政府监管下群体性突发事件的演化博弈分析与研究

发布时间：2018-09-01 10:35

【摘要】：进入21世纪以来,随着我国改革开放的深化,社会矛盾凸显,群体性突发事件进入多发阶段,而且与以往相比,规模更大、涉及的职业范围更广、危害也更突出,对我国社会主义现代化建设已造成不良影响。而政府作为社会的管理者,控制监管群体性突发事件是政府的基本职能,现如今更成为衡量政府工作能力的一个重要指标。本文研究的主要内容为政府如何有效监管群体性突发事件这类问题,目的旨在为政府监管工作提供理论支持,同时为丰富和发展我国群体性突发事件的一些基础性理论研究。首先,从总体概况、基本特征、主要原因以及利弊性四个角度深入分析了我国群体性突发事件的当前现状,并指出我国政府和社会必须正视群体事件的不良影响,政府监管群体性突发事件有着很重要的现实意义。政府在应对群体性突发事件时发挥着两种不同的职能：直接利益的矛盾冲突方、间接利益的控制协调方,本文接下来主要分析了这两种,职能下政府应当如何监管群体性突发事件。而群体性事件往往由利益诉求不同的群体冲突而造成,此外群体事件的爆发并不是“一蹴而就”的,往往是不断模仿和“学习”调整的动态过程。因而,本文引入博弈理论研究政府监管下的群体性突发事件。为研究政府作为矛盾冲突方如何监管群体性突发事件,本文选择了现今关注度比较高的网络群体事件,首次引用博弈理论分析其内在机理。在网络群体事件中,普通网络群众作为无直接利益的参与者,对于网络信息的真伪无法辨别,基于这一点,本文首先分析了不完美信息下的网络群体事件。在建立政府与网络群众的博弈模型的基础上,给出了一些参数约束下的完美贝叶斯均衡,并指出我国当前比较符合部分成功的社会管理以及接近失败的社会管理这两种情形,强调了监管网络群体事件的重要性,研究表明我国当前网络群体事件是当前社会无法避免的,政府应当通过建立预警机制等手段监控。然后,针对当前一些敏感信息“事实”更容易滋生网络群体事件,建立了这一事实下政府与网络群众的演化博弈模型,并结合现实情况,给出了不同阶段下稳定性均衡的参数约束以及现实意义分析,通过“周久耕事件”的案例分析说明了本文模型的适用性。进一步,通过数值分析说明了信息机制对网络群体事件的演化传播影响很大。对网络群体事件的平息和缓解,主要采用“引导”的方式,平息事件的同时也有效地缓和了社会变革中的一些矛盾,并指出网络群众传播敏感信息的内在根源。接下来,将政府部门视为社会矛盾的调解者,运用演化博弈理论分析了政府作为利益协调者在群体性突发事件中的重要作用,并考虑公平因素,详细分析了一些主要参数对决策行为的影响。结果表明,政府提早介入、公平的利益再分配以及适当的惩罚措施有助于减少群体性突发事件。通过对案例“重庆市出租车罢工事件”发展演化历程及政府协调作用的分析,说明了本文模型的适用性。最后,对本文的整体研究做了总结,并指出本文研究的不足以及未来研究值得关注的一些地方。
[Abstract]:Since the beginning of the 21st century, with the deepening of China's reform and opening up, social contradictions have become prominent, mass emergencies have entered a multi-stage, and compared with the past, the scale is larger, involving a wider range of occupations, and the harm is more prominent, which has had a negative impact on China's socialist modernization. Management of mass emergencies is the basic function of the government, and now it has become an important indicator to measure the ability of the government to work. The main content of this paper is how to effectively regulate mass emergencies for the government. The purpose of this study is to provide theoretical support for the government's supervision work and to enrich and develop mass emergencies in China. Some basic theoretical researches on events.
Firstly, the current situation of mass emergencies in China is analyzed from four aspects: general situation, basic characteristics, main causes, advantages and disadvantages, and it is pointed out that the government and society must face up to the adverse effects of mass incidents.
The government plays two different functions in dealing with group emergencies: the conflict of direct interests and the control and coordination of indirect interests. This paper then analyzes these two functions and how the government should supervise group emergencies. In addition, the outbreak of group incidents is not "overnight" and is often a dynamic process of constant imitation and "learning" adjustment.
In order to study how the government regulates group emergencies as a conflicting party, this paper chooses the network group events with high concern nowadays and analyzes their internal mechanism by using game theory for the first time. In this paper, we first analyze the network group events under imperfect information. On the basis of establishing the game model between the government and the network masses, we give the perfect Bayesian equilibrium under some constraints of parameters, and point out that China is more in line with the two situations of partial successful social management and near-failure social management. The importance of monitoring network group incidents has been adjusted. The research shows that the current network group incidents in our country are unavoidable. The government should establish early warning mechanism and other means of monitoring.
Then, aiming at the fact that some sensitive information "facts" are more likely to breed network group events, the evolutionary game model of government and network masses under this fact is established. Combining with the actual situation, the parametric constraints and practical significance of stability equilibrium in different stages are given, and the case study of "Zhou Jiuguang Event" is illustrated. Furthermore, the numerical analysis shows that the information mechanism has a great influence on the evolution and propagation of network group events. In order to alleviate and alleviate the network group events, we mainly adopt the method of "guiding" to alleviate the incidents while effectively alleviating some contradictions in the social change. At the same time, we point out that the network mass transmission has a great influence on the evolution and propagation of network group events. The inherent source of sensitive information.
Next, the government departments are regarded as mediators of social contradictions, and the important role of the government as a coordinator of interests in group emergencies is analyzed by using evolutionary game theory. Considering the factors of fairness, the influence of some main parameters on decision-making behavior is analyzed in detail. Through the analysis of the evolution of the case of "taxi strike in Chongqing" and the coordinating role of the government, the applicability of this model is illustrated.
Finally, this paper summarizes the whole research, and points out the shortcomings of this study and some areas worthy of attention in the future.
【学位授予单位】：华南理工大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D631.43

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