政府—冷链食品企业质量安全监管博弈分析

发布时间：2018-01-08 10:37

本文关键词：政府—冷链食品企业质量安全监管博弈分析　出处：《中国管理科学》2016年S1期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：基于博弈论,构建了政府和冷链食品企业之间的纯战略博弈模型和混合战略博弈模型,并对博弈模型中的纯战略Nash均衡、占优战略Nash均衡和混合战略Nash均衡进行了分析,探讨了两者间的博弈关系以及不同情况下各自的最优策略选择,揭示了影响政府积极监管或消极监管、冷链食品企业提供高质量或低质量食品的关键因素。通过本文分析,研究结果表明:政府积极监管概率与冷链食品企业提供高质量冷链食品的成本、提供低质量冷链食品的成本、冷链食品所处温度和政府监管部门对冷链食品企业的惩罚力度有关;冷链食品企业提供高质量冷链食品的概率与政府监管成本、对冷链食品企业的惩罚力度和上级对政府监管部门失职行为的惩罚力度有关。最后,提出了政府和冷链食品企业共同提高食品质量安全的对策与建议。
[Abstract]:Based on game theory, the pure strategic game model and mixed strategic game model between government and cold-chain food enterprises are constructed, and the pure strategic Nash equilibrium in the game model is analyzed. The dominant strategic Nash equilibrium and mixed strategic Nash equilibrium are analyzed, and the game relationship between them and the choice of optimal strategies under different conditions are discussed. It reveals the key factors that affect the government's active or negative supervision, and the cold-chain food enterprises provide high-quality or low-quality food. The results show that the government actively supervises the probability and the cost of providing high quality cold chain food and low quality cold chain food. The temperature of cold-chain food is related to the punishment of cold-chain food enterprises. The probability of providing high quality cold-chain food by cold-chain food enterprises is related to the cost of government supervision, the punishment of cold-chain food enterprises and the punishment of negligence on the part of higher authorities. Finally. The countermeasures and suggestions for improving food quality and safety by government and cold chain food enterprises are put forward.
【作者单位】：山东师范大学商学院;山东大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重点资助项目(13AGL012) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2015M580597) 山东省博士后创新资助项目(201503009) 山东师范大学青年科技项目培育基金资助
【分类号】：F224.32;F259.2;F426.82
【正文快照】： 1引言随着经济的快速发展,人民生活水平的显著提高,冷链食品质量安全已经成为社会越来越关注的话题之一。2010年6月,国家发改委发布了《农产品冷链物流发展规划》,2012年我国首部关于食品冷链物流的分级标准已经出台,同时在贯彻落实《中共中央国务院关于加快发展现代农业进

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