“一把手”体制与权力监督体系的重塑——基于S市腐败案例的经验研究

发布时间：2018-06-07 11:54

本文选题：民主集中制 + 党委书记　；参考：《长白学刊》2016年04期

【摘要】：当前,腐败的重灾区是党委"一把手"的腐败。由于拥有对于人事、财务和决策领域的广泛裁量权,且缺乏有效的权力约束机制,党委"一把手"腐败案件频频发生。通过对近年来S市区和街道党委"一把手"的腐败案例分析,可以发现:从腐败发生概率上看,经济发达区域的党委"一把手"容易因腐败落马;从腐败发生的领域来看,土地、项目、工程是其腐败的重要缘由;从腐败发生的方式上看,买官卖官、官商勾结是其腐败的重要途径。根治党委"一把手"腐败,必须从配权、分权、督权三个维度,构建严密的权力监督体系。
[Abstract]:At present, the worst-hit area of corruption is the corruption of the party committee. Due to extensive discretion in personnel, finance and decision-making, and lack of effective power restraint mechanism, the party committee "chief" corruption cases occur frequently. Through the analysis of the corruption cases of the "top leaders" of the S city and street party committees in recent years, we can find that in terms of the probability of the occurrence of corruption, the "top leaders" of the party committees of the economically developed regions are apt to be defeated by corruption; from the perspective of the areas in which corruption occurs, Land, projects and projects are the important causes of corruption, and from the point of view of the way of corruption, buying and selling officials and colluding with business are the important ways of corruption. In order to eradicate the corruption of the party committee, it is necessary to construct a strict power supervision system from the three dimensions of power allocation, separation of powers and superintendency.
【作者单位】：深圳大学当代中国政治研究所;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“政治发展视野中的当代领导干部特点研究”(13CZZ020);国家社科基金重点项目“地方官员政绩激励的生成机制与政策引导研究”(16AZZ013) 广东省人文社科类省级重大项目“广东省地方政府创新的经验梳理与模式拓展研究”(2014WZDXM025)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D262.6

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