美国总统与国会的战争决策权之争

发布时间：2018-02-23 17:03

本文关键词： 美国外交总统国会战争决策权　出处：《北京外国语大学》2005年博士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：由于宪法确立的分权和制衡体制,在美国建国两百多年来所进行的大大小小的战争中,总统与国会关于战争决策权力的斗争一直持续不断,成为总统与国会争夺外交决策权力斗争的核心内容之一。研究总统与国会关于战争决策权力的斗争不但可以考察美国的战争决策机制和决策模式,而且可以更加深入地了解美国外交政策制订过程中总统与国会的相互作用和影响。越战以来,对战争决策权之争的研究在美国学界成为热点,但美国学者的研究大多是从宪法或法律角度进行讨论或围绕《战权决议》进行个案研究,其着眼点往往在于总统和国会谁应拥有战争决策权力的法律或政治论争,摒弃个人立场对战争决策实践的综合历史研究并不多见。国内目前对此问题的研究多限于对战争权力之争特别是对《战权决议》的一般性介绍,鲜有比较全面或深入的研究成果。本文的写作目的就在于从一定程度上弥补现有研究之不足。论文对美国建国以来总统与国会关于战争决策权力的斗争进行了综合历史研究,全面考察了美国战争决策实践在各个历史时期的发展变化及其国际国内政治背景,分析并总结了总统战争决策权扩展的阶段、成因、和总统扩展权力的手法,以及总统和国会在战争决策中的互动模式及影响互动模式的国内外因素,同时,论文对战争决策权之争的性质及未来发展也进行了试探性定位和分析。论文以历史分析和案例分析为主要研究方法,以“府院政治互动过程”研究模式为主要分析工具,在两个层面上进行了分析研究:对战争决策权之争和战争决策实践的历史综合研究及对战争决策案例的具体分析考察。论文主要内容如下: 首先,论文阐述了战争决策权之争的法律框架和总统与国会对相关法律条文的不同解读。战争决策权之争的根源在于美国宪法的分权和制衡原则,宪法对大部分战争权力进行了明确的划分,但在决策权的归属上并不十分明确,从而导致行政与立法部门对宪法条文解读不一,在实践中引发了持续不断的府院之争。二战以后,《联合国宪章》以及《里约热内卢条约》、《北大西洋公约》、《东南亚共同防御条约》等同盟条约的签署都涉及到战争决策权力问题并引发争论,国会亦先后通过《联合国参与法案》及《战权决议》,试图对战争决策权力加以明确,但结果仍然是总统与国会对相关法律条文各自解读,使战争决策权之争更为复杂。而负责解释宪法和联邦法律的法院则竭力置身事外,以各种理由回避对战争决策权的归属做出判决,遂致府院之争无休无
[Abstract]:As a result of the separation of powers and checks and balances established by the Constitution, the struggle between the President and Congress over the power to make decisions on war has continued throughout the wars of the United States over the past 200 years or so. To become one of the core contents of the struggle between the President and Congress for the power of diplomatic decision-making. Studying the struggle between the President and Congress on the power to make decisions on war can not only examine the decision-making mechanism and mode of war in the United States. Moreover, we can gain a deeper understanding of the interaction and influence between the President and Congress in the process of making American foreign policy. Since the Vietnam War, the research on the war decision-making power has become a hot topic in American academic circles. However, most of the American scholars' research is carried out from the angle of constitution or law or case study around "War right Resolution". The focus is often on the legal or political debate between the president and Congress about who should have the power to make war decisions. It is rare to study the comprehensive history of war decision making practice without personal stand. At present, domestic research on this issue is limited to a general introduction to the war power struggle, especially to the "War right Resolution". The purpose of this thesis is to make up for the deficiency of the existing research to some extent. This paper makes a comprehensive historical study on the struggle between the President and Congress on the power of war decision-making since the founding of the United States, and comprehensively examines the development and changes of the practice of war decision-making in the United States in various historical periods, as well as the political background at home and abroad. This paper analyzes and summarizes the stages and causes of the expansion of the President's decision-making power in war, the means of the expansion of the power of the President, the interactive mode between the President and the Congress in the war decision, and the domestic and foreign factors affecting the interactive mode, at the same time, The thesis also makes a tentative analysis of the nature and future development of the war decision-making power. The thesis takes the historical analysis and case analysis as the main research methods, and the research model of "the process of political interaction between the House and the Yuan" as the main analysis tool. Two levels of analysis and research are carried out: the historical comprehensive study of the war decision-making power and the practice of war decision making and the concrete analysis and investigation of war decision making cases. The main contents of the thesis are as follows:. First of all, the paper expounds the legal framework of the war decision-making power dispute and the different interpretations of the relevant legal provisions between the President and Congress. The root of the war decision-making power dispute lies in the separation of powers and checks and balances of the United States Constitution. Most of the war powers are clearly divided by the Constitution, but the attribution of the decision-making power is not very clear, which leads to different interpretations of the articles between the executive and the legislature. After World War II, the signing of the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, the Treaty of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Treaty on Common Defense in Southeast Asia, and so on, all related to war. The power to make decisions is a matter of debate, Congress also passed the UN participation Act and the Warfare Resolution one after another, trying to clarify the power of war decision-making, but as a result, the President and Congress still interpreted the relevant legal provisions separately. The court responsible for interpreting the constitution and federal law tried to stay out of the matter and, for various reasons, avoided the decision on the attribution of the power of war decision making, thus resulting in a dispute between the government and the house of government...
【学位授予单位】：北京外国语大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2005
【分类号】：K712

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