富人治村—浙中吴镇的权力实践（1996-2011）

发布时间：2018-03-30 10:14

本文选题：富人治村　切入点：乡村场域　出处：《华中科技大学》2012年博士论文

【摘要】：进入后税费时代,“富人治村”已成为乡村治理中的主流模式,这一权力结构变化背后有经济背景、社会基础、制度与政策因素的复杂作用。一方面,税改后的农村基层政治在摆脱了资源汲取的压力之后开始初步民主化,对选举的控制逐渐放开；另一方面,随着经济的飞速发展,乡村社会出现了剧烈的分化,与此同时国家也在通过大幅下渗公共品资源缓解农村的衰颓。在国家的基础设施建设投入与地方政府的土地开发进程中,城镇周边农村的超级地租开始出现。新的时代背景下,顺利承接资源、完成土地增值开发、引导农民致富成为农村基层工作的中心任务,基层组织建设中的“双带方针”由是兴起,农村先富能人阶层在地方政府基础性权力不足的情况下成为基层工作达致目标的支柱力量。然而,当由权力主导的巨大利益空间出现之后,村两委选举及人大代表直选便被财富所左右,“贿选”进入相当普遍而难以监管的灰色地带。村庄政治的公共性严重萎缩,占人口大多数的中下阶层被排斥出去,民主决策、民主管理与民主监督难以实现,规范利益分配的各种制度设计在权力实践中得不到有效的执行。乡村社会的权力结构在日益激烈的竞争中趋于寡头化。个体的富人出于桑梓情怀回报家乡的类慈善行为并不能代表富人阶层的参政动机。作为一个整体,他们的投资遵循“一步领先、步步领先”的竞争逻辑,而且前提是自身获利更多。虽然他们的投入客观上能使局部地区获得资源,但却以更多地区的利益受损为代价,因为他们所要承接的资源总量是有限的。更为重要的是,横亘于国家与社会之间的寡头结构放大了基层场域中权力-利益网络的“结构洞”效应,从上至下输入农村的资源在流动过程中被大量吸食,且流量愈大吸食愈深,乡村治理发生了内卷化。这与税改前发生的国家政权内卷化如出一辙,只不过资源流向发生了逆转。所以,如果不能在将乡村社会加以组织的基础上设法以协商民主的政治过程代替权力主体的利益博弈,那么权力-市场的结盟不仅会使国家下渗资源的战略意图落空,还会将经济社会运行带入“转型陷阱”中,停滞、溃烂。
[Abstract]:In the post-tax era, "the rich people ruling villages" has become the mainstream mode in rural governance, which has the complex effects of economic background, social foundation, system and policy factors behind the change of power structure. After the tax reform, rural grassroots politics began to democratize initially after getting rid of the pressure of absorbing resources, and the control of elections was gradually liberalized. On the other hand, with the rapid development of the economy, the rural society became sharply divided. At the same time, the country is also alleviating the decline of rural areas through the massive infiltration of public goods resources. In the process of investment in national infrastructure construction and land development by local governments, the super-rent in the rural areas around cities and towns has begun to emerge. Under the new background of the times, Undertaking resources smoothly, completing land value-added development, and guiding farmers to become rich become the central task of rural grassroots work. The "double belt policy" in the construction of grass-roots organizations has arisen. Under the condition that the basic power of the local government is insufficient, the rural rich and talented stratum becomes the pillar force to achieve the goal of the grass-roots work. However, after the emergence of a huge interest space dominated by power, the election of the two committees of the village and the direct election of the deputies to the people's Congress were influenced by wealth, and the "bribery election" entered a very common gray area which was difficult to supervise. The public nature of the village politics shrank severely. The middle and lower classes, which make up the majority of the population, are excluded, and democratic decision-making, democratic management and democratic supervision are difficult to achieve. The system design of regulating the distribution of benefits cannot be carried out effectively in the practice of power, and the power structure of rural society tends to be oligopolistic in the increasingly fierce competition. The philanthropic behavior of individual rich people in return for their hometown is not representative of the political motivation of the rich class. As a whole, their investments follow the competitive logic of "one step ahead, step by step". And the premise is that they are profiting more. Although their investment can objectively lead to local access to resources, it is at the expense of the interests of more regions, because the total amount of resources they have to undertake is limited. More importantly, The oligarchic structure between the state and the society amplifies the "structural hole" effect of the power-interest network in the grass-roots field. The resources imported from the top to the bottom are sucked in a large amount during the flow process, and the greater the flow is, the deeper the sucking is. Rural governance has been internalized. This is the same as before the tax reform, but the flow of resources has been reversed. If the political process of deliberative democracy can not be used to replace the interests of power subjects on the basis of organizing rural society, then the alliance of power and market will not only frustrate the strategic intention of the state to infiltrate resources. Will also bring the economic and social operation into the "transition trap", stagnation, ulceration.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：C912.82

【引证文献】