基于演化博弈论的网络舆情危机治理策略研究
发布时间：2018-12-26 08:25
【摘要】：网络既是网民参与政治、评论是非的重要场所,也是网民通过网媒与政府进行沟通、交流的主流形式。新环境下的网络舆情,既涉及了网民自身需求的有效表达,也挑战着网媒在网民与政府之间的协调能力,更是考验着政府的治理能力。基于演化博弈论来研究网络舆情危机的治理,能够使我们清晰地了解到:网络舆情危机中网络参与主体之间相互博弈的动态演变过程,进而知道如何选择最优化策略来达到平衡,最终优化网络舆情危机的有效治理。围绕着演化博弈论来研究网络舆情危机治理的具体策略。以相关的文献研究为基础,针对现实生活中具体的网络舆情危机事件,分析网络舆情危机事件中关键性博弈主体,对各博弈主体的相关参数与概率作出假设,通过构建各博弈主体之间的演化博弈模型来进行分析。分析认为,网络舆情危机事件中主要的博弈主体为三个:政府、网媒、网民。在网络舆情危机事件中,博弈主体可以根据自身或对方的情况进行选择,政府可以选择积极治理,消极治理的方式,网媒可以选择推动,阻滞的方式,网民可以选择积极参与,消极参与的方式,他们会根据对方的选择相对应地调整自己的选择。博弈模型的结果表明:第一,通过减少政府积极治理成本,增加政府积极治理收益,增加网媒选择推动策略时的罚金收益,增加政府消极治理成本,能提高政府选择积极治理网络舆情危机的概率以及治理的效率。第二,通过增加网媒推动网络舆情危机发展时的固定成本,增加政府对网媒推动网络舆情危机发展的罚金,降低网媒推动网络舆情危机发展带来的收益,降低网媒采取阻滞策略的损失成本,来提高网媒采取阻滞策略的概率。第三,通过减少网民积极参与网络舆情危机所需要花费的固定成本,减少网民积极参与网络舆情危机时,获得信息所需要支付的其它途径成本,增加网民积极参与网络舆情危机的自身收益,减少网民消极参与网络舆情危机的潜在成本,增加网民积极参与网络舆情危机获得的收益,来提高网民积极参与网络舆情危机的概率。最终得出结论:为提高网络舆情危机治理的有效性,完善网络舆情危机的治理策略,需要从政府、网媒、网民三个层面进行反思。提出以下若干建议:第一,树立合理地思维意识。第二,建立科学的治理流程。第三,构建完备的治理保障。第四,端正参与态度。第五,培养健康的参与素养。第六,维护有序的参与秩序。第七,发挥网络大“V”的积极作用。第八,完善教育培训内容。第九,增强网络参与能力。
[Abstract]:The Internet is not only an important place for netizens to participate in politics and comment on right and wrong, but also a mainstream form of communication between Internet users and the government. The network public opinion under the new environment not only involves the effective expression of the Internet users' own needs, but also challenges the coordination ability of the network media between the netizens and the government, and also tests the governance ability of the government. To study the governance of network public opinion crisis based on evolutionary game theory can make us understand clearly the dynamic evolution process of the game between network participants in network public opinion crisis. Then we know how to choose the optimal strategy to achieve balance and finally optimize the effective management of network public opinion crisis. Around the evolution game theory to study the network public opinion crisis management specific strategy. On the basis of relevant literature research, this paper analyzes the key players of network public opinion crisis events in real life, and makes assumptions about the relevant parameters and probability of each game subject. The evolutionary game model between the players is constructed to analyze. The analysis shows that there are three main players in the crisis of network public opinion: government, network media and Internet users. In the crisis event of network public opinion, the main body of the game can choose according to their own or the other party's situation, the government can choose the way of positive governance, negative governance, network media can choose to push, block the way, the netizen can choose to participate actively. In the way of negative participation, they adjust their choices according to each other's choices. The results of the game model show that: first, by reducing the cost of active governance of the government, increasing the revenue of the positive governance of the government, increasing the fines when the network media choose the promotion strategy, and increasing the cost of the negative governance of the government. It can improve the probability that the government chooses to manage network public opinion crisis actively and the efficiency of governance. Second, by increasing the fixed cost of the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, increasing the government penalty for the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, reducing the net media to promote the network public opinion crisis development to bring the income. The loss cost of blocking strategy is reduced to increase the probability of adopting blocking strategy. Third, by reducing the fixed cost of Internet users to actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, reduce the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, access to information needs to pay other way costs. Increase the self-income of the Internet public opinion crisis, reduce the potential cost of the negative participation in the network public opinion crisis, increase the income that the netizen actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, To improve the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis probability. Finally the conclusion is drawn: in order to improve the effectiveness of network public opinion crisis governance and improve the governance strategy of network public opinion crisis, it is necessary to reflect on it from three levels: government, network media and Internet users. Put forward the following several suggestions: first, set up reasonable thinking consciousness. Second, establish a scientific governance process. Third, the construction of complete governance protection. Fourth, correct participation attitude. Fifth, cultivate healthy participation literacy. Sixth, to maintain an orderly order of participation. Seventh, give play to the positive role of the network "V". Eighth, improve the content of education and training. Ninth, enhance the ability of network participation.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：C912.63
