反腐败与企业创新:基于政治关联的解释

发布时间：2018-08-09 19:05

【摘要】：本文以中共十八大以来中央强烈反腐败为背景,采用双重差分方法讨论了反腐败对企业创新的影响。研究发现,寻求政治关联和提高创新能力是企业发展的两个互为替代的手段。反腐败由于增加了企业谋求政治关联的相对成本,显著提高了企业的创新激励。在反腐败政策出台以后,具有政治关联的企业的研发支出显著增加,反腐败促进了企业创新。进一步研究表明,反腐败对企业创新的影响会随着企业性质的不同而变化。对于国有企业,反腐败只能促进其高管有从政经历的企业的创新:对于非国有企业,反腐败对企业创新具有更普遍的正向影响。同时,反腐败对企业创新的影响具有省级层面的异质性,反腐败越强的省份,有政治关联的企业的创新水平增幅越大。本文从政治关联的视角为"反腐有利论"提供了基于企业创新的证据。
[Abstract]:Based on the strong anti-corruption of the CPC Central Committee since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), this paper discusses the influence of anti-corruption on enterprise innovation by using the double difference method. It is found that seeking political connection and improving innovation ability are two alternatives to each other in the development of enterprises. Anti-corruption increases the relative cost of seeking political connections, and significantly increases the innovation incentives of enterprises. After the introduction of anti-corruption policy, R & D expenditure of politically connected enterprises increased significantly, and anti-corruption promoted enterprise innovation. Further research shows that the impact of anti-corruption on enterprise innovation varies with the nature of the enterprise. For state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption can only promote the innovation of enterprises whose executives have political experience; for non-state-owned enterprises, anti-corruption has a more general positive impact on enterprise innovation. At the same time, the influence of anti-corruption on enterprise innovation has the heterogeneity at the provincial level. The stronger the anti-corruption, the greater the increase of innovation level of the politically connected enterprises. From the angle of political connection, this paper provides evidence based on enterprise innovation for the theory of anti-corruption advantage.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学经济学院;
【基金】：教育部2011中国特色社会主义经济建设协同创新中心项目“认识、适应和引领经济新常态研究”
【分类号】：D262.6;F273.1

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