非对等同盟的游戏规则：日美“核密约”问题新论

发布时间：2018-02-04 05:54

本文关键词： 日美同盟日美外交 “核密约”问题　出处：《复旦大学》2012年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：本文考察1960年《日美安保条约》签订时的“核密约”问题,旨在更准确把握历史事实、更宽视野理解历史真相,探索历史事件内在规律。外交史研究的基础是史料,特别是解密档案等直接史料。基于史料分析可以发现：所谓“搭载核武器的美国军舰临时停靠日本港口”问题在被疑为是“核密约”的《讨论记录》中并未提及,也不在1960年《日美安保条约》的空间适用范围之内,因此不能认定《讨论记录》是关于该事项的“核密约”。应从宏观历史背景分析揭示“核密约”问题的历史真相。“核密约”问题的时代背景是东西方紧张对立的冷战初期,当事双方是曾经的占领国与被占领国、现在的盟国,涉及到攸关战略利益和国家最高机密的核问题。出于冷战形势及各自核心利益的需要,日美两国采取了一系列或公开或秘密的外交方式,既保证了美国保守核机密、维持核威慑、完成核部署的利益,也实现了日本政府应对国内反对势力、避免引起周边国家的戒备和对抗的目的,可谓是“双赢”的外交结果。日美之间形式上对等而实质上非对等的同盟关系决定了日美之间独特的“双面外交”行为模式,一面是公开外交,体现了日美同盟形式上的对等,另一面是秘密外交,体现了日美同盟实质上的非对等。更规范而言,本研究中的自变量是日美同盟关系的性质；因变量是日美之间的外交行为模式——本文将这一现象称之为“非对等同盟的游戏规则”。日美同盟的性质决定了日美外交的基本行为模式。1960年《日美安保条约》虽然在法律上实现了日美之间的地位平等,但日美同盟的根本属性仍然是非对等的。日本必须服从、服务于美国在全球特别是亚太地区的战略利益。由日美同盟性质决定的“双面外交”行为模式是“核密约”问题背后的游戏规则,也是支配日美外交关系的历史规则。
[Abstract]:This paper examines the issue of "Nuclear Security Treaty" when the Japan-US Security Treaty was signed on 1960, in order to grasp the historical facts more accurately, to understand the historical truth more broadly and to explore the inherent law of historical events. The study of diplomatic history is based on historical data. Based on the analysis of historical data, it can be found that the so-called "temporary docking of American warships carrying nuclear weapons at Japanese ports" is suspected to be a "nuclear secret treaty." Is not mentioned in the discussion record of. Nor is it within the spatial scope of the Japanese-US Security Treaty of 1960, so it cannot be assumed that the record of discussion is a "secret treaty" on the matter. The historical truth of the "nuclear secret treaty" problem should be revealed from the macroscopic historical background analysis. The background of the "nuclear secret treaty" problem is the beginning of the cold war, which is the tension between the East and the West, and the two parties concerned are the former occupying power and the occupied power. Today's allies are involved in the nuclear issue of strategic interests and the country's top secret. Due to the cold war situation and the needs of their respective core interests, Japan and the United States have adopted a series of open or secret diplomatic methods. It not only guarantees the interests of the United States in keeping nuclear secrets, maintaining nuclear deterrence, and accomplishing nuclear deployment, but also achieves the Japanese government's goal of responding to domestic opposition forces and avoiding the alarm and confrontation of neighboring countries. It can be described as a "win-win" diplomatic outcome. The alliance relationship between Japan and the United States in form and in essence determines the unique mode of "dual diplomacy" between Japan and the United States. On the one hand, it is open diplomacy, which embodies the formal equivalence of the alliance between Japan and the United States. The other side is secret diplomacy, which reflects the non-equivalence in essence of Japan-US alliance. More normative, the independent variable in this study is the nature of Japan-US alliance; The dependent variable is the mode of diplomatic behavior between Japan and the United States. The nature of the Japan-US alliance determines the basic behavior pattern of Japanese-US diplomacy. In 1960, the Japan-US Security Treaty realized the equality of status between Japan and the United States in law. But the fundamental attributes of the Japanese-US alliance are still non-reciprocal. Japan must obey. Serving the strategic interests of the United States in the world, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, the "dual diplomacy" behavior pattern determined by the nature of the Japan-US alliance is the rule of the game behind the "Nuclear Compact" issue. It is also the historical rule governing the diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.
【学位授予单位】：复旦大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2012
【分类号】：K153

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