基于碳关税理念的国家利益博弈研究
发布时间：2018-09-14 18:57
【摘要】：碳关税是一国以保护环境、应对全球气候变暖的危机为由，对没有温室气体减排限制的国家的高能耗出口产品在一般关税的基础上附加征收的一种特殊的环境税，以此阻碍他国产品进入本国市场，从而达到保护本国市场的目的。它最早由法国前总统雅克·希拉克提出，其用意是希望欧盟国家针对未遵守《京都协定书》的国家课征商品进口税，其实质是一种绿色关税，是一种广义的技术性贸易壁垒。“碳关税”深深根植于欧盟和美国曾经一度极为盛行的“碳政治”理念与“低碳政治”思潮，它本身其实是在国际气候变暖的大背景下所产生的一种与碳排放有关的政治经济博弈手段，尤其是在后金融危机时代以及欧洲债务危机时代的全球经济不景气的态势下，，被广泛的应用到各自的国家发展战略与国家利益上。从本质上来说碳关税问题是一个国际政治经济问题，其背后隐藏着复杂的战略利益博弈。 本文首先分析碳关税形成的社会基础、政治基础、经济技术基础，然后提出其产生的相关法理依据，以“碳关税”和“低碳经济”为切入点，从发达国家之间的博弈、发展中国家之间的合作与利益诉求以及中国、美国、欧盟等国家之间在各个层面上的激烈博弈与竞争展开分析，主要基于国际关系理论中的公共选择理论与国际机制论作为理论基础，运用博弈论的方法，深入分析上述博弈各方在其不同的“碳政治”理念下所主导的针对“碳关税”与“低碳经济”问题的不同立场，深刻揭示博弈各方在“碳关税”背后所隐藏的复杂的国家利益。 最后，本文的落脚点就会回到“碳关税”的征收可能带给中国的影响方面，并且提出中国的应对策略，目的是期望得到解决由全球气候变暖所引发的一系列的国际利益博弈的有效办法，最终寻找出适合中国自身低碳经济发展的新路，在日趋激烈的国际“碳关税”博弈上，最大程度的维护国家利益。
[Abstract]:A carbon tariff is a special environmental tax that a country imposes on high-energy exports of countries without greenhouse gas emission reduction restrictions on the basis of general tariffs to protect the environment and respond to the global warming crisis. In order to prevent the entry of other products into the domestic market, thus achieving the purpose of protecting the domestic market. It was first put forward by Jacques Chirac, the former French president, and its intention is to impose import duties on goods for countries that do not comply with the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, it is a green tariff and a broad technical barrier to trade. The "carbon tariff" is deeply rooted in the idea of "carbon politics" and the "low-carbon politics" that once prevailed in the European Union and the United States. In fact, it is a kind of political and economic game means related to carbon emissions under the background of international warming, especially in the post-financial crisis era and the global economic depression in the era of European debt crisis. Is widely applied to their respective national development strategies and national interests. In essence, carbon tariff is an international political and economic problem, which hides a complicated strategic interest game. This paper first analyzes the social basis, political basis, economic and technical basis of carbon tariff formation, and then puts forward the relevant legal basis for the formation of carbon tariff, taking "carbon tariff" and "low carbon economy" as the starting point, from the game between developed countries. The cooperation and interest demands among developing countries, as well as the fierce game and competition among China, the United States, the European Union and other countries at various levels are analyzed. Mainly based on the theory of public choice and the theory of international mechanism in the theory of international relations, using the method of game theory, This paper deeply analyzes the different positions of the above game parties on the issues of "carbon tariff" and "low carbon economy" under their different "carbon politics" concept, and deeply reveals the complicated national interests hidden behind the "carbon tariff" by all parties involved in the game. Finally, the conclusion of this paper will return to the possible impact of "carbon tariff" collection on China, and put forward China's countermeasures. The aim is to find an effective way to solve a series of international interest games caused by global warming, and finally to find a new way suitable for the development of China's own low-carbon economy, in the increasingly fierce international "carbon tariff" game. To maximize the protection of national interests.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D815;X2
本文编号：2243590
[Abstract]:A carbon tariff is a special environmental tax that a country imposes on high-energy exports of countries without greenhouse gas emission reduction restrictions on the basis of general tariffs to protect the environment and respond to the global warming crisis. In order to prevent the entry of other products into the domestic market, thus achieving the purpose of protecting the domestic market. It was first put forward by Jacques Chirac, the former French president, and its intention is to impose import duties on goods for countries that do not comply with the Kyoto Protocol. In essence, it is a green tariff and a broad technical barrier to trade. The "carbon tariff" is deeply rooted in the idea of "carbon politics" and the "low-carbon politics" that once prevailed in the European Union and the United States. In fact, it is a kind of political and economic game means related to carbon emissions under the background of international warming, especially in the post-financial crisis era and the global economic depression in the era of European debt crisis. Is widely applied to their respective national development strategies and national interests. In essence, carbon tariff is an international political and economic problem, which hides a complicated strategic interest game. This paper first analyzes the social basis, political basis, economic and technical basis of carbon tariff formation, and then puts forward the relevant legal basis for the formation of carbon tariff, taking "carbon tariff" and "low carbon economy" as the starting point, from the game between developed countries. The cooperation and interest demands among developing countries, as well as the fierce game and competition among China, the United States, the European Union and other countries at various levels are analyzed. Mainly based on the theory of public choice and the theory of international mechanism in the theory of international relations, using the method of game theory, This paper deeply analyzes the different positions of the above game parties on the issues of "carbon tariff" and "low carbon economy" under their different "carbon politics" concept, and deeply reveals the complicated national interests hidden behind the "carbon tariff" by all parties involved in the game. Finally, the conclusion of this paper will return to the possible impact of "carbon tariff" collection on China, and put forward China's countermeasures. The aim is to find an effective way to solve a series of international interest games caused by global warming, and finally to find a new way suitable for the development of China's own low-carbon economy, in the increasingly fierce international "carbon tariff" game. To maximize the protection of national interests.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：D815;X2
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