基于期望理论的低级别公职人员非法资产处置分析

发布时间：2019-06-02 18:24

【摘要】：近年来，低级别不法公职人员经济犯罪已然成为腐败案件的频发领域，他们虽然职务不高，权力不大，但是人数较多，且与基层群众的生活紧密相联，因此这些人的不法行为给社会带来的影响更为直接、也更为直观。然而，由于基层管理制度的缺陷以及低级别公职人员经济犯罪的特点导致他们的犯罪行为不易被执法机关发现。因此，研究低级别公职人员经济犯罪，探索和分析低级别公职人员非法资产处置特点，并有针对性的提出遏制“蚁贪”犯罪的对策方法，对于深入贯彻党的十八大精神，开展反腐败斗争工作具有重要的意义。本文主要从经济学角度出发，分别从低级别公职人员非法资产处置方式特点、犯罪过程的心理、行为特征以及非法资产处置路径三个方面着手研究，主要内容归纳如下：首先，通过对2008-2010年两个地级市人民法院判决的530名低级别不法公职人员的犯罪情况实地调查和数据分析，发现了低级别公职人员处置非法资产的主要方式分别是消费、投资、存入银行，即通常会选择简单、低层次、大众化的处置方式。采用这些处置方式主要有三个原因，一是交际圈层次低，二是利益相关人少，三是自身掩盖手段和能力不足。在总结已有研究的基础上，文章对低级别公职人员非法资产处置类型进行了重构。其次，在分析典型案例的基础上，分别对低级别公职人员上游敛财和下游资产处置的行为过程进行了剖析，认为低级别公职人员犯罪心理是一个循序渐进的过程；借助成本分析法分析，得出敛财环节可分为三个阶段：以恐惧矛盾心理为主导的初始阶段、以贪婪自傲为主导的猖狂阶段和以追求精神收益为主的转折阶段；通过期望效用分析，得出非法资产处置环节的三个阶段：从几乎不考虑资产处置的初始阶段到开始有安全需求选择资产处置的转折阶段，再到为追求更高层次的需求而大量处置资产的高峰阶段。再次，同样在分析典型案例的基础上，运用风险效用理论，，构建出风险成本约束下的低级别公职人员非法资产处置路径，得出三个结论：一是低级别不法公职人员的处置环节及次数要低于高级别不法公职人员；二是低级别不法公职人员处置非法资产时，如果处置的环节较少，虽然付出的风险成本较低，但是非法资产并不“安全”，其效用也较小。相反，如果处置的环节过多，虽然非法资产是越来越安全，但由于付出的风险成本过大，效用也会减少；三是在风险成本很高的条件下，低级别公职人员会以较少环节结束处置过程，不会为了过多的安全而去无限次的进行处置。最后，通过非法资产处置方式特点、犯罪过程的心理、行为特征以及非法资产处置的路径，提出防范低级别不法公职人员下游犯罪的对策及建议，希望在防范的重点领域以及侦测方法方面为相关执法机构提供决策支持。
[Abstract]:In recent years, economic crimes committed by low-level illegal public officials have become a frequent field of corruption cases. Although their posts are not high and their powers are small, they have a large number of people and are closely related to the lives of the grassroots. Therefore, the illegal behavior of these people has a more direct and intuitive impact on the society. However, due to the defects of the grass-roots management system and the characteristics of economic crimes of low-level public officials, their criminal behavior is not easy to be detected by law enforcement agencies. Therefore, to study the economic crime of low-level public officials, to explore and analyze the characteristics of the disposal of illegal assets of low-level public officials, and to put forward targeted countermeasures to curb the crime of "ant greed", in order to thoroughly implement the spirit of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), It is of great significance to carry out the fight against corruption. From the point of view of economics, this paper studies the characteristics of illegal assets disposal of low-level public officials, the psychology of criminal process, the characteristics of behavior and the path of illegal assets disposal. The main contents are summarized as follows: first of all, through the field investigation and data analysis of 530 low-level illegal public officials sentenced by the people's courts of two prefectural cities from 2008 to 2010, It is found that the main ways for low-level public officials to dispose of illegal assets are consumption, investment and deposit in banks, that is, simple, low-level and popular disposal methods are usually chosen. There are three main reasons for adopting these disposal methods, one is the low level of communication circle, the other is the lack of stakeholders, and the third is the lack of self-concealment means and ability. On the basis of summing up the existing research, this paper reconstructs the types of illegal asset disposal of low-level public officials. Secondly, on the basis of analyzing typical cases, this paper analyzes the behavior process of upstream wealth accumulation and downstream asset disposal of low-level public officials, and holds that the criminal psychology of low-level public officials is a gradual and orderly process. With the help of cost analysis, it is concluded that the link of enrichment can be divided into three stages: the initial stage dominated by fear and contradiction, the rampant stage dominated by greed and pride, and the turning stage dominated by the pursuit of spiritual benefits. Through the expected utility analysis, it is concluded that there are three stages of illegal asset disposal: from the initial stage of asset disposal with little consideration to the turning stage of choosing asset disposal with security needs. To the peak stage of massive disposal of assets in pursuit of higher levels of demand. Thirdly, on the basis of analyzing typical cases, using the theory of risk utility, this paper constructs the disposal path of illegal assets of low-level public officials under the constraint of risk cost. Three conclusions are drawn: first, the disposal link and frequency of low-level illegal public officials should be lower than that of high-level illegal public officials; Second, when low-level illegal public officials dispose of illegal assets, if there are fewer links to dispose of illegal assets, although the risk cost paid is lower, but the illegal assets are not "safe" and their effectiveness is less. On the contrary, if there are too many links to dispose of, although the illegal assets are becoming safer and safer, the utility will also be reduced because of the excessive risk cost paid. Third, under the condition of high risk cost, the low-level public officials will end the disposal process with fewer links, and will not go to the disposal for too many times for the sake of too much safety. Finally, through the characteristics of illegal assets disposal, the psychological and behavioral characteristics of the criminal process and the path of illegal asset disposal, this paper puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to prevent the downstream crimes of low-level illegal public officials. I hope to provide decision support to relevant law enforcement agencies in the key areas of prevention and detection methods.
【学位授予单位】：太原科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D924.393

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