China's construction industry with the perspective of repeated game theory and evolutionary stabilization strategy, and then explores the choice of cooperative strategy in the implementation of Partnering model by enterprises. The research holds that alternative enterprises have the same evolutionary and stable cooperative behavior as long as they meet certain conditions. This paper provides a theoretical basis for the selection of cooperative strategies for competitive construction enterprises. The thesis also systematically studies the correlation between the complementarity, substitution, technology level and other internal attributes of construction enterprises, such as the willingness to cooperate, the degree of effort, production efficiency, and cooperation profit, in the state of stable cooperative behavior. It provides theoretical guidance for formulating scientific and reasonable Partnering mode management mechanism in actual projects.
Two, through the analysis of the impact of external environmental factors such as the existing economic system, legal system and cultural background on the implementation of the Partnering model in the construction enterprises, and the analysis of the factors affecting the selection of the Partnering mode cooperation strategy and the resulting exploration of the Partnering model management mechanism, the construction of our country is targeted to the construction of China. The concrete management measures of the Partnering model are put forward and suggestions are put forward in the paper. The paper also establishes a reasonable and reasonable Partnering model, which is relatively fair and reasonable, suitable for the national conditions of our country and the Countermeasures of supervision and management, and provides some theoretical support for the better implementation of Partnering model in China's construction industry.
The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:
First, the production technology level is the same, the construction enterprises with different resources complementation and production substitution in the two different situations have a stable cooperative preference. That is, the cooperative behavior can be the best choice of equilibrium strategy. For the complementary enterprise, in any case, the cooperation behavior is better than the non cooperative behavior, and the cooperative behavior is the performance of the cooperative behavior. But for the production alternative enterprises, only when the substitution of the two sides is small enough (the willingness of cooperation is big enough), the cooperative behavior can evolve steadily, and the two parties are more suitable for cooperation. If the two sides can have a larger substitution and a higher similarity, the cooperation behavior of the two construction enterprises is not stable, and the betrayal will have time. But in any case, the uncooperative behavior will not evolve steadily. Thus, the "prisoner's dilemma" in the construction industry is solved, which proves that the cooperative behavior can be the best choice between the construction enterprises, and can also win more cooperative benefits for the partners.
Two, when the cooperative behavior is stable, two construction enterprises with the same or similar technical level are the more productive technology, the greater the complementarity of the resources, the smaller the substitutability, the greater the willingness of the enterprises to cooperate with, the more efforts they are willing to pay for the cooperation, the higher the production efficiency and the more profit of the cooperation. As for any type of construction enterprises with different levels of construction, high technical level construction enterprises have greater cooperation will, more effort, higher work efficiency and more profit of cooperation than those with low technical level.
Three, the distribution of cooperative income of construction enterprises in Partnering model should follow the following seven principles: cooperative income principle, optimal allocation principle, cost impact income principle, income and risk, pay, strength, engineering complexity matching principle, that is, the role of the cooperative project is relatively important, bear greater risk and pay more. The enterprises with strong strength should appropriately increase the proportion of the distribution of the cooperative income; but the proportion of the income distribution of the two similar enterprises should not have too big gap, otherwise it will affect the trust of the two parties, the degree of communication and sharing, and the failure of the cooperation. The study also shows that the profit Nash equilibrium value and the profit rate of the stronger party are also shown. There is a negative correlation, and the equilibrium income of the weaker side is positively related to the profit margin. This phenomenon can be explained by the "smart pig game" model: for the engineering with higher technical difficulty and higher uncertainty risk, the strong party can get more profit from the project, so its willingness to cooperate is higher, in order to stimulate the disadvantaged side. On the contrary, for a project with less technical difficulty, the strong side has a large choice of partners, and the weak side has a strong willingness to cooperate. In order to obtain cooperation opportunities, the disadvantaged enterprises should reduce the demand for profits.
Four, the owner units in the Partnering model, by improving their ability to supervise and inspect the problems, and increase the penalties for the speculation of contracting and construction units, can effectively improve the degree of duty of contractors and reduce the possibility of collusion between contractors and contractors; and The higher the cost of the owner's supervision and inspection and the discovery of the problem, the more the contractors and the contractors collude with the fraud, the greater the possibility of collusion, but the study also finds that with the increase in the punishment of the speculative behavior of the construction units, it will reduce the degree of respect for the single position of the contractor. The main source of profit of the contractor is the contractor. In the actual project, the contractor and the contractor have more common interests than the owner.
【学位授予单位】：东北财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F426.92

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