跨界水资源冲突中地方保护主义行为的演化博弈分析

发布时间：2018-11-25 10:01

【摘要】：通过分析我国跨界水资源冲突的特点,建立了跨界水资源冲突事件中地方保护主义行为的演化博弈数理模型,研究了地方政府部门在冲突的不同阶段与己方冲突群体、对方地方政府部门和中央政府博弈的策略选择。理论研究表明:(1)地方政府不会在跨界水资源冲突事件中有效发挥强互惠者的角色功能,在处理己方冲突群体的行动中,地方政府会选择"纵容"策略,导致跨界水资源冲突事态扩大化;(2)由于地方保护主义思想的存在,依靠地方政府之间的协商无法解决跨界水资源冲突,导致跨界水资源冲突事态久拖不决,必须中央政府的强制介入;(3)无论地方政府采取什么策略,中央政府的占优策略均为强制干预,此时,地方政府采取不合作策略的得益总是小于合作策略,则中央政府与地方政府博弈的演化稳定策略为(强制干预,合作),从而跨界水资源冲突得以解决。最后结合数值仿真分析,得到如下研究结论:依靠地方政府无法解决跨界水资源冲突,强互惠中央政府的管制是破解这一难题的必由之路。
[Abstract]:Based on the analysis of the characteristics of cross-border water resources conflict in China, the evolutionary game mathematical model of local protectionism in cross-border water resources conflict is established, and the conflict groups of local government departments and their own parties in different stages of conflict are studied. The other side local government and the central government game strategy choice. The theoretical research shows that: (1) Local governments will not play the role of strong reciprocity in cross-border water resources conflicts, and local governments will choose the "connivance" strategy in the action of dealing with their own conflict groups. Leading to the expansion of transboundary water conflicts; (2) because of the existence of local protectionism, it is impossible to solve the conflict of transboundary water resources by relying on the consultation among local governments, which leads to the protracted situation of the conflict of transboundary water resources and the compulsory intervention of the central government; (3) No matter what strategy the local government adopts, the dominant strategy of the central government is compulsory intervention. At this time, the benefit of the non-cooperative strategy of the local government is always less than that of the cooperative strategy. The evolutionary stabilization strategy of the game between central government and local government is (compulsory intervention, cooperation), thus the conflict of transboundary water resources can be solved. Finally, combined with numerical simulation analysis, the following conclusions are obtained: depending on the local government can not solve the conflict of transboundary water resources, strong reciprocal central government control is the only way to solve this problem.
【作者单位】：河海大学商学院;水利部海委漳河上游管理局;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金资助项目(10CGL051) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(50979024,90924027) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2009B22314)
【分类号】：TV213;F224.32

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