政党政治与庇护主义：印度选举庇护主义的生成与盛行

发布时间：2018-03-04 11:34

本文选题：政党政治　切入点：庇护主义　出处：《武汉大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：印度被称为世界上最大的民主国家,选民的投票热情甚至超过发达国家。然而,庇护主义、腐败与族群冲突让这场"最大规模的民主行动"挂上混乱的恶名。竞争性的民主制度并没有真正改善印度选民的生活状态,贫富差距依旧很大。庇护主义帮助解释印度高昂的投票热情与不断加剧的社会不平等之间的悖论。印度选举政治经历了 70年,从国大党体制向多党竞争过渡,庇护主义仍然存在甚至根深蒂固。激烈的政党竞争如何影响庇护主义,政党政治与庇护主义的关系是什么?这是作者试图解释的问题。本文的观点是,第一,印度政党依靠庇护网络展开政治动员,政党竞争强度的变化改变了印度庇护网络结构,庇护网络重心下沉,最终导致庇护主义进一步渗透。第二,政党为了缓解庇护资源的分配压力,他们通过情感动员的方式加强庇护纽带的韧性,最终导致族群民主主义的兴起,并加剧政党竞争的激化,推动第二轮庇护主义的渗透,形成闭合的自我循环圈。本文试图从国家-社会视角解释政党竞争与庇护主义的关系。国家制度框架上,印度中央集权的联邦制和潘查雅特的设立为印度庇护主义的渗透提供了制度空间。社会结构上,异质多元的印度社会为政党政治的变化提供了可能性。同时,作者再现了宗主-掮客-侍从的庇护金字塔,探析庇护纽带的物质与情感属性,了解政党竞争下庇护网络的动力变化。作者将印度政党竞争作为自变量,将庇护主义及其庇护网络作为因变量。我们对比了国大党体制时期与多党竞争时期的庇护网络,分析庇护网络构成与交换方式的变化。英迪拉时期,为了弥补尼赫鲁去世造成的党内权威下降,英迪拉通过民粹主义的方式建立从总理-选民的庇护机器,绕开了国大党传统的庇护网络,最终削弱了国大党的选民基础,庇护网络的重心下沉至各邦。多党竞争时期,印度联邦政治地方化,地方性政党对全国资源分配具有杠杆作用,低级种姓与经济能人开始建立自己的庇护网络,取代传统高级种姓的支配地位。潘查雅特制度的设立,让地方性政党的庇护交换渗透到村一级,庇护主义更有生命力。最后本文预测,印度庇护型民主存在结构性衰朽,即依靠物质激励展开政治动员,政府将面临滚雪球式的分配压力,权力寻租和腐败现象难以杜绝。任何结构性的调整将削弱政党的选民基础,只能通过财政透支的方式暂缓印度民主的通胀现象。
[Abstract]:India is known as the world's largest democracy, with voters voting even more enthusiastically than developed countries. Corruption and ethnic conflict have given this "biggest democratic act" a reputation for chaos. Competitive democracy has not really improved the lives of Indian voters. The gap between the rich and the poor is still wide. Asylum doctrine helps explain the paradox between India's high voting enthusiasm and rising social inequality. After 70 years of electoral politics, India's transition from the Congress party system to multiparty competition. Asylum still exists or even deep-rooted. How does fierce party competition affect asylum, and what is the relationship between party politics and asylum? This is the question the author is trying to explain. First, the political parties in India rely on the asylum network for political mobilization. The change in the intensity of political party competition has changed the structure of Indian asylum network, and the center of gravity of the asylum network has sunk. This eventually led to the further infiltration of asylum doctrine. Second, in order to ease the pressure on the distribution of asylum resources, political parties strengthened the resilience of asylum ties through emotional mobilization, and eventually led to the rise of ethnic democracy. This paper tries to explain the relationship between political party competition and asylum from the perspective of state and society, in the framework of national system, and promote the penetration of the second round of asylum doctrine, and form a closed circle of self-circulation, which intensifies the aggravation of the competition of political parties, and promotes the infiltration of the second round of asylum doctrine. The centralized federal system in India and the establishment of Panchayat provide institutional space for the penetration of asylum in India. In terms of social structure, the heterogeneous and pluralistic Indian society provides the possibility for the change of party politics. The author reproduces the asylum pyramid of the patriarchs, brokers and attendants, explores the material and emotional attributes of the sheltered ties, and understands the dynamic changes of the sheltered network under the competition of political parties. The author regards the competition of Indian political parties as an independent variable. Taking asylum doctrine and its sheltered network as dependent variables, we compare the asylum network between the Congress Party system and the multi-party competition period, and analyze the changes in the composition and exchange mode of the asylum network. To compensate for the decline in party authority caused by Nehru's death, Indira built a populist asylum machine from the prime minister to voters, bypassing the party's traditional asylum network and ultimately weakening the party's voter base. The center of gravity of the asylum network sank to the states. During the period of multi-party competition, the localization of federal politics in India, the local political parties leveraged the distribution of resources throughout the country, the lower castes and the economically able began to build their own sheltered networks. Instead of the dominant position of the traditional high caste, the establishment of the Panchayat system allowed the exchange of asylum among local political parties to permeate the village level, and asylum doctrine became more alive. Finally, this paper predicts that there is a structural decay in asylum democracy in India. That is, relying on material incentives for political mobilization, the government will face snowball pressure on distribution, power rent-seeking and corruption will be hard to eliminate. Any structural adjustment will weaken the party's voter base. India's democratic inflation can only be put on hold by fiscal overdraft.
【学位授予单位】：武汉大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D735.1

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