先验偶然真理理论研究
发布时间：2018-08-03 15:51
【摘要】：通过逻辑分析和语言分析的方法，以逻辑行动主义方法论对认知与行动主体所面对的“三个世界”——思想世界、语言世界和实在世界的区分作为分析工具，重新考量了“先验性”、“必然性”、“分析性”三组传统范畴和克里普克提出的“先验偶然真理”理论，论证了克里普克所举证的命题并非“先验偶然真理”。 首先，就三组范畴而言，“先验性”属于认识论范畴，表征某一认知的最初获得过程独立于经验。“必然性”属于形而上学范畴，分为“相对的必然”和“绝对的必然”。“分析性”属于语言哲学范畴，表达了在语言世界中，语句内部的语词已经存在着某种程度的同义，分析语句的否定是自相矛盾的。其次，就名称理论而言，认知与行动主体的思维当中存在着关于表示对象的语词的内涵和外延的意识或能动反映，这种意识表现在语言世界中就使得名称具有涵义和指称。虽然摹状词在一定程度上可以是克里普克所谓的“严格指示词”，但严格化的摹状词与专名并非完全等同。 由此，可以自然地得到结论：“巴黎标准米尺”之例是一个后验认识的命题，，它表征的内容具有目前实在世界中的“相对的必然性”，并不具有“绝对的必然性”。先验认识的例证“海王星”之例及“我思故我在”可以表征实在世界中的“相对的必然性”。对克里普克“先验偶然真理”理论的研究表明，先验真理和后验真理可以表征相对必然的事态，不能表征绝对必然的事态。
[Abstract]:Through the methods of logical analysis and linguistic analysis, the paper uses the method of logical activism to distinguish the "three worlds" between cognition and action subjects: the world of thought, the world of language and the world of reality. Reconsidering the three traditional categories of "transcendence", "inevitability", "analytical" and the theory of "transcendental accidental truth" put forward by Kripke, the thesis proves that the proposition that Kripke proves is not "transcendental accidental truth". First of all, as far as three categories are concerned, transcendence belongs to the category of epistemology, and the initial acquisition of a certain cognition is independent of experience. Necessity belongs to metaphysical category, divided into relative necessity and absolute necessity. "Analytical" belongs to the category of linguistic philosophy, which expresses that in the world of language, words within sentences already have some synonyms, and the negation of analytical sentences is self-contradictory. Secondly, as far as name theory is concerned, in the thinking of cognitive and action subjects, there is a conscious or active reflection of the connotation and extension of the words of the object of expression, which makes the name have meaning and reference in the world of language. Although the description can to some extent be called "strict demonstrative word" by Kripke, the strict description is not completely equivalent to the proper name. Thus, it is natural to draw a conclusion that the example of "Paris Standard Meter" is a posteriori proposition, which represents the "relative inevitability" of the present real world, but not the "absolute inevitability". A priori example of Neptune and "I think I am" can represent the "relative inevitability" in the real world. The study of Kripke's theory of "transcendental accidental truth" shows that transcendental truth and posteriori truth can represent the state of affairs of relative necessity, but not those of absolute necessity.
【学位授予单位】：燕山大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：B81-0
本文编号：2162223
[Abstract]:Through the methods of logical analysis and linguistic analysis, the paper uses the method of logical activism to distinguish the "three worlds" between cognition and action subjects: the world of thought, the world of language and the world of reality. Reconsidering the three traditional categories of "transcendence", "inevitability", "analytical" and the theory of "transcendental accidental truth" put forward by Kripke, the thesis proves that the proposition that Kripke proves is not "transcendental accidental truth". First of all, as far as three categories are concerned, transcendence belongs to the category of epistemology, and the initial acquisition of a certain cognition is independent of experience. Necessity belongs to metaphysical category, divided into relative necessity and absolute necessity. "Analytical" belongs to the category of linguistic philosophy, which expresses that in the world of language, words within sentences already have some synonyms, and the negation of analytical sentences is self-contradictory. Secondly, as far as name theory is concerned, in the thinking of cognitive and action subjects, there is a conscious or active reflection of the connotation and extension of the words of the object of expression, which makes the name have meaning and reference in the world of language. Although the description can to some extent be called "strict demonstrative word" by Kripke, the strict description is not completely equivalent to the proper name. Thus, it is natural to draw a conclusion that the example of "Paris Standard Meter" is a posteriori proposition, which represents the "relative inevitability" of the present real world, but not the "absolute inevitability". A priori example of Neptune and "I think I am" can represent the "relative inevitability" in the real world. The study of Kripke's theory of "transcendental accidental truth" shows that transcendental truth and posteriori truth can represent the state of affairs of relative necessity, but not those of absolute necessity.
【学位授予单位】：燕山大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：B81-0
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