指称、意向性和纯意向对象（英文）

发布时间：2018-06-04 11:16

  本文选题：intentional + speaker　； 参考：《逻辑学研究》2017年01期

【摘要】：要使信念和其他命题态度语境的量化有意义,存在两个大的困难。一个是所指称的对象可能不存在;另一个是共指称词项的替换性原则可能会在这样的语境下被破坏。我将在本文中论证,第一个问题可以通过如下方式解决:将信念对象看成是一类实体,这种实体不管它是否存在,都可以被指称。我将概述一种存在物的理论来使其可行。此外,我将论证,指示性指称本身不是直接指称;而且,当所涉及的共指称的两个词项都以直接指称的方式使用时,不存在替换性问题。
[Abstract]:There are two major difficulties in quantifying the context of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. One is that the object may not exist, the other is that the substitution principle of co-referential terms may be broken in this context. I will argue in this paper that the first problem can be solved by treating a belief object as a class of entities that can be referred to no matter whether it exists or not. I will outline an existential theory to make it feasible. In addition, I will argue that the indicative reference is not a direct reference per se; moreover, there is no question of substitution when the two terms of the co-reference in question are used in a direct manner.
【作者单位】： 奥斯陆大学哲学系;南京大学哲学系;
【分类号】：B812
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本文编号：1977162