认知态度的内容:命题论与属性论辨析
发布时间:2018-04-29 15:08
本文选题:认知态度 + 从己信念 ; 参考:《湖南科技大学学报(社会科学版)》2017年05期
【摘要】:信念等认知态度通常被认为是主体与命题间的一种关系,并且它们的内容也被认为是具有真假值的命题。但是这种观念却无法为从己信念的内容找到恰当的命题。而对"行为解释论证"和"两个上帝论证"的重构,可以说明从己信念问题的解决需要我们放弃关于信念等认知态度的主导观念——命题教条,即信念是主体与具有真假值的命题之间的关系,转而主张属性论,即信念是主体与自我归属的属性之间的关系。在考察了命题主义者对"两个上帝论证"及属性论的主要反驳后,就更有理由坚持属性论。
[Abstract]:Cognitive attitudes such as beliefs are generally considered as a relationship between subjects and propositions, and their contents are regarded as propositions with true and false values. But this kind of idea cannot find the proper proposition from the content of one's own belief. The reconstruction of "behavior explanation argumentation" and "two God argumentation" can show that from the solution of self-belief problem we need to give up the dominant concept of belief such as belief-propositional dogma. That is, belief is the relationship between the subject and the proposition with true and false value, and the theory of attribute is advocated instead, that is, belief is the relationship between the subject and the attribute of self-attribution. After examining the main rebuttal of "two gods' argument" and attribute theory by propositions, it is more reasonable to insist on attribute theory.
【作者单位】: 南京大学哲学系;
【基金】:国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(11&ZD187) 江苏省社会科学基金青年项目(16ZXC005) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2062014261)
【分类号】:B815.3
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本文编号:1820455
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