农村基层集体贪腐形成的内在逻辑——以海南省C县土地贪腐案为例

发布时间：2018-02-23 20:43

本文关键词： 集体贪腐收益成本分析土地流转　出处：《公共管理学报》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：随着我国反腐力度不断增强,基层集体贪腐案件越来越多地暴露在公众视野之中,为探究潜在贪腐个体转变为实际贪腐群体的内在逻辑,本文采用个案研究法,以海南省C县的骗取征地补偿款案为例,引入收益成本分析视角,从贪腐动机、制度约束、权力合谋、被查处风险这四个维度将集体贪腐分为贪腐动机萌发期、潜在贪腐群体合谋期和贪腐风险收益对比期三个阶段。研究表明:合谋能促进权力联合、增强信息不对称、分摊腐败风险、实现利益分配,从而具有消解被揭发风险、隐蔽腐败谋划的优势。产生贪腐动机后的潜在贪腐群体针对权力制衡的制度设计选择合谋,使其在收益成本分析的主观判断过程中易提高贪腐的可行性,结合客观惩处情况,潜在群体将进一步判断是否加入贪腐群体。本文在基层集体贪腐的形成机理及个案深入研究方面作出了创新性探索。
[Abstract]:With the strengthening of anti-corruption in our country, grassroots collective corruption cases are more and more exposed to the public view. In order to explore the internal logic of the transformation of potential corruption individuals into actual corruption groups, this paper adopts a case study method. Taking the case of compensation for land requisition by fraud in C County of Hainan Province as an example, this paper introduces the perspective of income and cost analysis and divides collective corruption into four dimensions: corruption motive, institutional constraint, collusion of power, risk of being investigated and dealt with, and the collective corruption is divided into the germination period of corruption motive. The study shows that collusion can promote power union, enhance information asymmetry, spread the risk of corruption, and realize benefit distribution, so as to eliminate the risk of being exposed. Hidden corruption planning advantages. The potential corruption groups after generating corruption motive design collusion against the system of power checks and balances, make it easy to improve the feasibility of corruption in the subjective judgment process of profit and cost analysis, combined with objective punishment, The potential group will further judge whether to join the corruption group. This paper makes an innovative exploration on the formation mechanism and case study of grassroots collective corruption.
【作者单位】：华南理工大学公共管理学院;
【基金】：教育部重大课题攻关项目(16JZD026) 广东省普通高校特色创新类项目(2015WTSCX001)
【分类号】：D262.6

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