二十世纪三十年代初美国的远东政策
发布时间：2018-08-28 18:10
【摘要】：1929-1933年的世界经济大危机使日本陷入绝境,日本统治阶级迫切需要寻找原料产地和消费市场来摆脱经济危机。而物产富饶的东北恰好满足这个条件,更为重要的是华盛顿《九国公约》并没有对东北作出明确的规定,它成了华盛顿体系中最薄弱的环节。所以,日本军国主义者就把它看做是摧毁华盛顿体系的突破口。 日本发动“九·一八”事变的时机是经过精心选择的,自从经济危机发生后,美国政府忙于应付国丙的经济危机,对世界上除经济以外的事务显得力不从心。由于美国在中国的投资在他所有的对外投资中所占比例本来就小,在满洲的投资更是微乎其微,所以日本判断如果它在中国东北进行侵略,美国进行干涉的可能性是非常小的。在各种因素的推动下,日本发动了“九·一八”事变。后来,日本为了配合其在满洲的侵略转移国际视线,镇压中国民间的反日运动,威逼国民政府承认日本侵略的既成事实,又发动了“一·二八”事变,“一·二八”事变后日本又试图着手把华北从中国分裂出去。 “九·一八”事变发生后基于以下原因导致了美国反应缓慢,偏向软弱。首先,随着二十年代和平运动的兴起,国际间一些和平协定的签订,美国的统治者思想麻痹了,他们沉浸在虚幻的和平中,对突发事变的准备不足。再者,事变发生后,美国政府一度产生误判,认为这只是地方冲突而已,是关东军擅自采取的行动,日本政府并没有参与。美国高层幻想依靠日本的文官政府制止军部的冒险,因而事变之初美国没有采取具体的行动,而是采取静观其变的方针,失去了最佳的干预时机。还有不容忽视的是,美国政府内部的不同意见也耽误了危机的处理。只是在日军轰炸锦州后,美国对日本的态度才开始趋于强硬,而所谓的强硬也只限于口头上和道义上的谴责。当日本攻占锦州,形成入关之势时,考虑到这有可能严重损害美国的利益,美国发出了“九·一八”事变发生以来最强硬的照会——“不承认主义”照会,表示美国政府不承认日本通过武力非法改变的远东秩序,。 严格的说,“一·二八”事变是”九·一八”事变的一部分。日本发动“一·二八”事变的主要目的是为了转移世界对东北的关注,好让满洲国粉末登场。针对日本发动“一·二八”事变美国反应迅速,它一方面迅速出面进行调解,并向日本抗议。另一方面不断调集兵力以防不测兼给日本施加压力。另外,和“九·一八”发生时美国的反应不一样的是,美国注意联合其他列强和国联给日本施加强大的国际压力。总之,美国这次反应和行动是迅速的、直接的和果断的,并且能够主动利用国际社会的力量,给日本施加压力,但是还不够强硬,没有采取经济制裁等有力手段对日本的侵略加以遏制。 “一·二八”事变后,随着李顿调查团报告书的出炉,中日两国围绕着调查团报告书在国联展开斗争。就在英国想要和日本妥协时,史汀生在征得新总统罗斯福的同意后发表了有利于中国的照会。这则照会在世界上引起了强烈的反响,此举使国联避免了向日本妥协的危险。 此后,日本加紧侵略中国北方,造成华北事变,中国为了赢得备战的时间在不断抵抗的同时又不断妥协。美国也在此期间加紧支持中国,比如通过棉麦贷款增强中国的国力。但是美国又是利己主义的国家,它为了一己私利不顾中国的反对通过《购银法案》,人为地抬高银价,造成中国白银严重外流,给中国经济带来了极大地损害。罗斯福总统上台后,为了集中精力解决经济问题,在远东问题上采取了,少说多做的方针。在避免与日本发生正面冲突的前提下,继续实行“不承认主义”政策。在罗斯福主政的前几年美国远东政策一直是比较保守的,但保守中也蕴含着变化。为了应付日后可能发生的美日太平洋争霸,美国一方面加强其军事实力特别是海军的实力,另一方面,为了延缓日美冲突的到来和制衡日本,美国政府采取睦邻政策改善同日本以及苏俄的关系。
[Abstract]:The Great World Economic Crisis of 1929-1933 put Japan in a desperate position. The ruling class of Japan urgently needed to find the source of raw materials and consumer markets to get rid of the economic crisis. The weakest link. So the Japanese militarists saw it as a breakthrough to destroy the Washington system.
The timing of the September 18th Incident in Japan was carefully chosen. Since the economic crisis, the U.S. government has been busy dealing with the economic crisis of the third country, which makes it difficult to deal with the world's economic affairs except economic affairs. Japan judged that if it invaded Northeast China, the possibility of American intervention was very small. Under the impetus of various factors, Japan launched the September 18th Incident. The people's government acknowledged the fait accompli of Japanese aggression and launched the "January 28" Incident. After the "January 28" Incident, Japan tried to split North China from China.
First of all, with the rise of the peace movement in the 1920s and the signing of some international peace agreements, the rulers of the United States were paralyzed. They were immersed in illusory peace and were not prepared for emergencies. At one point, the U.S. government misjudged it as a local conflict, an unauthorized action by the Kwangtung Army, and the Japanese government did not participate. It is also important to note that differences within the U.S. government also delayed the handling of the crisis. It was only after the Japanese bombing of Jinzhou that the U.S. attitude towards Japan began to become tough, and so-called toughness was limited to verbal and moral condemnation. Can seriously harm the interests of the United States, the United States issued the strongest note since the September 18th Incident - "non-recognition" note, indicating that the United States Government does not recognize Japan through force to illegally change the Far East order.
