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试析美国尼克松政府与联邦德国“新东方”政策(1969-1974)

发布时间:2018-02-03 08:18

  本文关键词: 尼克松政府 “新东方”政策 基辛格 勃兰特 出处:《浙江师范大学》2011年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:1969年10月,社会民主党领导人维利·勃兰特当选为联邦德国新一届政府总理。勃兰特在上台伊始便着手推行自己的“新东方”政策,意图缓和与苏联、民主德国及其它东欧国家之间的紧张关系。远在大洋彼岸的美国尼克松政府是如何看待西德在东方政策上的这一重大变化?面对联邦德国与苏联及其它东欧国家关系的改善,尼克松政府又是采取了怎样的态度和应对策略?有哪些因素影响了尼克松政府在这些问题上的决策?对于这些问题,目前尚未引起国内学术界的注意,偶有涉及,也仅是概括性的论述。笔者通过研究和整理尼克松政府时期的对德外交档案、总统公开文件以及中情局报告等史料,并结合西方学术界近年来涌现出的相关论著及当事者回忆录,试图深入探讨尼克松政府对“新东方”政策的态度及相应对策。本文主要由四个部分组成: 第一部分考察战后历届美国政府在联邦德国东方政策上的态度。出于对抗苏联的考虑,五十年代的艾森豪威尔政府支持西德阿登纳政府对东方的强硬政策。然而在第二次柏林危机及古巴导弹危机后,美苏关系逐渐趋于“缓和”,联邦德国僵硬的东方政策在这一大背景下显得越发的孤立。意图缓和与苏联紧张关系的肯尼迪、约翰逊政府都曾希望联邦德国改变其僵硬的东方政策,美德双方在这一问题上的矛盾在一定程度上导致了六十年代末联邦德国在东方政策上的转向以及社会民主党人勃兰特的上台。 第二部分研究尼克松政府初期对“新东方”政策的看法和态度。出于国内外诸多因素的综合考虑,尼克松政府初期对“新东方”政策采取了观望的态度。美国在联邦德国与苏联的谈判以及联邦德国与东欧其它国家的谈判中采取了“不介入”政策,对德国人的谈判不加干涉。在柏林问题上,尼克松政府的态度也较为消极。 第三部分论述尼克松政府对“新东方”政策的态度转变。为了将“新东方”政策纳入美国对苏缓和的战略轨道上,控制“新东方”政策的走向,尼克松政府决定以柏林谈判为切入点,积极介入“新东方”政策。在柏林问题和东方条约的批准问题上尼克松政府给予勃兰特政府积极的帮助。美国的积极介入确保“新东方”政策的顺利实施,同时也将该政策成功的纳入了对苏缓和的轨道上。 第四部分分析影响尼克松政府对“新东方”政策考量的各种因素。在诸多因素之中,来自苏联方面的影响可以说是最为重要和直接的。尼克松政府在初期对该政策的担忧也主要是害怕联邦德国与苏联关系过于密切。之后尼克松政府对“新东方”政策的介入在很大程度上也是为美苏“缓和”这一大局服务。作为美国在西欧的重要盟国,英、法两国在“新东方”政策上的态度也对尼克松政府产生了一定的影响。除此之外,尼克松总统本人对于当时国际形势的分析与判断,以及此届政府独特的外交运作方式也对尼克松政府在“新东方”政策上产生了重要的影响。
[Abstract]:In October 1969, the Social Democratic Party leader Willy Brandt was elected as the new Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. Brandt embarked on his "new" policy on the stage at the beginning, the intention of detente with the Soviet Union, tensions between East Germany and other Eastern European countries. The Nixon administration in the United States far across the ocean is how to treat this policy in the East West a major change? In the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries improved, the Nixon administration is to take what attitudes and policies? What are the factors that influence the decision-making of the Nixon administration on? For these problems, at present domestic has not yet attracted the attention of the academic circles, sometimes involved, it is only a general in this paper. Through the study and arrangement of the Nixon administration on German diplomatic archives, President of public documents and the CIA report In the light of historical data, combined with western academic circles in recent years, related publications and reminiscences of the parties, we attempt to further explore Nixon administration's attitude towards New Oriental Policy and corresponding countermeasures. This paper is mainly composed of four parts.
The first part of the study of postwar American government attitudes in the East Policy on the Federal Republic of Germany against the Soviet Union. For consideration, Adenauer's tough policy on the west east Eisenhower government support in 50s. However in the second Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis, the US Soviet relations tends to be "moderate", rigid Eastern Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany this background is becoming more and more isolated. Detente with the Soviet Union, Kennedy, the Johnson administration had hoped the Federal Republic of Germany changed its stiff East policy, both in virtue of this issue contradiction led to a certain extent, at the end of 60s the Federal Republic of Germany's Eastern policy direction and the Social Democrats Brandt came to power.
The views and attitudes of the "New Oriental" policy on the second part of the early Nixon government. For comprehensive consideration of many factors at home and abroad, the early Nixon government adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards Ostpolitik. The United States adopted a "non intervention" policy in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union negotiations and the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries in Eastern Europe the Germans, the negotiations without interference. In Berlin, the Nixon administration's attitude is very negative.
The third part discusses the change of Nixon's attitudes towards Ostpolitik. In order to Ostpolitik into the United States on the strategic track detente, to control the "New Oriental" policy, the Nixon administration decided to Berlin negotiations as the starting point, and actively involved in the "New Oriental" policy. In the approval of the issue of Berlin and the east of the treaty the Nixon administration to give Brandt government actively help. The active involvement of the United States to ensure the smooth implementation of the "New Oriental" policy, but also the success of the policy of detente into orbit.
The fourth part analyzes the various factors that influence the Nixon administration considerations of Ostpolitik. Among those factors, the influence from the Soviet Union can be said to be the most important and direct. The Nixon administration in the early of the policy concerns is also afraid of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union too close. After the Nixon government intervention "the new policy is largely for the United States and the Soviet Union" Relaxation "of the overall services. As the important allies of the US in Western Europe, Britain, and France attitude towards Ostpolitik also of the Nixon administration has produced certain effect. In addition, President Nixon himself for the analysis and judgement of the international situation at that time, the government and the unique diplomacy of Nixon government played an important role in the" New Oriental "policy.

【学位授予单位】:浙江师范大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2011
【分类号】:K712.54;K516.4

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