重复囚徒困境视角下的两次朝核危机

发布时间：2018-04-07 16:25

本文选题：朝核危机　切入点：博弈模式　出处：《华东师范大学》2011年硕士论文

【摘要】：朝鲜问题无疑是东亚地区“冷冻的活火山”,朝核问题更是关乎亚太地区和平稳定的重要问题之一。在始于上世纪90年代初期的第一次朝核危机和2002年10月爆发的第二次朝核危机中,美国均未能实现其对朝政策的理想目标——解除朝鲜的核武计划,维护核不扩散机制和半岛稳定。相反,在美朝对局当中,朝鲜却成功迫使美国两次与其达成了缓和紧张局势的协议——1994年的《美朝核框架协议》和2007年的《“2·13”共同文件》。美国和朝鲜之间是经历了怎样的博弈过程才达成了两份协议?两国是选择实施了什么样的策略才实现了从对峙向“合作”的过渡?两国间的博弈模式呈现出什么样的特点?这是作者所关注的问题。本文以密歇根大学政治学教授罗伯特·艾克斯罗德(Robert Axelrod)关于合作演进的理论为基础,分析了美朝围绕朝核问题进行的“重复囚徒困境”博弈,并对美朝在博弈期间政策行为的强硬与合作程度进行赋值,画出双方政策行为的过程图。最后,本文将在这些过程图和分析的基础上总结美朝博弈的行为特点。本文共分五章,从博弈理论的框架出发,阐述朝核危机的爆发、僵持以及化解过程中的美朝博弈。第一章为博弈论的分析框架和本文的研究内容,第二章阐述美朝博弈中各自的策略选择和利益诉求,第三章和第四章运用了政策行为过程图的方法分别剖析了两次朝核危机中的美朝博弈过程、各自的行为策略和政策走向,并重点分析了两份协议达成前后美朝间的“利益交换”。第五章分析了美朝在危机博弈时的行为特点。本文采用过程图的方法对美朝博弈过程分析后发现,美朝在两次核危机中所表现出的博弈模式符合“重复囚徒困境”的特征,而且双方的对局过程也证明了艾斯克罗德教授“合作演进”理论的有效性。本文总结发现,一方面,美国的对朝策略行为表现出双层博弈的特征；另一方面,除第一次朝核危机爆发阶段之外,此后的朝鲜对美策略表现出了与美国对朝策略很强的同步性,尤其是在朝鲜实施“以牙还牙”的策略后,美国才真正认识到朝鲜的态度立场并回到谈判桌前,由此实现了从对抗到达成协议、缓和危机的演变。《“2·13”共同文件》签署后,朝鲜半岛的政治格局和安全形势也发生了巨大的变化,朝核危机的发展也面临着一系列新的环境和因素。如果美朝仍然延续过去的“以牙还牙”的博弈规则,朝核危机将很难走出美朝互不信任的困境。
[Abstract]:The Korean issue is undoubtedly a frozen active volcano in East Asia, and the North Korean nuclear issue is one of the most important issues related to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.During the first North Korean nuclear crisis, which began in the early 1990s, and the second North Korean nuclear crisis, which broke out in October 2002, the United States failed to achieve the ideal goal of its policy towards North Korea-the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.To maintain the nuclear non-proliferation regime and stability on the peninsula.On the contrary, North Korea succeeded in forcing the United States twice to reach an agreement with the United States to ease tensions-the 1994 US-DPRK Nuclear Framework Agreement and the 2007 "213" Joint document.What was the game between the United States and North Korea that led to two agreements?What strategy did the two countries choose to implement in order to achieve the transition from confrontation to "cooperation"?What are the characteristics of the game model between the two countries?This is a matter of concern to the author.Based on Robert Axelrod, a professor of political science at the University of Michigan, this paper analyzes the "repeated prisoner's dilemma" game around the North Korean nuclear issue in the United States and North Korea.And the policy behavior of the United States and North Korea in the game during the tough and cooperative degree of assignment, draw the process of policy behavior of both sides.Finally, based on these process diagrams and analysis, this paper summarizes the behavioral characteristics of the game.This paper is divided into five chapters, starting from the framework of game theory, this paper expounds the outbreak of nuclear crisis in North Korea, stalemate and the United States and North Korea in the process of resolving the game.The first chapter is the analysis frame of game theory and the research content of this paper.The third and fourth chapters use the method of the policy behavior process diagram to analyze the game process of the United States and North Korea in the two North Korean nuclear crises, their behavior strategies and policy trends, respectively.And analyzed the two agreements before and after the agreement between the United States and North Korea between the "exchange of interests."The fifth chapter analyzes the behavior characteristics of the United States and North Korea in the crisis game.After analyzing the game process between the United States and North Korea by using the method of process diagram, it is found that the game pattern of the United States and North Korea in the two nuclear crises accords with the characteristics of "repeated prisoner's dilemma".Moreover, the process of the two sides also proves the validity of Professor Esclarde's theory of "cooperative evolution".This paper concludes that, on the one hand, the strategic behavior of the United States toward North Korea shows the characteristics of a two-tier game; on the other hand, in addition to the outbreak of the first North Korean nuclear crisis,Since then, North Korea's strategy towards the United States has shown a strong synchronization with the United States' strategy towards the DPRK, especially after the DPRK implemented the "tit-for-tat" strategy, before the United States really realized the DPRK's stance and returned to the negotiating table.This achieved from confrontation to reach an agreement, ease the evolution of the crisis.After the signing of the "213" common document, the political structure and security situation of the Korean Peninsula have also undergone tremendous changes, and the development of the Korean nuclear crisis is also facing a series of new circumstances and factors.If the United States and North Korea continue the "tit-for-tat" game rules of the past, the North Korean nuclear crisis will be difficult to extricate itself from the dilemma of mistrust between the United States and North Korea.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：D815.2

【参考文献】