反恐国际合作双重标准问题的序贯互惠博弈模型

发布时间：2018-06-25 23:08

本文选题：恐怖主义 + 反恐合作　；参考：《中国管理科学》2015年S1期

【摘要】：恐怖主义成为世界各国面临的重大挑战,但是中美反恐国际合作却面临着美国在反恐问题上采取"双重标准"的问题。本文考虑到反恐国际合作的战略互惠关系和心理效用,建立了反恐国际合作双重标准问题的序贯互惠博弈模型。分析了当事国之间在构建长期互惠的反恐合作关系,与采取"双重标准"或搭便车行为获取单方面收益之间的权衡,剖析了反恐国际合作失败的主要原因。研究表明,影响反恐合作的主要因素是双方对战略互惠关系的重视程度(互惠敏感系数)、双重标准或搭便车的单方面获益、反恐合作成本等。增加反恐合作效用、降低合作成本和双重标准等单方面行动获益,有助于实现反恐国际合作。
[Abstract]:Terrorism has become a major challenge to all countries in the world, but the international cooperation between China and the United States is confronted with the issue of "double standards" adopted by the United States on the issue of counter-terrorism. In this paper, considering the strategic reciprocity and psychological utility of international cooperation against terrorism, a sequential reciprocal game model for the double standard problem of international cooperation against terrorism is established. This paper analyzes the tradeoff between the countries concerned in establishing a long-term reciprocal anti-terrorism cooperation relationship and taking "double standards" or hitchhiking to obtain unilateral benefits, and analyzes the main reasons for the failure of international cooperation against terrorism. The research shows that the main factors influencing anti-terrorism cooperation are the importance of strategic reciprocal relationship (reciprocity sensitivity coefficient), the unilateral benefit of double standards or hitchhiking, the cost of anti-terrorism cooperation and so on. Increasing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism cooperation, reducing cooperation costs and double standards and other unilateral actions to help achieve counter-terrorism international cooperation.
【作者单位】：东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心;东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171035;71271045) 东北财经大学学科建设支持计划公共安全治理特色学科项目(XKT-201411) 国际合作研究支持项目(DUFE2015GY03)
【分类号】：D815.5

【共引文献】