马歇尔调停使命之东北调停
发布时间:2018-08-04 21:22
【摘要】:1946年是二战胜利后的第一年,也是牵系中国前途与命运的关键一年。这一年,中国面临战争与和平的历史抉择,国共关系的处理问题深刻影响着中国的未来和当时的远东国际关系格局。此时马歇尔带着和平的使命来调处国共之间可能引发的内战,而马歇尔调处使命的重点和难点是东北问题。本文通过对1945年12月马歇尔来华,到1947年1月离开中国这段时间,马歇尔对中国东北的调停过程作了简单的梳理,尤其是对调停开始到东北六月停战这一段时间马歇尔对东北内战的态度和奉行的策略以及东北调停的成功与失败作了粗浅的探讨。 纵观马歇尔东北调停的过程,大致可分为三个阶段。第一阶段是1945年12月至3月,经历了马歇尔与国共之间的初次会谈、一月谈判、政协会议和整军谈判几个时期,签署了一系列协议,使中国局势包括东北局势暂时得以稳定,国共冲突得以控制,中国出现了前所未有的和平局面,在这一阶段马歇尔对东北的调停是积极有效的;第二阶段是1946年3月至6月,从有名无实的东北军调小组徒劳地调停到东北战事愈演愈烈,直至于事无补的六月停战,在这一阶段,协议不断遭到践踏,冲突逐步升级,调停陷入僵局,最终爆发全面内战:最后一阶段,1946年7月到1947年1月,表面是谈判,实际是战酣,所谓调停已并无实际意义。 本文在论述中,主要侧重于对第一和第二阶段的东北调停。笔者认为马歇尔在调停过程中始终愿意保持客观公正的调处态度和方式,只不过马歇尔的个人意愿和美国的政策之间存在无法调和的矛盾,使得马歇尔越到调处后期越具有压共助蒋的倾向。在调处过程中,东北若停战,则关内相安无事,东北若大打,关内就容易兵戎相见,东北内战是国共内战的缩影也是影响全局的关键。无论国民党还是共产党都是一个独立的政党,在东北问题上又都十分看重,都希望在停战谈判中获得更多的权益,最终的结果是国民党认为马歇尔没有全力支持国民政府,共产党责怪马歇尔是促蒋挑起内战。在调处时期,大多数时期是共产党处于优势,国民党自恃武力,经常最先发难,导致马歇尔在个人情感上往往同情共产党,责怪国民党,但出于美国战略利益考虑,马歇尔又实际上支持国民党,逼迫共产党。由此,形成了复杂的、矛盾的、变幻的东北局势。值得注意的是,美国在东北问题上支持国民党,使得国民党最终敢于发动内战。苏联采取不干预政策,对中共也有很大助力,它在一定程度上牵制了美国对东北国民党军队的援助,也提供了中共要求美国完全退出中国的有力借口。总之,东北问题是中国的内政,但在当时国际环境中,在马歇尔所代表的美国的影响下,又成为美苏角力的场所。
[Abstract]:1946 was the first year after the victory of World War II and a crucial year for China's future and destiny. This year, China was faced with the historical choice of war and peace. The handling of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had a profound impact on the future of China and the pattern of international relations in the far East at that time. At this time, Marshall took the mission of peace to mediate the possible civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the focus and difficulty of Marshall's mission was the Northeast issue. In this paper, Marshall made a brief combing of the mediation process in Northeast China during the period of Marshall's coming to China in December 1945 and leaving China in January 1947. In particular, Marshall's attitude and strategy to the Northeast Civil War during the period from the beginning of mediation to the armistice in June in Northeast China and the success and failure of mediation in Northeast China were discussed. The process of Marshall's mediation in Northeast China can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from December to March 1945. After the initial talks between Marshall and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the January talks, the CPPCC session and the military integration negotiations, a series of agreements were signed, so that the situation in China, including the situation in the Northeast, was temporarily stabilized. The conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was brought under control, and there was unprecedented peace in China, during which Marshall's mediation in the Northeast was active and effective; the second stage was from March to June 1946. From the vain mediation of the nominal Northeast military Coordination Group to the intensification of the northeast war, until the futile June armistice, the agreement was constantly trampled on, the conflict escalated, and the mediation reached an impasse. Finally, a full-scale civil war broke out: the last stage, from July 1946 to January 1947, was ostensibly a negotiation, but in fact a war of war, and the so-called mediation had no practical meaning. In this paper, the main focus on the first and second stages of Northeast mediation. The author believes that Marshall is willing to maintain an objective and impartial attitude and manner in the process of mediation, but there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Marshall's personal will and American policy. The more Marshall to the later period of mediation, the more pressure to help Chiang. In the process of mediation, if the Northeast armistice, there will be peace within the Northeast, if the Northeast to fight, it is easy to battle, the Northeast Civil War is the epitome of the KMT civil war is also the key to the overall situation. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party is an independent political party, and they all attach great importance to the issue of the Northeast and all hope to gain more rights and interests in the armistice negotiations. The final result is that the KMT believes that Marshall did not fully support the National Government. The Communists blamed Marshall for provoking civil war. During the period of mediation, most of the time the Communist Party was in the ascendancy, and the Kuomintang, relying on military force, often made the first attack, which led Marshall to sympathize with the Communist Party and blame the Kuomintang on his personal feelings, but in view of the strategic interests of the United States, Marshall actually supported the Kuomintang and forced the Communist Party. As a result, a complex, contradictory, changing situation in the Northeast. It is worth noting that the United States supported the Kuomintang on the northeast issue, making the Kuomintang finally dare to launch a civil war. The Soviet Union's policy of non-intervention has also helped the Chinese Communists greatly. To a certain extent, it has restrained the United States' assistance to the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast and provided a powerful excuse for the Chinese Communists to demand that the United States withdraw completely from China. In short, the Northeast issue was China's internal affairs, but in the international environment at that time, under the influence of the United States represented by Marshall, it became the arena for the United States and the Soviet Union to wrestle.
