准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价机制实证研究

发布时间：2018-04-25 18:30

本文选题：准市场条件 + 水权交易　；参考：《中国人口·资源与环境》2017年04期

【摘要】：在经济新常态背景下,水资源的准公共产品特征具有更加重要的管理价值,如何依托市场与行政的两手发力,提升我国水资源管理水平,更好地服务于"两个百年"奋斗目标,具有十分重要的理论与现实意义。水权交易制度是利用市场与行政手段提高水资源利用率,解决人水冲突的重要技术手段,如何在准市场条件下构建符合我国国情的水权交易定价机制已成为实现水权交易制度的核心技术。因此,针对政府-企业-公众等多利益相关者参与下的水权交易定价问题,本文引入生态经济学理论构建了水权价值测度模型,进而引入合作博弈理论,构建了准市场条件下的水权交易双层动态博弈定价模型,主要包括买方政府和卖方政府的微分博弈模型,以及买方政府与水务公司的Nash-Bargaining合作定价模型,运用HJB条件求解多利益相关者合作框架下的水权交易均衡水价空间,进而以江西省萍乡市水权交易实践为例开展实证研究,结果表明:均衡水价主要受上级政府协调能力k、水量需求系数β影响,且均为正相关,针对萍乡实践而言,由于水量需求主要体现在中长期发展规划阶段,上级政府协调能力显著性强于水量需求系数;均衡水价随着上级政府协调能力k值增大呈现由快转慢再转快的趋势,整体服从逻辑函数分布,均衡水价随着水量需求系数β的增大呈现由快转慢趋势,整体服从对数函数分布,针对萍乡实践而言,水权交易中市场与行政力量的两手发力存在稳定状态,二者缺一不可;随着议价能力系数提高,Nash-Bargaining的水权交易价格随之升高,表明政府与公司之间的合作关系对水价具有直接的影响能力。
[Abstract]:Under the background of the new normal state of economy, the characteristics of quasi-public goods of water resources have more important management value. How to improve the level of water resources management and serve the goal of "two hundred years" by relying on the two hands of market and administration, It has very important theoretical and practical significance. The water right trading system is an important technical means to improve the utilization rate of water resources and solve the conflict between human and water by using market and administrative means. How to construct the pricing mechanism of water right transaction in the quasi market has become the core technology to realize the water right trading system. Therefore, aiming at the pricing problem of water right transaction with the participation of multi-stakeholders such as government, enterprise and public, this paper introduces the theory of ecological economics to construct the value measurement model of water right, and then introduces the cooperative game theory. A two-level dynamic game pricing model for water rights trading under quasi-market conditions is constructed, including the differential game model of buyer's government and seller's government, and the Nash-Bargaining cooperative pricing model between buyer's government and water company. Using HJB condition to solve the equilibrium water price space of water right transaction under the framework of multi-stakeholder cooperation, and then taking Pingxiang City of Jiangxi Province as an example to carry out an empirical study. The results show that the equilibrium water price is mainly affected by the coordination ability of the higher level government and the coefficient of water demand 尾, and all of them are positively related. According to the practice of Pingxiang, the water demand is mainly reflected in the medium and long term development planning stage. The coordination ability of higher government is significantly stronger than the coefficient of water demand, and the equilibrium water price shows the trend of changing from fast to slow and then turning faster with the increase of K value of coordination ability of higher government, and the whole water price is distributed according to logical function. With the increase of water demand coefficient 尾, the equilibrium water price changes from fast to slow, and the whole service is distributed from logarithmic function. According to the practice of Pingxiang, there is a stable state between the market and the administrative power in the water right trade, both of which are indispensable; With the increase of bargaining power coefficient, the price of water right trade in Nash-Bargaining increases, which indicates that the cooperative relationship between government and company has direct influence on water price.
【作者单位】：河海大学管理科学研究所;河海大学沿海开发与保护协调创新中心;中国水权交易所;国电环境保护研究院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重点项目“变化环境下水资源冲突管理研究”(批准号:71433003) 国家社会科学基金青年项目“多尺度耦合下水生态系统服务价值测度及政策路径选择研究”(批准号:14CGL030);国家社会科学基金面上项目“用水效率异质特征下跨区域多部门水权配置及政策模拟研究”(批准号:14GBL097) 教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(新教师类)“流域初始二维水权合作定价机制及建模研究”(批准号:20130094120022)
【分类号】：TV213.4

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