当代俄罗斯社会寻租的机理与影响评析
发布时间：2018-08-07 13:29
【摘要】：本文主要分为三个部分:第一部分(第一章)对寻租理论及政商关系的国内外理论和研究成果进行了深入挖掘与梳理;第二部分包括第二章和第三章,探索了俄罗斯社会寻租现象的原因,分析了俄罗斯社会的寻租结构,并解析了寻租如何影响政商关系及俄罗斯经济发展;第三部分(第四章)从实证的角度评价了俄罗斯社会寻租对企业表现和宏观经济发展的影响。俄罗斯社会政商寻租水平在30个转型国家中处于较高的位置,且腐败已经成为直接阻碍俄罗斯企业发展的重要因素之一。俄罗斯社会中寻租行为广泛存在,一方面是由于寻租产生的必然性,另一方面则是由俄罗斯转型过程中的私有化改革及其特定的历史条件所决定,其寻租又具有特殊性。寻租结果与政商关系有关。大型企业和寡头与政府官员的关系更接近合作关系,通常都在联邦一级拥有代言人,能够在一定程度上影响联邦层面的决策;中小型企业与官员的关系则不是对等的,谈判力和话语权都比较弱,也无法影响高层政府的决策。本文从不同角度对俄罗斯社会寻租的机理及影响进行分析后,得出以下结论:1)寻租广泛分布于食品、纺织、机械、交通那等各个行业。寻租代价与是否与政府有交易关系无关,与行业性质有关;不同所有权类型企业寻租情况不同,有国有资本成分的企业与政府合作最紧密,其次是民营资本,再次是外国资本。2)寻租并不会为企业带来显著的业绩增长,其销售增长率显著低于低政府俘获国家的总体平均值,这一点在俄罗斯的高政府俘获企业和低政府俘获企业的对比中更加突出,所以在过去三年中,俄罗斯企业并未从高政府俘获中获得相应的回报,并且造成了资源的浪费。
[Abstract]:This paper is mainly divided into three parts: the first part (chapter one) deeply excavates and combs the domestic and foreign theories and research results of rent-seeking theory and the relationship between politics and business, the second part includes the second chapter and the third chapter. This paper probes into the causes of the phenomenon of rent-seeking in Russian society, analyzes the structure of rent-seeking in Russian society, and analyzes how rent-seeking affects the relationship between politics and business and the development of Russian economy. The third part (Chapter 4) evaluates the impact of social rent-seeking on the performance and macroeconomic development of Russian society. The level of political and commercial rent-seeking in Russian society is in a high position in 30 transition countries, and corruption has become one of the important factors directly hindering the development of Russian enterprises. Rent-seeking behavior exists widely in Russian society, on the one hand because of the inevitability of rent-seeking, on the other hand, it is determined by the privatization reform and its specific historical conditions in the process of Russian transformation, and its rent-seeking behavior has its particularity. The result of rent-seeking is related to the relationship between government and business. The relationship between large enterprises and oligarchs and government officials is closer to partnership, often with spokesmen at the federal level that can influence decision-making at the federal level to some extent, while the relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises and officials is not equal. Bargaining power and speaking power are weak, and can not affect the decision-making of high-level government. This paper analyzes the mechanism and influence of social rent-seeking in Russia from different angles, and draws the following conclusion: (1) Rent-seeking is widely distributed in food, textile, machinery, transportation and other industries. The rent-seeking cost has nothing to do with whether there is a transaction relationship with the government, it is related to the nature of the industry. Different types of enterprises have different rent-seeking situations. The enterprises with state-owned capital have the closest cooperation with the government, followed by private capital. Second, rent-seeking does not bring about significant growth in corporate performance. The growth rate of sales is significantly lower than the overall average of countries captured by low governments. This is particularly true in the contrast between high and low government capture firms in Russia, so in the past three years Russian firms have not received a corresponding return from high government capture and have caused a waste of resources.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D771.2
本文编号：2170167
[Abstract]:This paper is mainly divided into three parts: the first part (chapter one) deeply excavates and combs the domestic and foreign theories and research results of rent-seeking theory and the relationship between politics and business, the second part includes the second chapter and the third chapter. This paper probes into the causes of the phenomenon of rent-seeking in Russian society, analyzes the structure of rent-seeking in Russian society, and analyzes how rent-seeking affects the relationship between politics and business and the development of Russian economy. The third part (Chapter 4) evaluates the impact of social rent-seeking on the performance and macroeconomic development of Russian society. The level of political and commercial rent-seeking in Russian society is in a high position in 30 transition countries, and corruption has become one of the important factors directly hindering the development of Russian enterprises. Rent-seeking behavior exists widely in Russian society, on the one hand because of the inevitability of rent-seeking, on the other hand, it is determined by the privatization reform and its specific historical conditions in the process of Russian transformation, and its rent-seeking behavior has its particularity. The result of rent-seeking is related to the relationship between government and business. The relationship between large enterprises and oligarchs and government officials is closer to partnership, often with spokesmen at the federal level that can influence decision-making at the federal level to some extent, while the relationship between small and medium-sized enterprises and officials is not equal. Bargaining power and speaking power are weak, and can not affect the decision-making of high-level government. This paper analyzes the mechanism and influence of social rent-seeking in Russia from different angles, and draws the following conclusion: (1) Rent-seeking is widely distributed in food, textile, machinery, transportation and other industries. The rent-seeking cost has nothing to do with whether there is a transaction relationship with the government, it is related to the nature of the industry. Different types of enterprises have different rent-seeking situations. The enterprises with state-owned capital have the closest cooperation with the government, followed by private capital. Second, rent-seeking does not bring about significant growth in corporate performance. The growth rate of sales is significantly lower than the overall average of countries captured by low governments. This is particularly true in the contrast between high and low government capture firms in Russia, so in the past three years Russian firms have not received a corresponding return from high government capture and have caused a waste of resources.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D771.2
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