国际危机中的领导人决策行为分析——基于多元启发理论视角
发布时间：2018-11-04 14:22
【摘要】：领导人如何进行危机决策?现有的四种模型——官僚政治模型、组织行为模型、理性选择模型、"刺激—反应"模型——仅提供部分解释,对该问题的研究在理论上仍存在不足。为弄清决策者在危机中的决策模式,形成"从动机到行为再到对策"的逻辑链条,本文在既有研究的基础上,从多元启发理论视角出发,结合博弈分析,进一步完善了从认知到理性分析两阶段式的领导人危机决策模型。论文选择第一次和第三次朝核危机中的朝美谈判为案例,验证了提出的领导人危机决策模型。对两次朝核危机中领导人决策的分析与比较,揭示了朝美领导人的博弈行为所表现出的一些特征,这有助于我们理解和判断朝核问题的走向。
[Abstract]:How do leaders make crisis decisions? The existing four models-bureaucracy model, organizational behavior model, rational choice model, stimulus-response model-only provide some explanations, but the research on this problem is still insufficient in theory. In order to make clear the decision mode of the decision maker in the crisis and form the logical chain of "from motive to behavior to countermeasure", this paper, on the basis of the existing research and from the angle of multiple heuristic theory, combines the game analysis. Further improved the two-stage leadership crisis decision-making model from cognition to rational analysis. In this paper, the DPRK-US negotiation in the first and third North Korean nuclear crisis is selected as a case to verify the proposed leadership crisis decision-making model. The analysis and comparison of the leaders' decision-making in the two North Korean nuclear crises reveals some characteristics of the game behavior of the leaders of the DPRK and the United States, which is helpful for us to understand and judge the trend of the North Korean nuclear issue.
【作者单位】： 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目(项目编号:13&ZD049)的资助
【分类号】：D815.2
[Abstract]:How do leaders make crisis decisions? The existing four models-bureaucracy model, organizational behavior model, rational choice model, stimulus-response model-only provide some explanations, but the research on this problem is still insufficient in theory. In order to make clear the decision mode of the decision maker in the crisis and form the logical chain of "from motive to behavior to countermeasure", this paper, on the basis of the existing research and from the angle of multiple heuristic theory, combines the game analysis. Further improved the two-stage leadership crisis decision-making model from cognition to rational analysis. In this paper, the DPRK-US negotiation in the first and third North Korean nuclear crisis is selected as a case to verify the proposed leadership crisis decision-making model. The analysis and comparison of the leaders' decision-making in the two North Korean nuclear crises reveals some characteristics of the game behavior of the leaders of the DPRK and the United States, which is helpful for us to understand and judge the trend of the North Korean nuclear issue.
【作者单位】： 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金重大项目(项目编号:13&ZD049)的资助
【分类号】：D815.2
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