反腐败的投资效应——基于地区与企业双重维度的实证分析

发布时间：2018-05-16 01:05

  本文选题：高官落马 + 反腐败　； 参考：《金融研究》2017年09期

【摘要】：本文从理论和实证两个方面探讨了反腐败对固定资产投资产生的影响及机制。我们基于中国地方高级官员被查落马的事件冲击,全面考察反腐败对固定资产投资总量、结构及其效率的影响。基于1998-2013年的省区面板数据及1998-2007年的工业企业数据库数据实证发现,高官落马产生震慑效应,进而显著地抑制了固定资产投资规模。这种遏制效应主要体现于国有企业固定资产投资,特别是那些属于管制程度较强的领域的国有工业企业投资,非国有企业投资活动并未受到负面影响。从效率角度来看,高官落马促进了高效率的工业企业的投资活动,改善了投资资源的配置效率。本文发现对于理解国有企业投资行为与政府廉政建设具有启示意义,提升政府组织的清廉度、大力推进简政放权,是提升投资动能和效率的有效保障。
[Abstract]:This paper discusses the impact of anti-corruption on fixed assets investment and its mechanism from two aspects of theory and demonstration. Based on the impact of the incident of local senior officials in China, we examine the impact of anti-corruption on the total amount, structure and efficiency of fixed assets investment. Based on the 1998-2013 year provincial panel data and 1998-2007 years The database data of industrial enterprises found that the high officials had a deterrent effect, and thus significantly inhibited the investment scale of fixed assets, which mainly reflected the investment in the fixed assets of the state-owned enterprises, especially those of the state-owned industrial enterprises which belong to the field of stronger control, and the investment activities of non-state-owned enterprises were not received. From the point of view of efficiency, high officials have promoted the investment activities of high efficiency industrial enterprises and improved the efficiency of the allocation of investment resources. This article finds that it is of great significance to understand the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises and the construction of government clean government, to improve the integrity of government organizations and to promote the decentralization of the government, and to promote the kinetic energy of investment. Effective guarantee of efficiency.

【作者单位】： 暨南大学经济学院;广东外语外贸大学广东国际战略研究院;厦门大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71303063;71773038;71403062) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(15JNQM029)资助
【分类号】：D262.6;F275
，

本文编号：1894736