具溢出效应的重大工程承包商合作创新机制的演化博弈

发布时间：2018-05-16 11:46

  本文选题：溢出效应 + 合作创新　； 参考：《系统工程》2016年07期

【摘要】：针对重大工程设计施工总承包模式(DB)下总承包商和分包商的合作创新问题,基于演化视角建立博弈模型,研究在有限理性下二者之间的合作机制,同时对合作创新中存在的溢出效应、收益分配、激励与补贴对演化稳定策略的影响进行了探讨。研究结果表明,在一定的情形下,合作给创新主体带来的溢出效应、单独研发收益和合作创新的超额收益对双方的合作具正效用;创新成本及总承包商的补贴系数的增加则不利于双方走向合作;存在一个最优的超额利益分配系数时,使得双方实现共赢;业主采取合适的策略介入,可以促进承包商之间的合作。
[Abstract]:Aiming at the innovation of cooperation between general contractors and subcontractors under the general contracting mode of major engineering design and construction, a game model is established based on the evolutionary perspective, and the cooperative mechanism between the two is studied under the limited rationality. At the same time, the effects of spillover effects, income distribution, incentives and subsidies on evolutionary stabilization strategies in cooperative innovation are discussed. The results show that, under certain circumstances, the spillover effect of cooperation on innovation subject, R & D revenue alone and excess income from cooperative innovation have positive effects on the cooperation between the two sides. The increase of the innovation cost and the subsidy coefficient of the general contractor is not conducive to the cooperation between the two sides; when there is an optimal excess benefit distribution coefficient, the two sides can achieve a win-win situation; the owner takes the appropriate strategy to intervene. Cooperation between contractors can be promoted.
【作者单位】： 南京大学工程管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金重大资助项目(71390520);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271107;71471077;71571098) “十一五”国家科技支撑计划项目(2011BAG07B00) 交通运输部建设科技项目(2013318282310)
【分类号】：F416.92
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本文编号：1896691