亚星化学管理层收购与利益侵占研究

发布时间：2018-11-17 15:38

【摘要】：管理层收购(Management Buy-outs,简称MBO)在美国和欧洲发展已有三十多年的历史。不同于西方发达国家,我国MBO起步稍晚。1997-2003年,我国迎来了管理层收购的高潮,然而在众多实施了MBO的公司中却出现了许多负面影响。2003年,财政部紧急叫停了MBO。然而,在实际应用中,各种“隐形”、“曲线”MBO被创造性地运用于躲开政策的限制。在国家政策的调控与企业自身需求的发展下,管理层收购成了一个探索性的话题。鉴于我国目前的市场环境与制度环境,不能照搬国外的经验。因此,本文在我国实际的市场环境和制度环境背景下对亚星化学MBO进行研究,不仅可以丰富我国管理层收购的相关理论,同时也可以为我国的产权改革实践提供一定的参考。文章主要运用文献分析法和案例分析法对管理层收购和利益侵占进行了较为详细的剖析,并结合处在我国特殊市场和制度背景下的亚星化学MBO进行案例分析。在具体的案例分析中,文章首先介绍了亚星化学的基本情况及亚星化学实施管理层收购的途径;其次,文章运用统计分析法详细地分析了管理层在完成收购之后陆续利用关联交易、资产转让、担保和资金占用等方式长期侵占上市公司的利益;再次,剖析了管理层对上市公司进行利益侵占后,出现了公司利润连续下滑、公司整体质量降低、中小股东利益受损以及投资者热情持续低迷的情况;最后,总结了管理层完成收购后对上市公司造成利益侵占的原因,其具体表现在公司股权制衡结构失效、公司治理结构缺陷、信息披露不透明以及外部监管不完善等。管理层收购作为一种特殊的激励手段,能够降低代理成本、激励并约束管理层、改善经营状况以及推进公司成长与提高资源配置效率。然而,在本文的研究中,管理层收购并未能实现改善公司经营状况、提升股东财富的愿望。相反,在本文的案例中,管理层顺利地利用了MBO,巧借其交叉任职和内部管理的优势,不断地通过关联交易、担保、资产转让和资金占用等方式长期侵占上市公司的利益,导致了国有资产的流失,给上市公司造成了不可挽回的损失,同时也损害了中小股东的利益。因此,结合上述分析,提出以下建议:首先,完善上市公司管理层激励体系;其次,优化公司治理结构;再次,加大上市公司信息披露力度;最后,强化中小投资者保护机制。
[Abstract]:Management buyout (MBO) has been developed in the United States and Europe for more than 30 years. Unlike the western developed countries, China's MBO started a little later. In 1997-2003, China ushered in the climax of MBO, but in many companies that implemented MBO, there were many negative effects. In 2003, the Ministry of Finance urgently stopped MBO.. However, in practical applications, various "invisible", "curve" MBO are creatively used to avoid policy constraints. Under the control of national policy and the development of enterprises' own demand, MBO has become an exploratory topic. In view of the current market and institutional environment, we can not copy the experience of foreign countries. Therefore, under the background of our country's actual market environment and institutional environment, this paper studies the Asian Star Chemical MBO, which can not only enrich the relevant theories of MBO in China, but also provide a certain reference for the practice of property right reform in our country. This article mainly uses the literature analysis method and the case analysis method to analyze the MBO and the interest encroachment in detail, and carries on the case analysis combining the sub-star chemical MBO under the special market and the system background of our country. In the concrete case analysis, the article first introduced the basic situation of the substar chemistry and the way of implementing the management buyout of the substar chemistry; Secondly, the paper uses the statistical analysis method to analyze in detail the long-term usurpation of the interests of listed companies by means of related party transaction, asset transfer, guarantee and capital occupation by the management after the completion of the buyout. Thirdly, it analyzes the situation that the profit of the listed company has been continuously declining, the overall quality of the company has been reduced, the interests of the minority shareholders have been damaged and the enthusiasm of the investors has been in the doldrums after the management has encroached on the interests of the listed company. Finally, the paper summarizes the causes of interest encroachment on listed companies after MBO, which is manifested in the failure of equity balance structure, the defects of corporate governance structure, the opaque disclosure of information and the imperfection of external supervision and so on. As a special incentive, MBO can reduce the agency cost, motivate and restrain the management, improve the management condition, promote the growth of the company and improve the efficiency of resource allocation. However, in this study, MBO failed to achieve the desire to improve the company's operating conditions and enhance shareholders' wealth. On the contrary, in the case of this paper, the management took advantage of MBO, 's advantages of cross-service and internal management, and continuously encroached on the interests of listed companies through related party transactions, guarantee, asset transfer and capital occupation for a long time. It leads to the loss of state-owned assets, irreparable loss to listed companies, and damage to the interests of minority shareholders. Therefore, combined with the above analysis, the following suggestions are put forward: first, to improve the incentive system of the management of listed companies; secondly, to optimize the corporate governance structure; thirdly, to strengthen the information disclosure of listed companies; finally, to strengthen the protection mechanism of small and medium-sized investors.
【学位授予单位】：石河子大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：F426.7;F271

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