收缩论与断定的规范

发布时间：2018-05-16 20:32

  本文选题：真 + 断定　； 参考：《逻辑学研究》2017年02期

【摘要】："真"是不是断定行为的规范?收缩论者能否接受"真"作为断定的规范?怀特(Crispin Wright)回答"是"和"不能"。怀特尝试从真之规范出发证明收缩论是内在不一致的。他试图建立两条不一致性定理。然而怀特的论证并不成功:第二不一致性定理不能成立;第一不一致性定理则可以从另一途径——考虑真与断定的联系与区别——建立,无关乎真之规范。
[Abstract]:Is "true" the norm for determining conduct? Can the contractionary accept "truth" as the norm of determination? White Crispin Wright answered yes and no. White tries to prove that the theory of contraction is inherently inconsistent from the norm of truth. He tried to establish two inconsistency theorems. However, White's argument was not successful: the second inconsistency theorem could not be established, and the first inconsistency theorem could be established from another way-considering the connection and difference between truth and determination-without reference to the criterion of truth.
【作者单位】： 中山大学逻辑与认知研究所;中山大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B815.3
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本文编号：1898297