冷战后美国台海政策析论
发布时间：2018-12-15 04:41
【摘要】：冷战结束后,美苏两极体系终结,美国在政治与军事方面取得单一的超级强国地位。虽然其他国家在经济等方面大有与美国分庭抗礼的态势也逐渐具备了这种实力,但总体而言,单极为主多元体系(uni-multipolar)的世界结构已然形成。美国的全球战略开始从与苏联争夺霸权转向确保其超级大国地位不受挑战,防止挑战其全球霸权地位的地区性大国的出现。本文以此作为背景,拉开后冷战时期美国的台海政策帷幕,以国际政治知名理论作为引导,引用相关史实和数据作为支撑,试图揭示美国的台海政策实质并探析其走向。全文共分为四章： 第一章为本文的导论部分。在对本课题的选题背景和研究价值阐述过后,着重围绕本选题,按照美国、大陆和台湾的地域划分,对国内外研究的相关成果进行梳理。 第二章通过扩大系统理论的理论假设基础,将中国大陆、台湾和美国两岸三方的复杂关系纳入结构现实主义的经典理论——系统理论之中,以美国为自变量剥离出其在台海两岸关系中扮演的独特角色。并对冷战后美国的台海政策进行历史追溯,希冀通过史实梳理出一个更为清晰详实的分析框架。 第三章主要将“两岸平衡”对美国的政策引导作为分析重点,并探讨这项政策带来的重大战略价值,由此深入分析美国采取以上举动的内在逻辑。其中利用美国在1995—1996年和1999年两次台海危机期间的表现作为本文提出的“两岸平衡”政策的现实支持。 第四章以1995—1996年台海危机期间三方的博弈结构为例揭示了美国在台海局势特别是台海危机中所能做到的极限,并结合三方实力变化趋势对比,得出美国台海政策的走向仍将是维持现状,继续扮演“两岸平衡者”。 最终结语部分给予全文总结：冷战结束后,虽然中美之间的共同战略利益——抗击苏联消失,但是随着中国国力的上升,美国希望保持同大陆的经贸往来,却也不放弃《与台湾关系法》。台海若没有战争威胁、两岸从事和平竞争发展经济、美国不需被迫卷入危机,应是美匡台海政策的优先目标。美国对北京的期待是,不能对台湾动武或威胁对台使用武力；对台北的期望则是,处理所有两岸关系问题时必须谨言慎行。其中,台海现状的核心是,台北与北京均不得发表声明或采取行动片面改变台湾地位。为了维持台海现状,美国在台海关系上日益成为一个平衡者,究其实质,美国的台海政策围绕如何保全其国家利益做出。同时,中国应该注意到这种宏观影响并及时制定应对措施规避甚至是利用“美国之手”,早日实现国家统一
[Abstract]:After the end of the Cold War, the two-pole system of the Soviet Union and the United States became a single super power in politics and military affairs. Although other countries have a tendency to compete with the United States in economic and other aspects, overall, the world structure of unipolar multivariate system (uni-multipolar) has been formed. The United States' global strategy began to shift from competing with the Soviet Union for hegemony to ensuring that its superpower status was not challenged and preventing the emergence of regional powers that challenged its global hegemony. Based on this background, this paper opens the curtain of American Taiwan Strait policy in the post-Cold War period, guided by the well-known international political theory, and cites relevant historical facts and data as the support to try to reveal the essence of the US Taiwan Strait policy and analyze its trend. The full text is divided into four chapters: the first chapter is the introduction of this article. After expounding the background and research value of this topic, this paper focuses on this topic, according to the regional division of the United States, mainland and Taiwan, to sort out the relevant research results at home and abroad. In the second chapter, by expanding the theoretical hypothesis of the system theory, the complex relations between mainland China, Taiwan and the United States are brought into the classical theory of structural realism, which is the system theory. With the United States as an independent variable, its unique role in cross-straits relations across the Taiwan Strait has been stripped out. By tracing the history of American Taiwan Strait policy after the Cold War, the author hopes to carve out a clearer and more detailed analysis framework through historical facts. The third chapter focuses on the policy guidance of "balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait" to the United States, and probes into the important strategic value brought about by this policy, thus deeply analyzing the inherent logic of the United States in taking the above actions. Among them, the performance of the United States during the two Taiwan Strait crises in 1995-1996 and 1999 is used as the realistic support of the "cross-strait balance" policy put forward in this paper. The fourth chapter takes the game structure of the three parties during the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996 as an example to reveal the limits that the United States can achieve in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, especially in the Taiwan Strait crisis. The conclusion is that the direction of the US Taiwan Strait policy will still be to maintain the status quo and continue to play the role of "the balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." The final conclusion gives the full text a summary: after the Cold War, although the common strategic interests between China and the United States-the disappearance of the Soviet Union, but with the rise of China's national strength, the United States hopes to maintain economic and trade exchanges with the mainland. But he did not give up the Taiwan Relations Act. If the Taiwan Strait is free from the threat of war and the two sides are engaged in peaceful competition to develop their economies, the United States does not have to be forced to get involved in the crisis, which should be a priority goal of its Taiwan Strait policy. The United States expects Beijing not to use force or threaten to use force against Taiwan, while Taipei is expected to be cautious in dealing with all issues related to cross-strait relations. The core of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is that neither Taipei nor Beijing can make statements or act unilaterally to change Taiwan's status. In order to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, the United States has increasingly become a balancer in the Taiwan Strait relations. In essence, American policy on the Taiwan Strait revolves around how to preserve its national interests. At the same time, China should pay attention to this macro-impact and formulate timely countermeasures to avoid or even make use of the "hands of the United States" to realize national reunification at an early date.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D871.2;D822.3