本文编号：2391814
[Abstract]:The Internet is not only an important place for netizens to participate in politics and comment on right and wrong, but also a mainstream form of communication between Internet users and the government. The network public opinion under the new environment not only involves the effective expression of the Internet users' own needs, but also challenges the coordination ability of the network media between the netizens and the government, and also tests the governance ability of the government. To study the governance of network public opinion crisis based on evolutionary game theory can make us understand clearly the dynamic evolution process of the game between network participants in network public opinion crisis. Then we know how to choose the optimal strategy to achieve balance and finally optimize the effective management of network public opinion crisis. Around the evolution game theory to study the network public opinion crisis management specific strategy. On the basis of relevant literature research, this paper analyzes the key players of network public opinion crisis events in real life, and makes assumptions about the relevant parameters and probability of each game subject. The evolutionary game model between the players is constructed to analyze. The analysis shows that there are three main players in the crisis of network public opinion: government, network media and Internet users. In the crisis event of network public opinion, the main body of the game can choose according to their own or the other party's situation, the government can choose the way of positive governance, negative governance, network media can choose to push, block the way, the netizen can choose to participate actively. In the way of negative participation, they adjust their choices according to each other's choices. The results of the game model show that: first, by reducing the cost of active governance of the government, increasing the revenue of the positive governance of the government, increasing the fines when the network media choose the promotion strategy, and increasing the cost of the negative governance of the government. It can improve the probability that the government chooses to manage network public opinion crisis actively and the efficiency of governance. Second, by increasing the fixed cost of the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, increasing the government penalty for the network media to promote the development of the network public opinion crisis, reducing the net media to promote the network public opinion crisis development to bring the income. The loss cost of blocking strategy is reduced to increase the probability of adopting blocking strategy. Third, by reducing the fixed cost of Internet users to actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, reduce the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, access to information needs to pay other way costs. Increase the self-income of the Internet public opinion crisis, reduce the potential cost of the negative participation in the network public opinion crisis, increase the income that the netizen actively participate in the network public opinion crisis, To improve the Internet users actively participate in the network public opinion crisis probability. Finally the conclusion is drawn: in order to improve the effectiveness of network public opinion crisis governance and improve the governance strategy of network public opinion crisis, it is necessary to reflect on it from three levels: government, network media and Internet users. Put forward the following several suggestions: first, set up reasonable thinking consciousness. Second, establish a scientific governance process. Third, the construction of complete governance protection. Fourth, correct participation attitude. Fifth, cultivate healthy participation literacy. Sixth, to maintain an orderly order of participation. Seventh, give play to the positive role of the network "V". Eighth, improve the content of education and training. Ninth, enhance the ability of network participation.
【学位授予单位】：湘潭大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：C912.63
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