【学位授予单位】:安徽大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:K266;K712.54
本文编号:2165188
[Abstract]:1946 was the first year after the victory of World War II and a crucial year for China's future and destiny. This year, China was faced with the historical choice of war and peace. The handling of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party had a profound impact on the future of China and the pattern of international relations in the far East at that time. At this time, Marshall took the mission of peace to mediate the possible civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and the focus and difficulty of Marshall's mission was the Northeast issue. In this paper, Marshall made a brief combing of the mediation process in Northeast China during the period of Marshall's coming to China in December 1945 and leaving China in January 1947. In particular, Marshall's attitude and strategy to the Northeast Civil War during the period from the beginning of mediation to the armistice in June in Northeast China and the success and failure of mediation in Northeast China were discussed. The process of Marshall's mediation in Northeast China can be divided into three stages. The first stage was from December to March 1945. After the initial talks between Marshall and the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the January talks, the CPPCC session and the military integration negotiations, a series of agreements were signed, so that the situation in China, including the situation in the Northeast, was temporarily stabilized. The conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was brought under control, and there was unprecedented peace in China, during which Marshall's mediation in the Northeast was active and effective; the second stage was from March to June 1946. From the vain mediation of the nominal Northeast military Coordination Group to the intensification of the northeast war, until the futile June armistice, the agreement was constantly trampled on, the conflict escalated, and the mediation reached an impasse. Finally, a full-scale civil war broke out: the last stage, from July 1946 to January 1947, was ostensibly a negotiation, but in fact a war of war, and the so-called mediation had no practical meaning. In this paper, the main focus on the first and second stages of Northeast mediation. The author believes that Marshall is willing to maintain an objective and impartial attitude and manner in the process of mediation, but there is an irreconcilable contradiction between Marshall's personal will and American policy. The more Marshall to the later period of mediation, the more pressure to help Chiang. In the process of mediation, if the Northeast armistice, there will be peace within the Northeast, if the Northeast to fight, it is easy to battle, the Northeast Civil War is the epitome of the KMT civil war is also the key to the overall situation. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Communist Party is an independent political party, and they all attach great importance to the issue of the Northeast and all hope to gain more rights and interests in the armistice negotiations. The final result is that the KMT believes that Marshall did not fully support the National Government. The Communists blamed Marshall for provoking civil war. During the period of mediation, most of the time the Communist Party was in the ascendancy, and the Kuomintang, relying on military force, often made the first attack, which led Marshall to sympathize with the Communist Party and blame the Kuomintang on his personal feelings, but in view of the strategic interests of the United States, Marshall actually supported the Kuomintang and forced the Communist Party. As a result, a complex, contradictory, changing situation in the Northeast. It is worth noting that the United States supported the Kuomintang on the northeast issue, making the Kuomintang finally dare to launch a civil war. The Soviet Union's policy of non-intervention has also helped the Chinese Communists greatly. To a certain extent, it has restrained the United States' assistance to the Kuomintang troops in the Northeast and provided a powerful excuse for the Chinese Communists to demand that the United States withdraw completely from China. In short, the Northeast issue was China's internal affairs, but in the international environment at that time, under the influence of the United States represented by Marshall, it became the arena for the United States and the Soviet Union to wrestle.
【学位授予单位】:安徽大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:K266;K712.54
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