Strictly speaking, the Jan. 28 Incident was part of the September 18 Incident. The main purpose of the Jan. 28 Incident was to divert the world's attention from the Northeast so that Manchukuo powder could be put on the scene. The United States reacted quickly to the Jan. 28 Incident. On the one hand, it mediated quickly and went to Japan for mediation. This protest. On the other hand, the United States is constantly mobilizing its forces to prevent accidental and concurrent pressure on Japan. In addition, unlike the response of the United States at the time of September 18th, the United States pays attention to bringing together other powers and the League of Nations to exert strong international pressure on Japan. It can take the initiative to use the strength of the international community to exert pressure on Japan, but it is not strong enough to take economic sanctions and other powerful means to contain Japan's aggression.
After the January 28 Incident, with the release of the report of the Lighton Mission, China and Japan fought against the League of Nations around the report of the Lighton Mission. Just as Britain wanted to compromise with Japan, Stimson issued a note in favour of China with the consent of the new President Roosevelt. The note aroused strong repercussions around the world, and this was the case. The union avoided the danger of compromise with Japan.
Since then, Japan has stepped up its aggression against northern China, causing the North China Incident. China has been resisting and compromising in order to win the time to prepare for war. The United States has also stepped up its support for China during this period, such as strengthening China's national strength through cotton and wheat loans. After President Roosevelt took office, he adopted the policy of doing more than saying on the Far East in order to concentrate on solving economic problems. On the premise of avoiding a positive conflict with Japan, he continued to implement the policy of "no recognition". In the early years of Roosevelt's administration, the Far East policy of the United States was conservative, but conservative also implied changes. In order to cope with the possible future U.S. -Japan Pacific hegemony, the United States on the one hand strengthened its military strength, especially the naval strength, on the other hand, in order to delay the arrival of the Japanese-American conflict and balance Japan. The US government has adopted a good neighbourly policy to improve relations with Japan and Russia.
【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：K712
本文编号：2210170
[Abstract]:The Great World Economic Crisis of 1929-1933 put Japan in a desperate position. The ruling class of Japan urgently needed to find the source of raw materials and consumer markets to get rid of the economic crisis. The weakest link. So the Japanese militarists saw it as a breakthrough to destroy the Washington system.
The timing of the September 18th Incident in Japan was carefully chosen. Since the economic crisis, the U.S. government has been busy dealing with the economic crisis of the third country, which makes it difficult to deal with the world's economic affairs except economic affairs. Japan judged that if it invaded Northeast China, the possibility of American intervention was very small. Under the impetus of various factors, Japan launched the September 18th Incident. The people's government acknowledged the fait accompli of Japanese aggression and launched the "January 28" Incident. After the "January 28" Incident, Japan tried to split North China from China.
First of all, with the rise of the peace movement in the 1920s and the signing of some international peace agreements, the rulers of the United States were paralyzed. They were immersed in illusory peace and were not prepared for emergencies. At one point, the U.S. government misjudged it as a local conflict, an unauthorized action by the Kwangtung Army, and the Japanese government did not participate. It is also important to note that differences within the U.S. government also delayed the handling of the crisis. It was only after the Japanese bombing of Jinzhou that the U.S. attitude towards Japan began to become tough, and so-called toughness was limited to verbal and moral condemnation. Can seriously harm the interests of the United States, the United States issued the strongest note since the September 18th Incident - "non-recognition" note, indicating that the United States Government does not recognize Japan through force to illegally change the Far East order.
Strictly speaking, the Jan. 28 Incident was part of the September 18 Incident. The main purpose of the Jan. 28 Incident was to divert the world's attention from the Northeast so that Manchukuo powder could be put on the scene. The United States reacted quickly to the Jan. 28 Incident. On the one hand, it mediated quickly and went to Japan for mediation. This protest. On the other hand, the United States is constantly mobilizing its forces to prevent accidental and concurrent pressure on Japan. In addition, unlike the response of the United States at the time of September 18th, the United States pays attention to bringing together other powers and the League of Nations to exert strong international pressure on Japan. It can take the initiative to use the strength of the international community to exert pressure on Japan, but it is not strong enough to take economic sanctions and other powerful means to contain Japan's aggression.
After the January 28 Incident, with the release of the report of the Lighton Mission, China and Japan fought against the League of Nations around the report of the Lighton Mission. Just as Britain wanted to compromise with Japan, Stimson issued a note in favour of China with the consent of the new President Roosevelt. The note aroused strong repercussions around the world, and this was the case. The union avoided the danger of compromise with Japan.
Since then, Japan has stepped up its aggression against northern China, causing the North China Incident. China has been resisting and compromising in order to win the time to prepare for war. The United States has also stepped up its support for China during this period, such as strengthening China's national strength through cotton and wheat loans. After President Roosevelt took office, he adopted the policy of doing more than saying on the Far East in order to concentrate on solving economic problems. On the premise of avoiding a positive conflict with Japan, he continued to implement the policy of "no recognition". In the early years of Roosevelt's administration, the Far East policy of the United States was conservative, but conservative also implied changes. In order to cope with the possible future U.S. -Japan Pacific hegemony, the United States on the one hand strengthened its military strength, especially the naval strength, on the other hand, in order to delay the arrival of the Japanese-American conflict and balance Japan. The US government has adopted a good neighbourly policy to improve relations with Japan and Russia.
【学位授予单位】：安徽大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2011
【分类号】：K712
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