跨搜索引擎的关键字广告预算分配策略研究

发布时间：2018-04-15 13:16

本文选题：仿真 + 最优控制　；参考：《哈尔滨工业大学》2013年硕士论文

【摘要】：关键字广告已经成为网络营销中最主要的网络广告形式。目前中国市场上流行的搜索引擎提供商有很多，主要有百度、谷歌、搜狗、搜搜。不同的搜索引擎有不同的使用人群，对不同的物品的关注不同，对广告的关注程度也不同，并且搜索引擎本身的拍卖机制、关键字广告的平均每点击价格也不同。因此广告商如果想获得较高的收益就需要跨搜索引擎进行广告。本文使用最优控制理论，把广告商整个竞拍过程看作一个系统，选择所分配预算占总预算的百分比作为控制变量，对跨搜索引擎关键字广告预算分配进行建模。根据所存在的搜索引擎使用的关键字广告机制的不同，分别跨广义第二价格机制，跨基于质量得分的广义第二价格机制和跨广义第二价格的和基于质量得分的广义第二价格机制三种情况进行建模，并分别求出其最优解。通过以上这三种情况的分析发现，在一定的时间跨度的广告投入中，给定一个搜索引擎市场，跨搜索引擎中的一个搜索引擎上的预算分配趋势和单个搜索引擎的预算分配趋势是相同的。在跨同种机制的搜索引擎进行关键字广告时，在一定的时间跨度和给定的搜索引擎市场上，当预算充足时，一般的广告商应在竞争激励程度大的搜索引擎上投入较大比例的预算；当预算总额很小时候，应投入较多的预算比例在竞争激烈程度较小的搜索引擎上。在跨基于质量得分的广义第二价格机制机制的搜索引擎上进行预算分配时，当预算充足时，，应在质量得分较小和点击率对质量得分影响较小的搜索引擎上投入较大比例的预算；当预算不充足时，应在质量得分较大和点击率对质量得分影响较大的搜索引擎上投入较大比例的预算。在跨广义第二价格机制和基于质量得分的广义第二价格机制搜索引擎的预算分配中，虽然基于质量得分的广义第二价格机制的搜索引擎有一定的优越性，也并不是一定在基于质量得分的广义第二价格机制的搜索引擎上投入较大比例的预算。最后通过Matlab仿真验证了本文所得的最优预算分配策略的优越性。
[Abstract]:Keyword advertising has become the most important form of online advertising in network marketing.At present, there are many popular search engine providers in the Chinese market, mainly Baidu, Google, Sogou, search.Different search engines have different groups of users, pay different attention to different items, pay different attention to advertisements, and the auction mechanism of search engines themselves, the average price per click of keyword ads are also different.Therefore, advertisers who want to obtain higher revenue need cross-search engine advertising.Using the optimal control theory, this paper regards the whole bidding process of advertisers as a system, selects the percentage of the allocated budget as the control variable, and models the cross-search engine keyword advertising budget allocation.According to the existence of keyword advertising mechanism used by search engines, the second price mechanism is different across the broad sense.The generalized second price mechanism based on the quality score and the generalized second price mechanism based on the quality score are modeled and their optimal solutions are obtained respectively.Through the analysis of the above three cases, it is found that in a certain time span of advertising investment, given a search engine market,The trend of budget allocation across a search engine is the same as that of a single search engine.When advertising keywords across search engines of the same kind, in a given search engine market and within a given time span, when the budget is adequate,The average advertiser should spend a large proportion of the budget on the search engine with a high degree of competition incentive, and when the total budget is very small, a larger proportion of the budget should be invested in the search engine with a smaller degree of competition.When the budget is allocated across the search engine of the generalized second price mechanism based on the quality score, when the budget is sufficient, a large proportion of the budget should be invested in the search engine with low quality score and less impact on the quality score.When the budget is not sufficient, a large proportion of the budget should be invested in the search engine, where the quality score is higher and the click rate has a greater impact on the quality score.In the budget allocation of the cross-generalized second price mechanism and the generalized second price mechanism based on the quality score, although the search engine based on the quality score has some advantages,Nor is it necessary to invest a large proportion of the budget on the search engine based on the generalized second price mechanism of quality score.Finally, the superiority of the optimal budget allocation strategy is verified by Matlab simulation.
【学位授予单位】：哈尔滨工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F713.8

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