核时代的虚张声势行为——以朝鲜在第四次核试验后的行为为例

发布时间：2018-03-06 04:25

本文选题：虚张声势　切入点：核威慑　出处：《外交评论(外交学院学报)》2017年06期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：在核时代的国际政治中,虚张声势是一种比较常见的威慑行为,它旨在通过夸大自我实力和意图、释放虚假信号和推行不透明政策,以及不经意间越过政策红线的边缘政策,迫使对手放弃攻击意图,以维护自身国家安全。一个刚跨过核门槛的国家往往倾向于利用虚张声势行为威慑敌对核大国,以防止敌对核大国在其尚未获得可信核威慑时发动先发制人打击,并最终促使敌对核大国承认其核国家地位。刚跨过核门槛的国家作为较弱一方,其虚张声势行为受到技术进步、政体安全和联盟凝聚力三个因素的重要影响。从战略效用来看,虚张声势行为不仅可以帮助刚跨过核门槛的国家隐藏弱点,有利于其度过危险的过渡期,也可以作为展示决心的重要途径,进而增加敌对核大国的战略成本。以朝鲜在第四次核试验后的虚张声势行为为例,本文还进一步分析了刚跨过核门槛国家虚张声势行为的内在机制。
[Abstract]:In the international politics of the nuclear age, bravado is a more common act of deterrence, designed to unleash false signals and policies of opacity, as well as policies that inadvertently cross the red line of policies, by exaggerating their own power and intentions. A country that has just crossed the nuclear threshold tends to use bluff to deter hostile nuclear powers. In order to prevent hostile nuclear Powers from launching pre-emptive strikes when they have not yet received credible nuclear deterrence and, ultimately, to induce hostile nuclear Powers to recognize their nuclear statehood... States that have just passed the nuclear threshold are the weaker parties, Its bravado is greatly influenced by technological advances, regime security and alliance cohesion. From a strategic point of view, bluffing can not only help countries that have just crossed the nuclear threshold hide their weaknesses, It can also serve as an important way to show determination and thus increase the strategic costs of hostile nuclear powers. Take North Korea's bravado after the 4th nuclear test as an example. The internal mechanism of bluff behavior in countries that have just crossed the nuclear threshold is also analyzed.
【作者单位】：中国人民大学国际关系学院;
【分类号】：D815.2

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