本文编号：2379999
[Abstract]:After the end of the Cold War, the two-pole system of the Soviet Union and the United States became a single super power in politics and military affairs. Although other countries have a tendency to compete with the United States in economic and other aspects, overall, the world structure of unipolar multivariate system (uni-multipolar) has been formed. The United States' global strategy began to shift from competing with the Soviet Union for hegemony to ensuring that its superpower status was not challenged and preventing the emergence of regional powers that challenged its global hegemony. Based on this background, this paper opens the curtain of American Taiwan Strait policy in the post-Cold War period, guided by the well-known international political theory, and cites relevant historical facts and data as the support to try to reveal the essence of the US Taiwan Strait policy and analyze its trend. The full text is divided into four chapters: the first chapter is the introduction of this article. After expounding the background and research value of this topic, this paper focuses on this topic, according to the regional division of the United States, mainland and Taiwan, to sort out the relevant research results at home and abroad. In the second chapter, by expanding the theoretical hypothesis of the system theory, the complex relations between mainland China, Taiwan and the United States are brought into the classical theory of structural realism, which is the system theory. With the United States as an independent variable, its unique role in cross-straits relations across the Taiwan Strait has been stripped out. By tracing the history of American Taiwan Strait policy after the Cold War, the author hopes to carve out a clearer and more detailed analysis framework through historical facts. The third chapter focuses on the policy guidance of "balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait" to the United States, and probes into the important strategic value brought about by this policy, thus deeply analyzing the inherent logic of the United States in taking the above actions. Among them, the performance of the United States during the two Taiwan Strait crises in 1995-1996 and 1999 is used as the realistic support of the "cross-strait balance" policy put forward in this paper. The fourth chapter takes the game structure of the three parties during the Taiwan Strait crisis from 1995 to 1996 as an example to reveal the limits that the United States can achieve in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, especially in the Taiwan Strait crisis. The conclusion is that the direction of the US Taiwan Strait policy will still be to maintain the status quo and continue to play the role of "the balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait." The final conclusion gives the full text a summary: after the Cold War, although the common strategic interests between China and the United States-the disappearance of the Soviet Union, but with the rise of China's national strength, the United States hopes to maintain economic and trade exchanges with the mainland. But he did not give up the Taiwan Relations Act. If the Taiwan Strait is free from the threat of war and the two sides are engaged in peaceful competition to develop their economies, the United States does not have to be forced to get involved in the crisis, which should be a priority goal of its Taiwan Strait policy. The United States expects Beijing not to use force or threaten to use force against Taiwan, while Taipei is expected to be cautious in dealing with all issues related to cross-strait relations. The core of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait is that neither Taipei nor Beijing can make statements or act unilaterally to change Taiwan's status. In order to maintain the status quo of the Taiwan Strait, the United States has increasingly become a balancer in the Taiwan Strait relations. In essence, American policy on the Taiwan Strait revolves around how to preserve its national interests. At the same time, China should pay attention to this macro-impact and formulate timely countermeasures to avoid or even make use of the "hands of the United States" to realize national reunification at an early date.
【学位授予单位】：南京大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：D871.2;D822.3
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前1条
1 吴心伯;反应与调整:1996年台海危机与美国对台政策[J];复旦学报(社会科学版);2004年02期
，本文编号：2379999
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